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A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP
ON THE CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SYSTEM
PETER K. YU*
Today, the Chinese intellectual property system has garnered considerable
global policy and scholarly attention. To help develop a more sophisticated,
complex, and nuanced understanding, this Article reviews the past five decades
of English-language scholarship on the system. It begins by creating a taxonomy
of this body of literature based on the most common method—chronology. It then
turns to an alternative method of organizing and categorizing scholarly
literature—disciplinary focus. The second half of the Article identifies the
continuing challenges to researchers studying the Chinese intellectual property
system. It further explains why it is important for intellectual property scholars
to study China and for China scholars to study intellectual property
developments. The Article concludes with some observations on the future
directions in scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system.
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INTRODUCTION
The first modern Chinese intellectual property law was established
in August 1982, offering protection to trademarks.1 Although that law
was primitive by today’s standards, it launched China’s journey into the
world of modern intellectual property protection. Two years later,
China adopted a modern patent law,2 which has since been revised
three times and is currently undergoing yet another revision.3 In the
early 1990s, China also adopted a copyright law4 and a law against
unfair competition.5 While the former is currently being amended for
the third time,6 the latter recently underwent its first complete

1. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983) (China)
[hereinafter 1982 Trademark Law].
2. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) (China).
3. Since its adoption, the Patent Law has been amended in September 1992,
August 2000, and December 2008. The fourth revision of the Patent Law is currently
under consideration.
4. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) (China)
[hereinafter 1990 Copyright Law].
5. Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective
Dec. 1, 1993) (China).
6. Since its adoption, the Copyright Law has been amended in October 2001 and
February 2010. The last amendment was not a complete overhaul, but was adopted
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overhaul.7
In December 2001, China became the 143rd member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).8 Such membership requires the country
to, among other obligations, abide by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights9 (TRIPS Agreement), the most
comprehensive intellectual property agreement ever adopted by the
international community. In the past decade, China has also actively
participated in the negotiation of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade
agreements,10 including most notably the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP).11
Today, the Chinese intellectual property system has garnered
considerable global policy and scholarly attention. Based on the
statistics compiled by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), China had the world’s second largest number of international
applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty12 in 2017,
behind only the United States.13 Among corporate applicants, Chinabased Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation had the first and

primarily to implement a WTO panel report. See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1097–98 (2011) (discussing the amendment of Article 4
of the Chinese Copyright Law in an effort to comply with the WTO panel report).
7. Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective
Jan. 1, 2018) (China).
8. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s
Accession (Nov. 11, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm.
9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 288–95 (discussing the scholarship covering
these topics).
11. For the Author’s discussions of the RCEP negotiations, see generally Peter K.
Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in GOVERNING
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: REGULATORY
DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al.
eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future of Copyright Normsetting in the AsiaPacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC?
JUXTAPOSING
HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY (Susan Corbett & Jessica Lai eds., forthcoming
2018); Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 673 (2017).
12. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231.
13. Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_201
7.pdf (last visited May 9, 2018).
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second largest volume of international patent applications, respectively.14
For the same year, China ranked third in the number of international
trademark applications15 under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks and its related protocol.16
Despite these rather impressive figures, many policymakers,
commentators, and industry representatives continue to question the
quality of patents issued by the State Intellectual Property Office of
China (SIPO).17 They also lament the country’s inadequate levels of
intellectual property protection, which do not compare favorably with
those offered by other world leaders, such as the European Union or the
United States.18 Only last year, the United States Trade Representative
14. Id.
15. Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_
madrid_2017.pdf (last visited May 9, 2018).
16. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr.
14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967); Protocol Relating to
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 27,
1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-41.
17. As Dan Prud’homme observed,
While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also on the rise,
patent quality has not proportionately kept up and in fact the overall strength of
China’s actual innovation appears overhyped. Statistical analysis . . . not only
reveals concerning trends in the quality of China’s patents at present, but
suggests that while patent filings in China will likely continue to notably grow in
the future, patent quality may continue to lag these numbers.
DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE: HOW PATENT-RELATED POLICIES AND
PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 1 (2012) (emphasis omitted). See generally
Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478 (2012) (questioning the quality of Chinese patents
and offering suggestions for reform).
18. See, e.g., China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous
Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy, at xiv, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub. 4226
(May 2011) (Final) [hereinafter ITC Report], https://www.usitc.gov/publications/
332/pub4226.pdf (estimating that “firms in the U.S. [intellectual property]-intensive
economy that conducted business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately
$48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellectual property right]
infringement in China”); INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALL., 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT OF
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 6 (2017), http://www.iipawebsite.com/
rbc/2017/2017SPEC301CHINA.PDF (“China’s legacy of piracy continues to distort
the market, including by severely depressing licensing revenues, and its continued
pursuit of policies that deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. content producers
and distributers threatens to undermine the progress that has been achieved.”);
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 28 (2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FI
NAL.PDF (“Serious challenges in China continue to confront U.S. intellectual
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(USTR) launched an investigation of China under section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974.19 This investigation focused on Chinese laws, policies,
and practices in the areas of intellectual property, innovation, and
technology development.20 In the past two years, the USTR also placed
Alibaba’s Taobao on his list of notorious online markets.21
Regardless of one’s assessment of the Chinese intellectual property
system, there is no denying that China has made considerable progress
since the establishment of its modern intellectual property system in
the early 1980s. Indeed, no other country in history has achieved as
much in the intellectual property field in only three short decades.22
To a large extent, China is now entering a new, and somewhat
unprecedented, stage of development that warrants serious review and
rethinking. Not only has the country moved away from utilizing legal
transplants to modernize its intellectual property system,23 it has also
property (IP) right holders with respect to adequate and effective protection of IP, as
well as fair and equitable market access for U.S. persons that rely upon IP
protection.”).
19. Section 301 permits the U.S. President to investigate and impose sanctions on
countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic
interests. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2012); see also Press Release, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of
China (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section [hereinafter Section 301
Investigation Press Release].
20. Section 301 Investigation Press Release, supra note 19.
21. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 20–23 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/
Reports/2017%20Notorious%20Markets%20List%201.11.18.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 12–13
(2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-Markets.pdf.
22. See CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 568 n.13 (2008)
(quoting Árpád Bogsch, the former Director General of WIPO, as reportedly saying in
1994 that “China has accomplished all this at a speed unmatched in the history of
intellectual property protection”); Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades of
Development of the Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1, 15 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Building
the Ladder] (describing China’s effort to “build its present patent system from the
ground up” in only three decades as “a feat that no country has ever achieved”); Peter
K. Yu, Trade Secret Hacking, Online Data Breaches, and the China Cyberthreat, 2015 CARDOZO
L. REV. DE NOVO 130, 139 (stating that China “has built a new intellectual property
system from the ground up faster than any other country in history”); Jack Valenti,
Letter to the Editor, China’s Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at A26 (stating that
“China has accomplished what no other country has achieved” when it seized over
seven million video compact disks in response to the USTR’s pressure).
23. As I noted in an earlier article,
[T]he development of the Chinese intellectual property system has changed
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reached a crossroads that requires the country to devise its own
intellectual property strategy.24
As I noted in a recent special issue on the first thirty-five years of the
Chinese intellectual property system, that system is now entering the
proverbial middle age.25 It will therefore be interesting to see whether
the system will start hitting its prime or facing a hard-to-predict midlife crisis.26 Should the system hit its prime, it will make China an even
stronger global competitor than it is today. Such competition in turn
will lead to even more intense scrutiny. By contrast, if the system is
facing the proverbial mid-life crisis, its developments will become
erratic and perplexing. These developments will equally attract
attention. In short, regardless of its developments, China will feature
prominently in future international intellectual property debates.
To help develop a more sophisticated, complex, and nuanced
understanding of the Chinese intellectual property system, this Article
reviews the past five decades of English-language scholarship on the
system. Part I creates a taxonomy of this body of literature based on
the most common method—chronology. This Part contends that the
scholarship in the past half-century can be separated into five broad
phases that at times have been punctuated by isolated major incidents.
Each phase contains a fairly distinctive body of scholarship.
Part II turns to an alternative method of organizing and categorizing
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system—disciplinary
focus. While most scholarship in this area has focused on law and policy,
this Part identifies three other broadly defined multi-disciplinary clusters
from actively transplanting laws from abroad to introducing amendments that
are specifically tailored to rapidly changing local conditions. Although China
will continue to borrow from foreign models and experiences, the country’s
intellectual property system, to a large extent, has already aged beyond the
point where it can benefit significantly from copying models from abroad.
Instead, the country needs to start exploring models that would best suit its
needs, interests, conditions and priorities while figuring out how to improve
these models to maximize their benefits.
Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL.
PROP. 3, 6 (2018).
24. See STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
STRATEGY], http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm (providing
the outline of a new national intellectual property strategy).
25. See Yu, supra note 23, at 3 (“[A]s far as the modern Chinese intellectual property
system is concerned, it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that the system began
in the early to mid-1980s and is now entering, or approaching, its middle age.”).
26. See id.
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within which an expanding body of scholarship has emerged: (1)
philosophy and culture; (2) economics, innovation, and cultural
industries; and (3) politics and international relations. Described as the
interdisciplinary turn in scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system, this Part not only highlights the scholarship’s growing richness,
diversity, and sophistication, but also its increasing inter- and multidisciplinarity. The latter development is particularly interesting
because scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
became more inter- and multi-disciplinary just when intellectual
property scholarship in other areas moved in the same direction.
Part III identifies the continuing challenges to researchers studying
the Chinese intellectual property system. Taking note of the
considerably improved environment for undertaking research in this
area, brought about in part by the transparency requirements of the
TRIPS Agreement,27 this Part contends that the challenges confronting
researchers on the Chinese intellectual property system have greatly
reduced. Nevertheless, many challenges still remain and have
continued to hinder researchers in this area.
Part IV explores why it is imperative to study the Chinese intellectual
property system and its rapidly changing developments. This Part
underscores both the need for intellectual property scholars to study
China and for China scholars to study intellectual property
developments. This Part shows that scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system should be seen as facilitating a two-way
dialogue. This dialogue not only allows China scholars to explore how
the country addresses an issue that is of great importance to the outside
world, but also enables intellectual property scholars to examine a
system that has become increasingly influential at the global level.28
Part V concludes with some observations on the future directions in
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system. While these
observations build on nearly two decades of my research and are
undeniably personal, they draw on developments that have already
begun in the area of Chinese legal scholarship or intellectual property
scholarship in general. By exploring these future directions, this
27. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 63 (detailing the transparency obligations).
28. See Peter K. Yu, Editorial, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2018)
(“[D]evelop[ing] a more holistic, sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the
past three decades of intellectual property developments in China . . . is particularly
important considering that not only have global intellectual property developments
influenced China, but Chinese intellectual property developments have also begun to
influence the globe.”).
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Article aims to convey the impression that scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system will only become richer, more diverse, and
more sophisticated in the future. Such richness, diversity, and
sophistication are certainly not what many early scholars on the
Chinese intellectual property system expected when they started
studying this system a half-century ago.
I.

A CHRONOLOGY-BASED TAXONOMY

Chronology provides the easiest method to create a taxonomy of
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system. Thus far, fairly
distinctive bodies of scholarship have emerged in five disparate phases: (1)
prehistoric development; (2) imitation and transplantation; (3)
standardization and customization; (4) integration and assimilation; and
(5) indigenization and transformation. This Part discusses each phase in
turn and shows how these phases are interrelated, episodic, and cyclical.
Section I.F offers four closing observations linking the five phases together.
A. Prehistoric Development
The first phase concerns those intellectual property developments
that occurred before the establishment of the modern Chinese
intellectual property system. While this phase is described as “prehistoric
development”—due largely to the Article’s specific focus—whether this
phase is categorized as prehistoric or simply historical will largely depend
on perspective and focus. The further back in history researchers trace
the Chinese intellectual property system to indigenous notions,29 the

29. As Ken Shao observed, it has been highly difficult to locate information about
early indigenous intellectual property notions in China:
[I]nformation about China’s intellectual property is scarce and cannot be
found in a single discipline. For instance, to perceive the emergence of
Chinese copyright in the 11th and 12th centuries, one needs to observe the
expansion of the commercial publishing industry and, in that, discover judicial
recognition of copyright claims. For trademark, the focus should be on
analysing the scale and nature of Chinese commodity economy. This has
already been extensively examined by economic historians, and its inherent
link with the unique distinctive nature of trade marks in the context of the
commodity economy has been observed. Although on the one hand there is
no evidence to suggest that China had ever adopted an indigenous patent
practice, on the other hand property rights or know-how for inventions and
technologies had existed for thousands of years. To understand this, one
should liberate the definition of intellectual property from the limitations of
modern intellectual property laws. Accordingly, only a highly interdisciplinary
approach can knit together the rich variety of sources of information to form
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less they would prefer the term “prehistoric development.”
As with any historical research involving prehistory, determining
when prehistory ends and history begins is not that difficult. Given this
Article’s focus on the modern Chinese intellectual property system, the
prehistoric phase understandably ended with the system’s establishment.
Notwithstanding this logical endpoint, it remains unclear when prehistory
actually began. Indeed, because this phase could go back as far as the
researcher’s interests and attention allow, this Section merely offers
suggestions on some possible starting points.
Although Western commentators widely believe that indigenous
notions of intellectual property rights did not exist in China30 before
foreign powers introduced these rights through gunboat diplomacy,
trade pressures, legal assistance, or other forceful means,31 Chinese
scholars have questioned those beliefs, which they find culturally

more comprehensive arguments.
Ken Shao, History is a Key Decoder: Why China Aims at Re-Emerging as a Global Leader of
Innovation, 29 LAW IN CONTEXT: A SOCIO-LEGAL J. 117, 123 (2013) (footnote omitted).
30. See, e.g., R. Michael Gadbaw, Republic of Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 272, 275 (R. Michael Gadbaw &
Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) (“This cultural gap is typical of many East Asian
countries, where the historical attitude toward intellectual property is noticeably
different from that in the West.”); John R. Allison & Lin Lianlian, Evolution of Chinese
Attitudes Toward Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735,
737 (1999) (“In . . . tracing of Chinese attitudes toward invention and discovery, one
can see that a culture deeply embedded with traditions completely antithetical to the
patenting of inventions and to the granting of property rights in other forms of
intellectual products has recently moved toward recognition of the necessity of a
modern patent system.”); William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai—China’s Copycat
Counterculture: Catch Me if You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 639–61 (2012) (discussing
the Chinese culture’s focus on masters, rather than creators); Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey
Mouse” in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996) (“[P]unishing copyright violation contradicts traditional
Chinese moral standards.”); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and
the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1998) (“The Soviet model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes toward
intellectual property and expounded the socialist belief that by inventing or creating,
individuals were engaging in social activities based on knowledge that belonged to all
members of society.”); Wang Liwei, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 15, 36–56 (1993) (discussing those Chinese traditions that were
inimical to a new patent law and how Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders utilized
these traditions).
31. See PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 3 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that
substantive intellectual property protection arrived “with such inventions and novel
ideas as the gunboat, opium, ‘most favoured nation’ trading status and
extraterritoriality”).
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stereotypical at times.32 The most informative source documenting the
existence of indigenous notions of intellectual property rights in China
is a Chinese-language anthology put together by Zhou Lin and Li
Mingshan.33 Covering the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties and
the Republican and Communist eras, this highly valuable volume
collected historical documents that showed indigenous copyright
notions in China.34
Thus far, most scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system traced the system’s origin to the late Qing period. For example,
some commentators emphasized the laws adopted by the Qing
government, such as the Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910 (Da Qing
Zhuzuoquan Lu).35 Meanwhile, others traced the system earlier to new
measures introduced during the short-lived Hundred-Day Reform
(1898)36 or the somewhat territorially limited Taiping Rebellion

32. For criticisms of culture-based claims regarding the Chinese intellectual
property system, see generally Ken Shao, Chinese Culture and Intellectual Property: Let’s
Realise We Have Been Misguided, 4 WIPO J. 103 (2012) [hereinafter Shao, Chinese
Culture]; Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: What if China Is Not a Born
Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341 [hereinafter Shao, Global Debate]; Shi Wei, Cultural
Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 1 (2006).
33. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF CHINA’S COPYRIGHT LAW (Zhou Lin & Li Mingshan
eds., 1999) (in Chinese) [hereinafter HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS]; see also Feng Xiaoqing
et al., Awakening of a Sleeping Dragon: The Evolution of Copyright Conception in China,
51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 615 (2004) (discussing the historical evolution of the
copyright concept in China); Ken Shao, The Promotion of Learning in Chinese History:
Discovering the Lost Soul of Modern Copyright, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 63 (2010) (examining
the historical environment in which copyright was practiced in traditional China).
34. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 33.
35. Da Qing Zhuzuoquan Lu [Great Qing Copyright Law] (1910) (China), reprinted
in HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 33, at 89–94 (in Chinese). Reenacted by the
Republican government in the form of a provisional act, the Great Qing Copyright
Law is translated in NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF
TRADE-MARKS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADE-NAMES IN CHINA 112–21 (1924). See
generally Li Yufeng & Catherine W. Ng, Understanding the Great Qing Copyright Law of
1910, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 767 (2008) (discussing the Law). The term
“zhuzuoquan” is better translated as “author’s right,” which brings with it the
European tradition. Nevertheless, this Article translates the term as “copyright” due
to its preferred usage in official English translations.
36. See ZHENG CHENGSI WITH MICHAEL D. PENDLETON, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW 52 (1987) (noting that, in 1898, a late Qing
emperor attempted to introduce the Regulations to Promote Industrial Technology
during the famous “Hundred-Day” Reform). The “Hundred-Day” Reform of 1898,
which lasted for only 103 days, was a short-lived reform movement that sought radical
change in the political and social systems during the reign of Emperor Guangxu of the
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(1850–1864).37 Those researchers who were willing to go further in
time even caught glimpses of intellectual property protection in those
rights that Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (Han Wudi) granted to
individual merchants to “smelt iron, distill salt, and mint coin” more
than two millennia ago.38
That researchers have located primitive forms of intellectual
property rights in early Chinese history is unsurprising. After all,
commentators have traced the Western intellectual property system to
the Venetian Republic in the fifteenth century39 or even earlier.40 They
have also considered the Statute of Monopolies of 1624 the origin of
the Anglo-American patent system.41 Moreover, many pioneering
Qing dynasty. See generally IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 373–76 (6th
ed. 2000) (discussing the reform movement).
37. As one commentator observed,
During the period of the Taiping Rebellion, the leader Hong Renxuan put
forward his concept of a patent system, noting that “if someone can design a
kind of train as we see in foreign countries which can run 8,000 kilometers in
a day and a night, he should be granted a patent and be given the power to
allow others to imitate.” He also maintained that “people [should be]
encouraged to improve craftsmanship and sell their technical inventions or
innovation . . . [and] . . . those who counterfeit will be punished.”
Flora Wang, An Overview of the Development of the Chinese Patent System, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 3, 3 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
38. Id.
39. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 6 (1975) (stating that the Venetian Republic did not
formalize such protection until the adoption of the first patent law on March 19, 1474).
40. As Ted Sichelman and Sean O’Connor observed,
[T]here is very strong evidence to rebut [the claim] that the first exclusionary
patent rights for what we would today label “technological” inventions appeared
in a directive limited to silk inventions passed in the late fourteenth or early
fifteenth century. Rather, the first evidence of such exclusionary rights appears in
1416, when Ser Franciscus Petri, from Rhodes, was granted a patent by the Grand
Council of Venice for his device for fulling wool (that is, turning it into felt).
Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Origins
of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1276 (2012) (footnote
omitted); see also Christopher May, The Venetian Moment: New Technologies, Legal
Innovation and the Institutional Origins of Intellectual Property, 20 PROMETHEUS 159, 160
(2002) (stating that intellectual property protection “existed in some form in Venetian
law as a customary practice” before the law’s codification in the late fifteenth century).
41. Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
aep/Ja1/21/3; see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF
THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 3 (Comm. Print 1958) (by Fritz Machlup) (“The Statute of Monopolies is the
basis of the present British patent law, and became the model for the laws elsewhere.”);
Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became Rights and
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inventions have emerged throughout the nearly five millennia of
Chinese civilization,42 such as the compass, gunpowder, papermaking,
and woodblock printing.43 Such inventions have inevitably raised
questions about the incentive structure or arrangement that led to their
creation in the first place. It is also worth noting that, even though the
term “intellectual property” was not translated into Chinese until the
1970s,44 the Chinese term “zhishi chanquan” can be traced back to “a
very ancient historical record, ‘Guo-Yu,’ which was written some 3,000
years ago in the late Zhou Dynasty.”45
In short, a growing volume of literature has revealed a much longer
and richer history of intellectual property developments in China than
many Western scholars have suggested in the 1980s and 1990s.
Notwithstanding this body of scholarship, this Part focuses on the
research published in only the past fifty years—that is, a period starting
only a decade before the establishment of the modern Chinese
intellectual property system. Such a durational focus has three
justifications. First, it will make the scholarship review conducted in this
Article more manageable. Second, reaching back to a decade before
the establishment of the modern Chinese intellectual property system
will enable us to capture most, if not all, of the scholarship on the
preparatory work that was undertaken to establish this system. Finally,
having a more limited focus is highly practical because Englishlanguage scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system was

Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 191 (2004) (“The origin of AngloAmerican patent law is usually traced to the 1624 Statute of Monopolies and a handful
of monumental common law decisions from the early seventeenth century.” (footnote
omitted)); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1272–73 (2001) (“[T]he Statute of Monopolies
represents the first definitive step toward the shift away from royal prerogative and
privileges to common law and legal rights.”).
42. See ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (4th ed. 2011) (noting “nearly five thousand years of a continuous
history of civilisation” in China).
43. For discussions of scientific developments in China, see generally BENJAMIN A.
ELMAN, ON THEIR OWN TERMS: SCIENCE IN CHINA, 1550–1900 (2005); JOSEPH NEEDHAM,
SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA (1956–2004); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF
CHINA: 3,000 YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY & INVENTION (2007).
44. See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 78 (2005) (quoting a September 1995 article in the People’s Daily
that states that the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade “had
rendered [the term ‘intellectual property’], for the first time, into the Chinese
equivalent, zhishi chanquan” when China sent a delegation to WIPO in November 1973).
45. ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 51.
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very rare before the mid-1970s.46
Within the first decade or so of the past half-century, very little
English-language scholarship can be found. Hsia Tao-tai and Kathryn
Haun provided a pioneering analysis of the attitudes within China
toward industrial, literary, and artistic property.47 It is notable that
their study was published in 1973, the year when China sent its first
delegation to WIPO.48 Five years later, Barden Gale published an
article examining the concept of “intellectual property” in China.49
That article analyzed the historical policies that had provided
incentives for inventive and innovative activities.50
On occasion, researchers focused on a specific branch of intellectual
property rights, as opposed to the entire field. In the trademark area,
Heinz Dawid examined the 1950 Provisional Regulations Concerning
the Registration of Trademarks and the 1963 Regulations Concerning
the Control of Trademarks.51 Although the latter was abolished during
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it was subsequently restored and
remained in force until the adoption of the 1982 Trademark Law.52
John Butler also offered a treatise-like analysis of the 1963 Regulations.53
Such article-by-article analysis, while rare in this phase, had become
more popular in later phases. Indeed, books and treatises on Chinese
intellectual property law began to appear after this phase.54
46. Rare exceptions are the works of the former U.S. Consul Norwood Allman. See, e.g.,
ALLMAN, supra note 35; N.F. Allman, China Trade-Mark Situation, 40 TRADEMARK REP. 303
(1950); N.F. Allman, Chinese Equivalents of Word-Marks, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 36 (1947); N.F.
Allman, Chinese Regulations for Control of Patent Medicines, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 131 (1947); N.F.
Allman, The Chinese Trademark Law and Extraterritoriality, 3 CHINA L. REV. 78 (1926).
47. Hsia Tao-tai & Kathryn A. Haun, Laws of the People’s Republic of China on
Industrial and Intellectual Property, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 274 (1973).
48. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 78.
49. Barden N. Gale, The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People’s Republic of China:
Inventors and Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 334 (1978).
50. Id.
51. Heinz Dawid, Trademark Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 9 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 217 (1980).
52. See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of
China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 273 (1986) (“After the Cultural Revolution, the 1963
Trademark Regulations remained the primary Chinese trademark legislation.”).
53. John I. Butler, Trademarks in the People’s Republic of China, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 89 (1975).
54. For treatise-like discussions of Chinese intellectual property law, see generally
LAURENCE J. BRAHM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN CHINA
(2d ed. 1994); CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS (Rohan
Kariyawasam ed., 2011); FENG, supra note 31; REBECCA ORDISH & ALAN ADCOCK, CHINA
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS: AN ESSENTIAL BUSINESS GUIDE
(2008); PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA (Stefan Luginbühl & Peter Ganea eds., 2014);
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In the copyright area, Dietrich Loeber explored how authors and
their publications were protected in China in the 1970s, drawing on
interviews and field research conducted shortly before the end of the
Cultural Revolution.55 His research was illuminating because China
would not adopt a modern copyright law until more than a decade
later.56 In a memorial lecture sponsored by the Copyright Society of
the U.S.A., Jon Baumgarten, a former general counsel of the U.S.
Copyright Office, also shared observations on the changing U.S.-China
copyright relations57 following the signing of the Agreement on Trade
Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s
Republic of China58 (“1979 Agreement”) in July 1979.
B. Imitation and Transplantation
The second phase began with the establishment of the modern
Chinese intellectual property system. Like its predecessor, this phase
included several possible starting points. The phase could begin with
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in
December 1978,59 in which Deng Xiaoping and his fellow leaders made a
decisive push for the “Four Modernizations” to develop China’s worldPROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997);
CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (2004); TAN
LOKE KHOON, PIRATES IN THE MIDDLE KINGDOM: THE NEW FRONTIER (3d ed. 2017); XUE
HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY
(2002); XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA: A COMPLETE
GUIDE (1999) [hereinafter XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION]; ZHENG CHENGSI,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: LEADING CASES AND COMMENTARY
(1997); ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 36.
55. Dietrich A. Loeber, Copyright Law and Publishing in the People’s Republic of China,
24 UCLA L. REV. 907 (1977).
56. 1990 Copyright Law, supra note 4.
57. Jon A. Baumgarten, Copyright Relations Between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China—The Seventeenth Annual Jean Geiringer Memorial Lecture, 27 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 419 (1980).
58. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter 1979
Agreement].
59. See STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA OF THE H. COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONGRESS, CHINA’S NEW PATENT LAW AND OTHER
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 5–6 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 H. COMM.
PRINT] (by the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress) (discussing the
restoration of the Chinese legal system at the Third Plenary Session); see also CHEN,
supra note 42, at 42 (“[T]he return to the idea of a socialist legal system (and the
related idea of socialist democracy) was the result of a conscious policy choice of the
post-Mao leadership.”).
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class strengths in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and
national defense by 2000.60 The leaders also normalized the country’s
diplomatic and commercial relationships with the United States, Japan,
and other Western developed countries.61 Without these policy reversals,
it is quite certain that China would not have developed the modern
intellectual property system so quickly after the end of the Cultural
Revolution.62 Indeed, sufficient evidence existed to document the gradual
expansion of domestic governmental support for the establishment of this
new system. As Andrew Mertha recounted chronologically,
In 1978, . . . the State Council charged the State Science and
Technology Commission (SSTC) with developing a patent system
for China. In March 1979, the drafting group of the Chinese Patent
Law was established. [In June 1979, the Chinese Patent Office, or
State Patent Bureau, was established, assuming the responsibilities
of the drafting group.] On October 17 of the same year, the formal
request for the establishment of a patent system in China was
submitted to the State Council by the SSTC. On January 14, 1980,
the State Council approved the request, and on March 3, China
became a member of [WIPO].63
60. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 803–14 (providing a comprehensive overview of the
Four Modernizations).
61. See id. at 858–69 (discussing the Open-Door Policy that China adopted in
December 1978, which provided “a complete reversal of the Maoist policy of seclusion
that had been in force . . . between 1958 and 1978”).
62. The development of the intellectual property system went hand in hand with
the development of these new policies. As Ren Jianxin, the Director of the Legal
Affairs Department of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade,
declared in September 1980, “[The Chinese] government is getting ready to institute
a patent system in order to protect and encourage invention, to expand international
exchange of technology, and to import advanced technology for acceleration of the
four modernizations.” Ren Jianxin, Some Legal Aspects of Our Import of Technology and
Utilization of Foreign Investment, 1 CHINA L. REP. 85, 89 (1980). Similarly, in an interview,
William Alford observed,
The fledgling intellectual property law movement owes as much to internal
considerations as external ones. The Chinese government has been
endeavoring to develop intellectual property law in part to encourage internal
economic development. It believes that technological development was
hindered because scientists were reluctant to share data and lacked adequate
incentives to make scientific advances. Proponents of the development of
intellectual property law contend that it will both reward individual initiative
and enhance collegiality among scientists. These two goals may seem slightly
contradictory, but in the leadership’s mind they are not.
Chinese Living Law: An Interview with Professor William Alford, 7 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
135, 137 (1989).
63. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 81–82.
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The second possible starting point is the signing of the 1979
Agreement, which entered into force on February 1, 1980.64 This
agreement is significant in the intellectual property context because it
called for the reciprocal protection of copyrights, patents, and
trademarks owned by the nationals of the other party.65 The
agreement is equally noteworthy in the international context because
it created in China “an international legal obligation for intellectual
property rights protection before [the country] had established a
domestic intellectual property protection system.”66
The third possible starting point is the beginning of China’s WIPO
membership. China joined this U.N. specialized agency on March 3,
1980 and became a member three months later.67 Although the
country was unable to join the agency before reestablishing
international ties, its involvement in the organization actually began
much earlier. As Professor Mertha recounted,
As early as November 1973, after the Chinese delegation to [WIPO]
returned to Beijing, delegation leader Ren Jiaxin, who would later
become Chief Justice of China’s Supreme Court, proposed the
establishment of a patent system in China. According to the People’s
Daily,
This was the first time that New China has sent
representatives to an international conference related to
intellectual property rights. At that time, many people in
China found the term “Intellectual Property” rather
unfamiliar. The [China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade (CCPIT)] had rendered it, for the first
time, into the Chinese equivalent, zhishi chanquan.68

The last possible starting point is the adoption of the 1982
64. 1979 Agreement, supra note 58.
65. See id. art. VI (3) (“Both Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall seek,
under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or
natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to
the patent and trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”);
id. art. VI (5) (creating the same obligation in the copyright area).
66. XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 54, at 5.
67. WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=1 (last visited May 9, 2018).
68. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 78; see also William O. Hennessey, Protection of
Intellectual Property in China (30 Years and More): A Personal Reflection, 46 HOUS. L. REV.
1257, 1283 (2009) (discussing Ren’s 1973 visit to WIPO). Although the CCPIT is
“nominally a nongovernmental organization, [it] is an essential arm of [China’s]
foreign trade apparatus.” Stanley B. Lubman, Trade Between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China: Practice, Policy, and Law, 8 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 17 (1976).
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Trademark Law.69 Using this historic milestone as the beginning is
quite popular among legal researchers. After all, the Trademark Law
was the first statute in the modern Chinese intellectual property
system. From a research standpoint, the early adoption of a new
trademark law in China is noteworthy because such adoption showed
that trademark law reform did not face as much domestic resistance as
reform in the copyright or patent area. As Peter Feng explained,
trademarks “were a state planning tool before they became a
marketing device and private property.”70 As such, they “survived
China’s socialist transformation of the 1950s, and registration
continued even during the Cultural Revolution.”71
In view of the existence of these four starting points, it has been
rather difficult to determine the beginning of the second phase. It has
also been quite challenging to determine what scholarship would fall
within this particular phase. Typically, scholarship on new laws and
policies emerge when they are proposed or considered, not after they
have been adopted. Researchers therefore often have to reach back to
scholarship published before the chosen starting point.
For analytical convenience and effectiveness, this Section focuses on
scholarship that has been published since China’s reopening to the
outside world in the late 1970s. The use of literature from that period
can be easily justified by the researchers’ tendency to use the
beginning of China’s WIPO membership or the 1982 Trademark Law
as the starting point of this second phase. The choice of this earlier
starting point also makes great sense considering that the country’s
reopening marked the critical juncture at which foreign researchers
became curious about the Chinese legal system, resulting in a growing
volume of English-language scholarship on this system.72
69. 1982 Trademark Law, supra note 1.
70. FENG, supra note 31, at 344.
71. Id. at 293; see also MERTHA, supra note 44, at 197 (noting that “trademarks
existed throughout [China], even during the Cultural Revolution, although . . . the
constriction in the universe of ‘politically correct’ brand names— . . . often obscured
the identity of the actual manufacturer—and in the process made trademarks largely
meaningless”); Sidel, supra note 52, at 272 (“Marks such as ‘Red Flag,’ ‘East Wind’ and
‘Worker-Peasant-Soldier’ appeared on thousands of similar and dissimilar goods
during the 1966–1976 period and many lasted into the late 1970s and early 1980s.”).
72. See, e.g., VICTOR H. LI, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES (1977) (providing an accessible account of the Chinese
legal system and dispelling the common American misconceptions of that system);
Jerome Alan Cohen, China’s Changing Constitution, 1978 CHINA Q. 794 (1978)
(discussing the 1978 Constitution and its ramifications for legal development in
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Similar to publications in the previous phase, scholarship in this
second phase tended to be rather straightforward; it focused mostly on
newly emerging laws and policies. For instance, the adoption of the
1982 Trademark Law and the 1984 Patent Law sparked a significant
volume of literature.73 A notable example is a special issue collecting
articles on the new Patent Law that Maria Lin guest-edited for the
AIPLA Quarterly Journal.74 In addition to scholarship in the trademark
and patent areas, one could find scholarship exploring the upcoming
Copyright Law,75 even though that body of scholarship remained scant

China); William C. Jones, An Approach to Chinese Law, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 3 (1978)
(advancing an approach to understanding the Chinese legal system through trade
laws); Lubman, supra note 68 (surveying the problems concerning laws and policies
involved in U.S.-China trade).
73. For discussions of the 1982 Trademark Law, the 1984 Patent Law, or both, see
generally Jesse T.H. Chang & Charles J. Conroy, Trade-mark Law in the People’s Republic
of China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 427 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE,
INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW]; Michael J. Moser & David Y.W. Ho, The Registration and
Protection of Patents in China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW, supra, at 453;
William E. Beaumont, The New Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC): Evidence
of a Second Chinese “Renaissance”?, 27 IDEA 39 (1986); Charles L. Gholz, China’s New
Trademark Law, 2 CHINA L. REP. 103 (1982); Kim Seong-Ki, Patent Law of China, 18
KOREAN J. COMP. L. 90 (1990); Maria C.H. Lin, The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of
China, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 107 (1985); T. Traian Moga, China’s Patent Law Considered and
Compared, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 335 (1987); Jeanette L. Pinard & Lian Chun-cheng, Patent
Protection Under Chinese Law, 1 J. CHINESE L. 69 (1987); P.D. Woods, Trademark and
Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 13 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 473 (1988);
L. Mark Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China’s New Patent and Trademark Laws, 6 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 86 (1984); Zheng Chengsi, China: The Alternatives: Patent, Utility Model
or Design Registration, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 103 (1987); David Ben Kay, Comment,
The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China in Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 331 (1985);
Ross J. Oehler, Note, Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Primer, 8 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451 (1987).
74. Symposium, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 98–164 (1985).
75. See generally Guo Shoukang, Some Opinions on Copyright in the People’s Republic of
China, 1 J. CHINESE L. 63 (1987) (offering personal observations on the forthcoming
Chinese Copyright Law and its related questions and challenges); Shen Yuanyuan, China’s
Protection of Foreign Books, Video Tapes and Sound Recordings, 12 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
78 (1989) (discussing the protection of foreign books, videotapes, and sound recordings
in China before the introduction of the 1990 Copyright Law); Mark Sidel, The Legal
Protection of Copyright and the Rights of Authors in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1984:
Prelude to the Chinese Copyright Law, 9 COLUM.-VLA J. ART & L. 477 (1985) (providing a
historical survey on the regulation of authors’ rights in China and observations on the
possible content of the forthcoming Copyright Law); Joseph T. Simone, Copyright in the
People’s Republic of China: A Foreigner’s Guide, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1988)
(discussing the draft Chinese Copyright Law); Zheng Chengsi, The Future Chinese Copyright
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until the law’s late adoption in the early 1990s.76 Some commentators
also explored the protection of computer software, which at that time
could be offered through either copyright law or a sui generis regime.77
Apart from the three main branches of intellectual property law, some
commentators broadened the research focus to cover law relating to
foreign investment, technology licensing and transfer, and dispute
settlement78—topics that were of great practical importance to
attorneys who had clients doing business in China.79 Because little
English-language scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system appeared before this phase, most scholarship in the second phase
offered a historical overview of developments in the relevant areas.80
System and Its Context, 15 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 141 (1984) (offering a
pioneering discussion of the future of copyright protection in China).
76. 1990 Copyright Law, supra note 4.
77. For early discussions of efforts to protect computer software in China, see
generally Elisa Cirillo, Note, The Legal Protection of Computer Software in the People’s
Republic of China, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387 (1989); William P. Fuller V, Note,
The Protection of Computer Software in the People’s Republic of China, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 57 (1989). China eventually chose to protect computer software by establishing a
sui generis regime. See Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software of the
People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the State Council, June 4, 1991, effective
Oct. 1, 1991) (China) (providing sui generis protection for computer software). For
early discussions of protection of computer software in China, see generally XUE &
ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 54; Du Juan & K.H. Pun, Practical Aspects of
Software Copyright in China, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 520 (2000); K.H. Pun, A Critique
of Copyright Protection for Computer Software in the People’s Republic of China, 16 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 227 (1994); Zheng Chengsi, The Protection of Computer Programs Under the
Chinese Copyright Law, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 344 (1995).
78. See FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW, supra note 73 (providing a
collection of articles covering trade, investment, and intellectual property law in
China); Chwang Tek Ling & Richard L. Thurston, Technology Takes Command: The
Policy of the People’s Republic of China with Respect to Technology Transfer and Protection of
Intellectual Property, 21 INT’L LAW. 129, 134–42, 164–67 (1987) (discussing laws relating
to foreign investment, technology transfer, and dispute settlement); T. Traian Moga,
Making Foreign Things Serve China: A Western Licensor’s Guide to the Chinese Market, 28 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 771 (1984) (providing a foreigner’s guide to licensing in China); David
E. Pierce, The Legal Regime for Technology Imports in the People’s Republic of China, 10 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 206 (1988); Mitchell A. Silk, Recent Efforts in China’s Drive to Promote
Investment Through the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: The 1988 Trademark Rules
and the 1988 Technology Import Contract Rules, 15 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COM. 215, 225–29
(1989) (covering the 1988 Technology Import Contract Rules).
79. Such a broadened focus continued into the next phase of standardization and
customization. See generally DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES
AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA (2002) (providing a primer on
intellectual property laws and other laws regarding foreign investment enterprises).
80. See Beaumont, supra note 73, at 40–48 (1986) (providing a brief history of science
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Complementing this body of scholarship was a helpful report the Far
Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress prepared for the
Special House Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China.81 Written in
1984 by Hsia Tao-tai, who co-authored one of the pioneering articles
mentioned in the previous Section,82 this highly influential report
provided in-depth analysis of the 1984 Patent Law and the muchneeded contextual background surrounding its development.83
Particularly commendable is the report’s inclusion of Chineselanguage sources84 that helped bridge the rather significant language
and access barriers encountered by virtually all early scholars of the
Chinese intellectual property system.85
C. Standardization and Customization
The third phase began in the early 1990s. Covering issues both
inside and outside China, this phase featured scholarship on the
United States’ aggressive intellectual property policy toward China and
China’s active preparation for WTO accession. At the beginning of this
phase, China made a dedicated effort to reintegrate with the outside
world following the international crisis precipitated by its handling of
the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square.86 The protests and
their aftermath not only resulted in sanctions from the international
community,87 but also led foreign policymakers and commentators to
view China with a different lens—with greater emphasis on the rule of

and technology developments in China and discussing the challenge of encouraging
innovation under Communism); Chwang & Thurston, supra note 78, at 131–34
(discussing the evolution of Chinese trademark and copyright laws); Sidel, 52 52
(providing a historically informed discussion of the Chinese intellectual property
regime); Kay, supra note 73 (providing a historical survey of the regulations concerning
invention awards and discussing the challenges to developing the 1984 Patent Law).
81. 1984 H. COMM. PRINT, supra note 59.
82. See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing the previous article).
83. 1984 H. COMM. PRINT, supra note 59, at iii, 18–35.
84. See id. at 18–35.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 340–42 (discussing the lack of research
materials for early scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system).
86. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 926–41 (discussing the protests and their aftermath).
87. See id. at 942 (noting the “universal condemnation[,] . . . severe international
economic and military sanctions [and] diplomatic ostracism” after 1989).
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law88 and human rights protection, for instance.89
In the intellectual property area, the international sanctions and
heightened global scrutiny greatly complicated policy and scholarly
discussions.90 For example, on May 19, 1989, China and the United

88. See generally Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.:
Impediments to Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1996)
(highlighting the multiple impediments to protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights in China and arguing that the development of rule of law principles
will be needed to remove these impediments); Li Yiqiang, Evaluation of the SinoAmerican Intellectual Property Agreements: A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 412–22 (1996) (advancing a judicial
approach to address local protectionism).
89. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 960–67 (discussing policies made by the first Bush
and Clinton administrations out of their concerns over human rights abuses in China).
Although the human rights issues remained of great concern to U.S. policymakers and
the American public, the Clinton administration delinked human rights protection
from its trade policy in the early 1990s. See JAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE: A HISTORY OF
AMERICA’S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 292–314
(2000) (discussing such delinkage).
Interestingly, the greater focus on human rights affects our views in both
directions. It sheds light on not only the Chinese intellectual property system, but also
on a country’s foreign intellectual property policy toward China. In his critique of the
American foreign intellectual property policy, Professor Alford noted that “[t]he real
irony, and even tragedy, . . . is that it impairs the advancement of fundamental rights
and the attainment of our stated goals regarding intellectual property as well as
broader national interests of both the United States and China.” William P. Alford,
Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and Foreign
Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 135, 143
(1996). As he elaborated,
What is tragic about the current U.S. intellectual property policy toward China
is the way it sacrifices our—and China’s—longer-term national interests for
perceived short-term electoral and commercial gain. A democratic, law-abiding
China surely will be a more stable, predictable, and dependable partner than
the alternative—be it for the attainment of freer trade, national security, nonproliferation and arms control, human rights, a sound environment, or
cooperation in dealing with any of the world’s myriad other problems. Such a
China will also advance its own people’s interests more amply than the
alternative. The United States impairs the realization of these vital interests
when, in its emphasis on results over process, it uses law as little more than a
blunt instrument to press Beijing to reconsolidate control. Such actions
strengthen the position of those in Beijing most skeptical about legal processes
and least interested in the devolution of power from central administrative
authorities and the empowerment, through law, of the citizenry.
Id. at 145–46.
90. As Joseph Massey, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and
China, recounted,
Tiananmen stilled the voices within the interagency process in Washington who
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States signed the first intellectual property-related memorandum of
understanding (“MOU”) after China reopened to the outside world.91
Focusing mostly on copyright protection and addressing software
protection in particular,92 this MOU “paved the way for the eventual
adoption of the Copyright Law in September 1990 and a separate set
of computer software regulations the year after.”93 Yet, scholarship
from both Chinese and non-Chinese intellectual property scholars
seldom mentions this MOU.94
Similar complications arose with respect to scholarship on the
adoption of the 1990 Copyright Law. Although the U.S. government
and copyright industries had been lobbying heavily for this law since
the mid-1980s,95 they remained reluctant to recognize its adoption as a
had been calling, on “geopolitical” or other grounds, for the negotiators to
moderate trade and IPR demands on China and accept lesser Chinese concessions.
At the same time, however, the US decided not to press for criminal penalties for
IPR piracy, a decision that (although appropriate at a time of severe political
repression in China) would lead to problems in IPR enforcement later on.
Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 234 (2006); see also MARTIN K.
DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
147 (2009) (“Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, it has not been desirable or
politically viable for the United States to encourage police involvement in any type of policy
implementation.”); Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual
Property, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 165, 172 (“While IPR would have been a source of
friction in any case, the disputes cannot be separated from the U.S. internal struggle
to define a credible post-Tiananmen policy toward China.”).
91. See PRC Agrees to Push for Copyright Law that Will Protect Computer Software, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REP. 151 (July 1989) (reprinting the 1989 MOU).
92. Id.
93. Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in
China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20, 25
(Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) [hereafter CHINA AND EUROPE].
94. Part of the reason why scholars seldom mention this MOU is that it was
unratified. See MERTHA, supra note 44, at 124 (noting its legal status). Nevertheless, a
few works have mentioned this MOU. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS
AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 112–13
(1995) (criticizing the U.S. government’s priorities and its negotiation for the 1989
MOU); Massey, supra note 90, at 234 (noting the negotiations of the 1989 MOU); Shen
Jianming, The P.R.C.’s First Copyright Law Analyzed, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
529, 556 (1991) (mentioning the 1989 MOU); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 186 (Daniel
J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) (noting the signing of the 1989 MOU).
95. As I noted in an earlier book chapter,
[In the mid-1980s], the United States’ main intellectual property concern was
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success. Their reluctance was due largely to the strained diplomatic
relationship between China and the United States and the suspension
of bilateral talks “in 1989 and 1990 as part of the U.S. sanctions.”96 This
lack of governmental engagement, in turn, caused U.S. policymakers
and scholars to pay little attention to the compromise facilitating the
adoption of the 1990 Copyright Law97—namely, the denial of copyright
protection to censored works. This compromise proved to be
problematic for U.S. copyright industries down the road.98 As the next
Section will discuss, Article 4 of the 1990 Copyright Law, which stated
that “works the publication and/or dissemination of which are
prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law,”99 would
eventually become a key part of the WTO complaint the United States
copyrights, not patents. Although China had already adopted new trademark
and patent laws a few years before, it had yet to introduce a new copyright law.
Part of the delay was caused by the need for censorship and control of
information flows in China. The lack of copyright protection was particularly
problematic, as a lack of both copyright protection and market access had
made it difficult for the politically powerful [U.S.] movie, music and software
industries to protect their content.
Yu, supra note 93, at 25; see also Maruyama, supra note 90, at 186 (“At a 1985 meeting
to the U.S.-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for the
first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR standards. In 1987, the U.S. put
IPR protection on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks.”).
96. Massey, supra note 90, at 235; accord MERTHA, supra note 44, at 42 (“One
outcome of the worldwide condemnation of [China following the Tiananmen
incident] was that ‘it was impossible to get the USTR to even talk to China between
June 1989 and autumn 1990.’” (quoting documented but undisclosed interview)).
97. As Andrew Mertha recounted,
In the post-June 4 period, many conservative elements in the government felt
that the copyright debate involved issues of ideological “correctness” and that
such issues should be explicitly included in the [Copyright Law]. By contrast,
copyright proponents argued that ideological issues should not clutter up the
Copyright Law—that the [Law] should not be used as a blunt instrument for
meting out punishment for ideological crimes—and that such issues should
be covered by the Criminal Law. This debate was particularly protracted, and
it resulted in the compromise that was enshrined in Article 4 . . . .
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 125 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 121–22 (noting the
debate about the sequencing of the publishing and copyright laws).
98. Another policy that had harmed these industries in the early 1990s was the U.S.
government’s reluctance to press for criminal penalties due to its concern over
political repression. See Massey, supra note 90, at 234 (noting the decision “not to press
for criminal penalties for IPR piracy” in the late 1980s and early 1990s); accord
DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 147 (“Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, it has
not been desirable or politically viable for the United States to encourage police
involvement in any type of policy implementation.”).
99. 1990 Copyright Law, supra note 4, art. 4.
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was to file more than a decade and a half later.100
Notwithstanding the considerable complications in the early part of
this phase, two specific developments radically changed the discourse
on the Chinese intellectual property system. First, on April 26, 1991, the
USTR designated China as a priority foreign country for the first time.101
This designation indicated that China “ha[d] the most onerous or
egregious acts, policies, or practices that . . . deny adequate and effective
intellectual property rights or . . . fair and equitable market access to
[intellectual property rights holders].”102 Such designation paved the way
for the first Bush administration’s announcement of $1.5 billion of
retaliatory tariffs on “Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic instruments,
and pharmaceuticals” in January 1992.103
Second, and more crucial for Chinese legal research, the economic
conditions in China changed rapidly following Deng Xiaoping’s visit
to Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai in January 1992.104 In the wake
of this so-called “southern tour” (nanxun),105 China not only
accelerated the opening up of its economy, but also actively prepared
for WTO accession.
To capture these two pathbreaking developments, this Section
highlights two distinct strands of scholarship. The first strand
concerned the American intellectual property policy toward China.
Prescient, informative, and of great practical relevance, this strand of
scholarship was largely sparked by the USTR’s designation of China as
a priority foreign country in April 1991, a designation that would soon
repeat on June 30, 1994, and April 30, 1996.106 The scholarship also
covered other actions that the USTR had imposed on China or
threatened the country with, such as economic sanctions, trade wars,

100. See infra text accompanying notes 134–50 (discussing this dispute and the
related scholarship).
101. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the
Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 141 (2000). Ironically, April 26 would
eventually become the World Intellectual Property Day, which WIPO launched in
September 2000. Press Release, WIPO, First World Intellectual Property Day to Be
Marked on April 26 Under Banner of “Creating the Future Today” (Apr. 23, 2001),
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/prdocs/2001/wipo_pr_2001_264.html.
That
date was chosen because it was “the date on which the Convention establishing WIPO
entered into force in 1970.” Id.
102. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A) (2012).
103. Yu, supra note 101, at 142.
104. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 945–47 (discussing Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour”).
105. Id. at 945.
106. Yu, supra note 101, at 144, 148.
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non-renewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to China’s
entry into the WTO.107
In addition, this strand of scholarship documented the back-and-forth
engagement between China and the United States, including the
multiple threats and counterthreats, the signing of the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property in January
1992,108 the adoption of the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property
Rights in February 1995,109 and the exchange of a report on the 1995
Agreement in June 1996.110 Although these bilateral instruments, in my
view, have been largely ineffective—creating what I have referred to as a
“cycle of futility”111—they have presented highly attractive topics for
107. See id. at 140–51 (describing the United States’ use of section 301 sanctions and
various trade threats to induce China to strengthen protection of intellectual property rights).
108. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property,
China-U.S., Jan. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995); see also Massey, supra note 90, at
235 (describing the 1992 MOU as “the first full bilateral IPR agreement” between
China and the United States).
109. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, China-U.S., Feb. 26, 1995,
34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement]; see also The U.S.-China Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement: Implications for U.S.-Sino Commercial Relations: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomms. on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of
the H. Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing a transcript of a
congressional hearing on the 1995 Agreement).
110. TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR., PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
1995 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AGREEMENT—1996 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
REPORT], http://tcc.export.gov/trade_agreements/all_trade_agreements/exp_0053
61.asp; see also The U.S.-China Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and Related Trade Issues:
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and
the Pacific of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1996) (providing the
transcript of a congressional hearing on the effectiveness of intellectual property
protection in China in the run-up to the 1996 Report). Some commentators have
referred to this report as the 1996 accord or an “exchange of letters.” As Professor
Mertha surmised, the use of the report format
was a nod to Chinese sensibilities: to call the 1995 agreement a Memorandum
of Understanding . . . would imply that the Chinese had failed to implement the
1992 MOU. The Chinese insisted the second agreement not be in the form of
an MOU; understanding the semantic significance, the U.S. side complied.
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 14.
111. Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO
China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 143 (2005); see
also Yu, supra note 101, at 140–48 (discussing this “cycle of futility”). As I described in
an earlier article,
That cycle went as follows: The United States began by threatening China with
trade sanctions (often with an ancillary threat of nonrenewal of China’s mostfavored-nation status). China responded with threats of retaliatory sanctions
of a similar amount. After several months of negotiations, both countries
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research on the Chinese intellectual property system.112
Before the early 1990s, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual
property system did not focus much on American intellectual property
policy toward China113 or issues relating to intellectual property
enforcement in the country.114 This prior scholarship seemed to have

agreed to an eleventh-hour compromise that usually led to a written
document. While intellectual property protection improved during the first
few months immediately following the agreements, piracy and counterfeiting
problems worsened once international attention was diverted. Within a short
period of time, American businesses again complained to the U.S.
government, and the cycle repeated itself.
Yu, supra, at 149; see also MERTHA, supra note 44, at 15 (“External pressure may have
succeeded in getting Beijing to promulgate satisfactory IPR-related laws and regulations,
but the enforcement of intellectual property, as with most policy in China, falls within
the domain of China’s complex bureaucracies and local government officials.”).
112. See generally Alford, supra note 89 (criticizing the wrong-headedness of the
American intellectual property policy toward China); Li, supra note 88, at 402–11
(noting the shortcomings of the enforcement mechanisms created by the 1995
Agreement and the 1996 report and underscoring the need for the use of a judicial
approach to address local protectionism and other underlying political, economic,
and social problems); Michael Yeh, Note, Up Against a Great Wall: The Fight Against
Intellectual Property Piracy in China, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 503, 515–21 (1996)
(exploring why the U.S. government’s strategy of using economic influence has not
led to the establishment of an effective intellectual property regime in China).
113. A rare exception is Baumgarten, supra note 57 (discussing the changing U.S.China copyright relations following the signing of the 1979 Agreement).
114. A rare exception is Stuart C. McCormack, Counterfeits in China, 77 TRADEMARK
REP. 133 (1987) (discussing the procedures and avenues for trademark holders to
address counterfeit goods in China). For later scholarship in this area, see generally
Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a
Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749 (2010); Daniel
C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2000)
[hereinafter Chow, Counterfeiting]; Daniel C.K. Chow, Enforcement Against Counterfeiting
in China, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 447 (2000); Daniel C.K. Chow, Organized Crime, Local
Protectionism, and the Trade in Counterfeit Goods in China, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 473
(2003); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 203 (2006) [hereinafter Chow, Commercial Piracy]; Eric Priest, The Future
of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 795 (2006). For articles
offering useful practical tips for enforcing intellectual property rights, see generally
Jack Chang, Practical Enforcement of IP in China: Suggestions and Comments from the Quality
Brands Protection Committee (QBPC), in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 54, at 367; John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner,
Swashbuckling the Pirates: A Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in China, in
CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 409; Eric M.
Griffin, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the
People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 187–96 (1998); Thomas
Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China, in
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taken for granted (somewhat naïvely) that China would effectively
enforce intellectual property laws once they had been put in place.
The scholarship after the mid-1990s, however, no longer make this
misguided assumption.115 Instead, a growing volume of literature
closely examined the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China and
proposed solutions to address them.
Specifically, the scholarship covered the introduction of a special
enforcement period through the 1995 Agreement,116 the
reinstatement of this period in June 1996,117 and the various
enforcement campaigns that China subsequently launched. This
coverage shows that policymakers and commentators started to
become aware that the intellectual property problems in China were
less about the lack of intellectual property laws than about the failure
to enforce those laws.118 As the USTR noted in the 2001 National Trade
Estimate Report, shortly before China’s admission to the WTO, rampant
intellectual property violations in the country were largely attributed
to “poor enforcement of existing laws and regulations, combined with
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 54, at 7.
115. See, e.g., ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA: THE ROOTS OF
THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT viii (1996) (“There has been an expanding literature
on the intellectual property situation in China but most of it is devoted to an exposition
of what is found in the laws, that is in the black letter aspect of them, as opposed to
the relevance of those laws to, and impact on, the social, economic and technological
conditions . . . in China now or in the foreseeable future.”).
116. See Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, pmbl., § IC, in 1995 Agreement, supra note 109 (providing for a sixmonth special enforcement period, during which China would make intensive efforts
to crack down on major infringers of intellectual property rights and to target regions
in which infringing activity was particularly rampant at the time of the agreement).
117. See 1996 REPORT, supra note 110 (“The United States asked China for a second major
step—reinstatement of the ‘Special Enforcement Period’ provided for in the Agreement.”).
118. See Peter Ganea & Jin Haijun, China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA: LAW,
ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND POLITICS 17, 31–32 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph Straus eds.,
2009) (“[M]odern laws transplanted from the West exist only on the books but are of
little practical relevance. In China, the gap between law on the books and actual
enforcement is the problem, not so much the remaining shortcomings of the present
legislation.”); Shi Wei & Robert Weatherley, Harmony or Coercion—China-EU Trade
Dispute Involving Intellectual Property Enforcement, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 439, 443 (2007) (“The
crucial issue for China lies not in the enactment of new laws, but in the application of
existing laws.”); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 923–46 (2006) (“[T]he problem with
China is not a lack of laws, but the existence of too many.”); see also William P. Alford,
How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law
in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21 (1994) (noting that he was “tempted to write
an article entitled ‘Why China Has Too Much Law—And Too Little Legality’”).
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weak punishments.”119
Another major strand of scholarship appearing in this phase focused
on those changes China made to the intellectual property system in its
run-up to WTO accession.120 This strand of scholarship complemented
and reinforced the previous strand of scholarship, because WTO
accession and related reforms helped address the concerns the U.S.
government and intellectual property industries had over inadequate
intellectual property protection in China. Because WTO reforms are
often examined together, this strand of scholarship inevitably touched
on China’s “reform and open” (gaige kaifang) policies. These policies
garnered even more policy, scholarly, and media attention following
the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.121 While this crisis deeply
affected countries such as Japan, South Korea, and other leading Asian
economies, China’s economy managed to grow on a steady pace.122
The discussion of WTO-related developments in this phase is
complex and challenging. Not only did scholars need to capture fastpace developments, which were often moving targets, they also had to
119. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 55 (2001), https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2001/2001_NTE_Report/asset_upload_fil
e535_6560.pdf.
120. See generally Li Yahong, The Wolf Has Come: Are China’s Intellectual Property
Industries Prepared for the WTO?, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77 (2002) (discussing the
amendments China introduced in the run-up to the WTO membership and the impact
such membership would have on the country and its intellectual property industries);
Julia Cheng, Note, China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an
Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 2005–12 (1998)
(discussing the potential improvements in the Chinese intellectual property system
that WTO accession could spark).
121. See CHANG HA-JOON, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE: THE MIRACLE,
THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE 179–225 (2006) (discussing the 1997 Asian financial crisis
and its implications).
122. See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 18 (2006) (“China has been
the world’s fastest growing economy for almost three decades, expanding at any
average pace of almost 10 percent.”); Yu, supra note 94, at 173 (“Since the late 1980s,
the Chinese economy has been growing at an enviable average annual rate of about
ten per cent.”); see also ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINA’S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS
178 (2005) (noting “Beijing’s careful responses to the crisis, including its pledges to
maintain economic growth, eschew devaluation of the Chinese currency, support IMF
rescue efforts, and provide supplementary support of $1 billion to Thailand and a
reported several billion dollars to Indonesia”); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements,
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 996 (2011) (noting China’s ability to provide financial
assistance to Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian countries during the Asian financial
crisis and its decision not to exacerbate the crisis by devaluing the renminbi).
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address the substantial changes that were simultaneously occurring in
the international intellectual property regime in the early to
mid-1990s. These changes included, most notably, those caused by the
arrival of the TRIPS Agreement123 and the mainstreaming of the
internet.124 Taking note of these changes, some scholarship in this
phase not only focused on domestic intellectual property reforms in
China, but also featured discussion of the dramatic changes within the
international intellectual property regime.125
When considered together, these two major strands of scholarship
reveal a clean break from scholarship in the previous phase. While there
were occasional articles covering the transition of the Chinese intellectual
property system from the mid-1980s,126 scholarship in this phase seems to
have broken the timeline and jumpstarted with a new direction. This new
direction was generated externally by the United States’ aggressive
intellectual property policy toward China, internally by reforms that
China eagerly undertook in its effort to join the WTO, or both.

123. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 3–27 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS
Agreement); DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002) (examining the role of intellectual property industries in
the TRIPS negotiations); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 96-120 (2003)
(recounting the trilateral discussions among the United States, the European Union,
and Japan); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11–47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the
TRIPS Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 369, 371–79 (2006) (examining four different accounts of the origins of the
TRIPS Agreement).
124. See generally COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2000) (discussing the challenges the internet has
posed to the copyright system).
125. For discussions of the Chinese intellectual property system in relation to the
TRIPS Agreement, see generally Reiko R. Feaver, Comment, China’s Copyright Law and
the TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 431 (1996); Michael N. Schlesinger,
Note, A Sleeping Giant Awakens: The Development of Intellectual Property Law in China,
9 J. CHINESE L. 93 (1995); Amy E. Simpson, Comment, Copyright Law and Software
Regulations in the People’s Republic of China: Have the Chinese Pirates Affected World Trade,
20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 575 (1994).
126. Notable examples are the discussions of the 1990 Copyright Law and the 1992
Patent Law. For these discussions, see generally Shen, supra note 75; Yang Yiping, The
1990 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 260 (1993);
Laurence P. Harrington, Note, Recent Amendments to China’s Patent Law: The Emperor’s
New Clothes, 17 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337 (1994).
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D. Integration and Assimilation
The fourth phase began with China’s accession to the WTO. Unlike
the first three phases, this phase is the most clearly identifiable. At the
Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, WTO members
approved the proposal to admit China to the international trading
body.127 After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations,128 China formally
became the organization’s 143rd member on December 11, 2001.129
In this phase, the scholarship built heavily on scholarship in the
previous phase. Indeed, the overlap between these two phases has led
researchers to lump together the two phases in their analyses.
Combining these two phases is also an approach I have taken in past
scholarship.130 While the previous phase covered the customization
and standardization efforts before China’s WTO accession, the present
phase focused on post-accession developments.131
127. See Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, WTO Approves China’s Entry, WASH. POST,
Nov. 11, 2001, at A47 (reporting China’s admission to the WTO); Joseph Kahn, World
Trade Organization Admits China, amid Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at 1A (same).
128. As Michael Schlesinger observed,
China was a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[GATT] in 1947, but in the aftermath of the retreat of Chiang Kaishek’s
Nationalist forces to the island of Taiwan in October 1949 and the rise to power
of the Communists on the mainland, the Nationalist government gave
notification to the GATT Secretariat in March 1950 that China was withdrawing
from the GATT. On July 14, 1986, the government of the People’s Republic of
China formally notified the GATT Secretariat of its intention to seek
“resumption” of its status as a contracting party[.] From late 1986 until the
founding of the WTO on January 1, 1995, China has been permitted to
participate in the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations as an observer.
However, China ultimately failed in its primary objective: persuading the GATT
contracting parties to allow it into the GATT before the founding of the WTO.
Schlesinger, supra note 125, at 135–36 (footnotes omitted).
129. For discussions of China’s entry into the WTO, see generally CHINA IN THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT (Frederick M.
Abbott ed., 1998) [hereinafter CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; GORDON G.
CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA 187–212 (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY,
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1–28 (2002); PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: NATIONAL CHAMPIONS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS
REVOLUTION 195–209 (2001); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND
THE WTO: CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Peter K. Yu et al., China
and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003).
130. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 22, at 9–10 (combining the two phases
under the stage of standardization and customization); Yu, supra note 23, at 4–6
(dividing the development of the modern Chinese intellectual property system into
three distinct phases).
131. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN CHINA: CHINESE
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Notwithstanding the continuity from the pre-accession phase to the
post-accession phase, this Part separates scholarship in the
customization and standardization phase from scholarship in the
integration and assimilation phase. Such separation makes salient the
latter’s focus on China’s integration efforts and legal and policy
responses following WTO accession. For instance, a significant volume
of scholarship in the integration and assimilation phase analyzed the
amendments China adopted shortly before WTO accession.132 These
amendments included the Second Amendment to the Patent Law, the
First Amendment to the Copyright Law, and the Second Amendment
to the Trademark Law, which China adopted in August 2000, October
2001, and October 2001, respectively.133
One major incident that attracted considerable policy and scholarly
attention in this phase was the U.S.-China WTO dispute over the lack
of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights under
the TRIPS Agreement.134 This dispute marked the first time the United
States used the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process to address
the massive piracy and counterfeiting problems in China.135 Filed on
April 16, 2007, the United States’ complaint included four issues: (1) the
AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) (collecting articles that

discuss China’s effort to comply with the TRIPS Agreement following WTO accession).
132. For this body of scholarship, see generally Chen Jiwen, Better Patent Law for
International Commitment—The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
BUS. 61 (2001); Feng Xiaoqing & Frank Xianfeng Huang, International Standards and
Local Elements: New Developments of Copyright Law in China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
917 (2002); Ran Ruixue, Well-Known Trademark Protection in China: Before and After the
TRIPS Amendments to China’s Trademark Law, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231 (2002); Louis
S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United
States, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 319 (2002).
133. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective
Nov. 1, 2001) (China); Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000,
effective July 1, 2001) (China); Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended
Oct. 27, 2001, effective Dec. 1, 2001) (China).
134. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report]. For the Author’s discussions of this dispute, see
generally Yu, supra note 6; Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries,
26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011).
135. See Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm (last visited May 9, 2018) (listing
the disputes involving the TRIPS Agreement).
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high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual
property area; (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to
properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the denial
of copyright protection to works that have not been authorized for
publication or dissemination within China; and (4) the unavailability
of criminal procedures and penalties for infringing activities that
involved either reproduction or distribution, but not both.136
By the time the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to
address the complaint, the two parties had already resolved the fourth
claim.137 As a result, the panel considered only the three remaining
claims. In January 2009, after some initial delay, the WTO panel finally
released its long-awaited report.138 While China prevailed on the claim
concerning criminal thresholds,139 the United States won the censorship
claim.140 The remaining customs claim was somewhat divided between
the two parties,141 with each side declaring victory.142 With a 2–1 outcome,
neither China nor the United States appealed the panel decision to the
WTO Appellate Body.143

136. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/1
(Apr. 16, 2007) (providing the complaint).
137. Yu, supra note 6, at 1055.
138. WTO Panel Report, supra note 134.
139. See id. ¶ 8.1(a) (stating that the first sentence of Article 4 of the Chinese
Copyright Law is inconsistent with China’s obligations under Article 5(1) of the Berne
Convention as incorporated by Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and under Article
41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement); id. ¶¶ 7.396–.682 (analyzing the claim on criminal
thresholds); id. ¶ 8.1(c) (stating that “the United States has not established that the
criminal thresholds are inconsistent with China’s obligations under the first sentence
of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement”); Yu, supra note 6, at 1056–69, 1083–90
(discussing this claim and analyzing its limitations).
140. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶¶ 7.1–.192 (analyzing the censorship
claim); Yu, supra note 6, at 1074–81, 1096–1101 (discussing this claim and analyzing
its limitations).
141. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 8.1(b)(ii)–(iii) (stating that “the
United States has not established that the Customs measures are inconsistent with
Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, as it incorporates the principles set out in the first
sentence of Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement . . . [but that those] measures are
inconsistent with Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, as it incorporates the principle
set out in the fourth sentence of Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement”); ¶¶ 7.193–.395
(analyzing the customs claim); Yu, supra note 6, at 1056–74, 1091–96 (discussing this
claim and analyzing its limitations).
142. See Yu, supra note 6, at 1081–82 (discussing the reactions and assessments of
the Chinese and U.S. governments and other commentators).
143. Id. at 1082.
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Although scholarship on this dispute existed long before the release of
the WTO panel report,144 most commentaries emerged after the report
and well into the next phase of indigenization and transformation.145 A
notable collection of articles on this report was published as a special issue
on “The WTO China—IPR Case in Perspective” in the Journal of World
Intellectual Property.146 These “post-mortems” not only assessed the
dispute’s outcome and its ramifications for the WTO and its TRIPS
Agreement, but also covered many different aspects of the WTO panel
report, including interpretive methodology,147 TRIPS flexibilities,148

144. See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.-China WTO
Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 113–86 (2008) (analyzing the
complaint’s merits); Yu, supra note 118, at 923–46 (articulating five reasons why the
United States should not file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body over the inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China); Yu,
supra note 111, at 144–51 (arguing that the United States’ WTO complaint could
create a new “cycle of futility” and suggesting ways to avoid such a cycle); Zhu Lanye &
Liu Jiarui, Sino-US Intellectual Property Dispute: A New Chapter in WTO History, 3 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. & PRAC. 194, 199–200 (2008) (analyzing the four claims in the United States’
WTO complaint).
145. For discussions of the WTO panel report, see generally Rogier Creemers, The
Effects of World Trade Organisation Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, 31
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 568 (2009); Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549 (2009);
Xue Hong, An Anatomical Study of the United States Versus China at the World Trade
Organisation on Intellectual Property Enforcement, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 292 (2009);
Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through the TRIPS Agreement, in
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH 286 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012); Yu, supra note 6; Yu, supra note 134; see
also infra note 146 (listing additional sources collected in a special issue of the Journal
of World Intellectual Property).
146. This special issue includes the following articles: Tomer Broude, It’s Easily
Done: The China—Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Dispute and the Freedom of
Expression, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 660 (2010); Li Xuan, The Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Flexibilities on Intellectual Property Enforcement:
The World Trade Organization Panel Interpretation of China—Intellectual Property
Enforcement of Criminal Measures and Its Implications, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 639
(2010); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, China—Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for
TRIPS-plus Border Measures, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 620 (2010); Jayashree Watal, USChina Intellectual Property Dispute—A Comment on the Interpretation of the TRIPS Enforcement
Provisions, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 605 (2010).
147. See generally Watal, supra note 146 (discussing the panel report’s significance
for the interpretation of TRIPS enforcement provisions).
148. See generally Li, supra note 146 (examining the panel report’s findings on the
claim on criminal thresholds and their implications for TRIPS flexibilities).
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border measures,149 and freedom of expression.150
Another major incident that received considerable policy, scholarly,
and media attention worldwide was the Beijing Olympics in August
2008.151 The hosting of this world sporting event was a great source of
national pride among the Chinese populace.152 In the view of one
commentator, such hosting “not only would help position the country
in the global economy, but might also trickle ripple effects to
accelerate reforms in the country,” including intellectual property
reforms.153 Scholarship covering the Beijing Olympics therefore
discussed issues ranging from international integration to trademark
protection to intellectual property enforcement.154
149. See generally Ruse-Khan, supra note 146 (examining the panel report’s findings on
the customs claim and their potential application to TRIPS-plus enforcement measures).
150. See generally Broude, supra note 146 (exploring the human rights implications
of the panel report’s findings on the censorship claim and the potential negative
effects on the legal framework of the freedom of expression in China).
151. See Jim Yardley, Games Open in a New China, Dazzling an Age of New Media, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at A1 (reporting the opening of the Beijing Olympics).
152. See Peter K. Yu, The Curious Case of Fake Beijing Olympics Merchandise, in
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259,
272 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014) (“The pride Chinese nationals derived
from Beijing’s successful bid to host the Olympics was understandable, especially
against a background of China’s painful struggle with the ‘century of humiliation’ and
the ongoing and repeated criticisms the country has received from the United States
and other foreign powers. As with citizens of any host country of major international
sporting events, these proud individuals wanted to showcase the country’s ability to
meet international standards in the face of heavy media scrutiny.”).
153. Id. at 262; see also Steve Friess, The Trouble with Olympic Trinkets, USA TODAY, Dec. 12,
2001, at 6B (quoting Michael Payne, marketing director of the International Olympic
Committee, in his assertion that “there are high expectations and hopes that the Olympics
will be an important catalyst for China’s trademark protection, just as it was in Korea”).
154. See generally Yu, supra note 152 (closely scrutinizing the intellectual property
developments during and in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics to determine whether
this important world event has provided the much-needed example to show that China
could effectively address the counterfeiting problem when national interests are at
stake); Brenda Pamela Mey (Ongech), China, the “Intellectual Property Black Hole” Hosts
the XXIX Olympiad: Measures the People’s Republic of China Undertook to Secure the Protection
of Olympic-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 153 (2009)
(discussing the efforts China undertook to protect Olympics-related intellectual
property rights and the continuing problems in the country); Yu, supra note 118, at
991–99 (discussing the Chinese authorities’ heightened efforts to protect trademarks
used in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympics); Jennifer L. Donatuti, Note, Can China
Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics Be Protected from China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
203 (2007) (discussing the challenges that would prevent China from offering
sufficient protection to intellectual property rights related to the Beijing Olympics);
Stacey H. Wang, Note, Great Olympics, New China: Intellectual Property Enforcement Steps
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Notwithstanding the significance of both the WTO panel report and
the Beijing Olympics, the timing of these events has presented some
taxonomical challenges for scholarship in this phase. Although both
events were held just when China was changing its intellectual property
system from a transplant-based model to one focusing on independent
innovation, scholarship regarding these events fit much better here
than in the next phase of indigenization and transformation.
From a chronological standpoint, the United States filed the WTO
complaint in this phase even though the WTO panel did not release
its report until two years later. Likewise, China had been planning the
Beijing Olympics since its winning bid in July 2001.155 Those years of
planning took place long before the development of the National
Intellectual Property Strategy.
From a research standpoint, the scholarship on both events also tie
well to scholarship in this phase. Both the WTO panel report and the
Beijing Olympics reflected China’s effort to assimilate international
standards and to integrate with the outside world. Scholarship on the
latter, in particular, foregrounded issues about global integration.
Because the International Olympic Committee had dictated many new
intellectual property standards the same way the WTO did,156 the
scholarship on the Beijing Olympics and post-WTO accession
adjustments bore remarkable similarities.
E. Indigenization and Transformation
The last phase began with the State Council’s release of the National
Intellectual Property Strategy in June 2008,157 a couple of months
before the Beijing Olympics. This nationwide strategy provided a
comprehensive plan to improve the creation, utilization, protection,
and administration of intellectual property rights.158 Specifically,
up to the Mark, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291 (2005) (discussing the unique
opportunity provided by the Beijing Olympics to set the framework needed to
strengthen foreign intellectual property rights).
155. See Jere Longman, Beijing Wins Bid for 2008 Olympic Games, N.Y. TIMES, July 14,
2001, at A1 (reporting China’s winning bid).
156. See Yu, supra note 152, at 264 (“Since the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the
[International Olympic Committee] has focused an increased amount of attention on
the intellectual property aspects of the Games.”); see also id. at 262–64 (discussing Beijing
Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad and a wide variety of legal
measures that China introduced in the run-up to the Olympics); Donatuti, supra note
154, at 206–09 (discussing the Committee’s role in the Olympic Games).
157. NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 24.
158. See id. pmbl. (“This Outline is formulated for the purpose of improving China’s
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paragraph 7 emphasized the need for active development of
independent or self-controlled intellectual property (zizhu zhishi
chanquan).159 As this Section will discuss further, this emphasis would
eventually cause policymakers and commentators from the United
States, Europe, and other parts of the world to link its discussion to
protectionist indigenous innovation policies.160
The origin of China’s National Intellectual Property Strategy traced
back to the mid-2000s when government leaders began to consider
major changes to move the economy forward. These laws were well
aware of the need to develop a new overall economic strategy to “avoid
what policymakers and commentators have described as the ‘middleincome trap’—the proverbial state of development at which a country
is stuck after it has attained a certain level of wealth, but has yet to catch
up with its more developed counterparts.”161
In February 2006, the State Council released the National Long-term
Scientific and Technological Development Program, formally
declaring its commitment to turn China into an innovation-based
economy within fifteen years.162 Since then, top Chinese leaders
increasingly recognized the economic and strategic significance of a
well-functioning intellectual property system. As the State Intellectual
Property Office recounted in its 2008 report,
During the Ninth Collective Study of the 17th [Chinese Communist
Party] Politburo, General Secretary Hu Jintao stressed specifically the
importance of sticking to innovation with Chinese characteristics,
energetically implementing the strategy of making the country
prosperous with science and technology, the strategy of capitalizing
on talent to make the country strong, IP [intellectual property]
strategy, and accelerating the construction of innovative country.

capacity to create, utilize, protect and administer intellectual property, making China
an innovative country and attaining the goal of building a moderately prosperous
society in all respects.”).
159. Id. ¶ 7.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 168–77 (discussing the linkage between the two).
161. Yu, supra note 93, at 27.
162. State Council, The Outline of the National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science
and Technology Development (2006–2020) § II(1) (2006), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/200602/09/content_183787.htm and translated in http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/
123%286%29.pdf. For discussions of this fifteen-year plan, see generally Cao Cong et
al., China’s 15-Year Science and Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 38; Feng
Xiaoqing, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent Innovation and
Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law of the P.R. China,
9 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2009); Liang, supra note 17, at 483–84.
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When addressing the Party’s meeting mobilizing the study and
practice of scientific outlook on development, Premier Wen Jiabao
said, “One thing necessary to stress is to concretely strengthen IPR
[intellectual property right] protection. In the new era, competition
of world science and technology as well as economy is mainly
competition of IPRs. Underscoring IP protection is underscoring and
inspiring innovation.” . . . Vice Premier Wang Qishan published an
article in his own name entitled China no longer tolerates piracy,
infringement on the Chinese version of the Wall Street Journal . . . .163

Although there had been lengthy policy discussion, scholarship on
the National Intellectual Property Strategy did not emerge in
intellectual property literature until after the launch of the new
strategy.164 Until then, that strategy was occasionally mentioned.
Moreover, because China released its National Intellectual Property
Strategy only a few months before the adoption of the Third
Amendment to the Patent Law in December 2008,165 scholarship in this
163. State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
Intellectual Property Protection in 2008, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/
200904/t20090427_457167.html (last visited May 9, 2018); see also PANG LAIKWAN,
CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES 8 (2012) (“If gaige kaifang (reform and open) was the
dominant policy principle of the [Chinese] government in the 1980s and 1990s, the
recent Hu Jintao government has shifted its attention to gaige chuangxin (reform and
innovation), emphasizing the importance of innovation and production of the new.”
(Chinese characters omitted)); Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress: The
Development of the Intellectual Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 120 (2009)
(“Strengthening the building of China’s system of intellectual property right and
vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, management, protection and
application regarding intellectual property are our urgent need for the purpose of
enhancing independent and self-driven innovation capabilities and building an
innovation-oriented country.” (quoting President Hu Jintao’s remarks in the Group
Study of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party in May 2006)).
164. See generally PRUD’HOMME, supra note 17 (discussing the impact of China’s new
patent policies and practices on innovation); Liang, supra note 17, at 483–91
(discussing China’s plans to become an innovative society); Ken Shao, Neoliberal
Capitalism and China’s Strategic Patent Framework for the Global Intellectual Property Regime,
8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 15 (2018) (discussing how the neoliberal capitalist view
of the global intellectual property regime fails to explain the design and
implementation of China’s strategic patent framework); Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-Repeated
Questions About China’s Recent Rise as a Patent Power, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 78,
88–101 (discussing China’s national intellectual property strategy and the push for the
active development of independent intellectual property); Yu, supra note 6, at 1122–
24 (discussing the concerns raised by China’s domestic innovation policies).
165. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1,
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phase often discussed the two topics together.166
From a research standpoint, the development of this amendment
was particularly noteworthy, as it reflected China’s eagerness to make
adjustment to its intellectual property system based mostly on internal
needs, as opposed to external demands.167 Up to that point,
intellectual property reforms in China focused primarily on
compliance with external norms. The development of the strategy and
the new patent law amendment also redirected scholarship on the
Chinese intellectual property system. Instead of continuing to address
issues that are of great concern to foreign governments and rights
holders—such as the massive piracy and counterfeiting problems in
China—scholarship emerging after this point has turned to other
issues that are equally interesting and significant to Chinese
policymakers and the local populace.
In this phase of indigenization and transformation—which is still
ongoing—the scholarship has focused mostly on law and policy
changes that China has introduced to implement and “perfect” its
National Intellectual Property Strategy. In addition to the latest round
of amendments to the copyright, patent, trademark, and unfair
competition laws, scholarship in this phase has covered new topics such
as indigenous innovation168—a topic that has greatly troubled foreign
2009), arts. 39–40 (China).
166. See, e.g., LI YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 2–3 (2010) (linking the strategy’s
discussion with that of the new patent law amendment); Stefan Luginbühl, China’s
Patent Policy, in PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA, supra note 54, at 3, 4–11 (same); Stefan
Luginbuehl & Thomas Pattloch, China’s New Patent Policy, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
274 (2011) (same).
167. See Guo He, Patents, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY
LAWS, supra note 54, at 25, 28 (“The impetus for the early amendments came from
outside, whilst the need for the third amendment [to the Patent Law] originated from
within China, that is to say, the majority of the third amendment was to meet the needs
of the development of the domestic economy and technology originating in China.”);
Yu, supra note 93, at 27–28 (noting that “China, for the first time, adjusted its patent
standards based on its own needs”).
168. For discussions of China’s independent innovation policies, see PRUD’HOMME,
supra note 17, at 75–115; Feng Xiaoqing, Challenges to China’s Self-Driven Innovation and
Intellectual Property Practice, in INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA:
STRATEGIES, CONTEXTS AND CHALLENGES 80 (Ken Shao & Feng Xiaoqing eds., 2014)
[hereinafter INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA]; An Siyuan & Brian
Peck, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in the Context of Its WTO Obligations and
Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375 (2011); Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Indigenous
Innovation Policies and the World Trade Organization, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81 (2013);
Ken Shao, Zizhu Chuangxin and China’s Self-Driven Innovation: Calling for a Holistic
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governments and intellectual property industries.169 Indeed, China’s
new indigenous innovation policies were so problematic that the
Trump administration launched a section 301 investigation of China
in August 2017.170 The WTO complaint that the USTR recently filed
also underscored the concerns raised by these policies.171 Focusing on
Articles 3 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement,172 the complaint alleged
that “China deprive[d] foreign intellectual property rights holders of
the ability to protect their intellectual property rights in China as well
as freely negotiate market-based terms in licensing and other
technology-related contracts.”173
As I noted in prior scholarship, indigenous innovation is actually not

Perspective, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 168, 169; Yu, supra note 6, at 1122–24.
169. As the U.S. International Trade Commission stated in its 2011 report,
China’s indigenous innovation policies, which promote the development,
commercialization, and procurement of Chinese products and technologies,
are of recent origin. In some industries, they appear to have eroded the
competitive positions of U.S. and other foreign firms in China while creating
new barriers to foreign direct investment . . . and exports. More generally,
U.S. firms are concerned about the future implications of China’s evolving
policies in such areas as preferential support to Chinese firms and the
implementation of China-specific technical standards.
ITC Report, supra note 18, at xiii; see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 69 (2010) (“A
troubling trend that has emerged . . . is China’s willingness to encourage domestic or
‘indigenous’ innovation at the cost of foreign innovation and technologies.”); Yu,
supra note 93, at 35–36 (“Since the release of [the National Intellectual Property
Strategy], US policymakers have translated the term as ‘indigenous intellectual
property’, suggesting China’s intention ‘to encourage domestic or “indigenous”
innovation at the cost of foreign innovation and technologies.’”); Travis Tanner,
Foreword to Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, China’s IP Transition: Rethinking
Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Asian Research, NBR
Special Report No. 29, 2011) (“The release of government procurement catalogues
and other government actions based on the nation’s policy of indigenous innovation
have . . . heightened foreign anxiety that China plans to develop domestic industries
by unfairly protecting the development of homegrown champions and forcing
technology transfers that undermine the rights of IP developers.”).
170. See Section 301 Investigation Press Release, supra note 19 (launching a section
301 investigation on Chinese laws, policies, and practices in the areas of intellectual
property, innovation, and technology development).
171. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23,
2018) [hereinafter WTO Complaint] (providing the complaint).
172. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3 (providing for national treatment);
id. art. 28 (conferring patent rights).
173. WTO Complaint, supra note 171, at 1.
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the best term to describe the focus of China’s new policies.174 A better
term is independent, self-driven, or self-controlled innovation. After all,
as far as those policies are concerned, the innovation involved does not
have to be homegrown or indigenous. As I noted in an earlier article,
As with many other Chinese terms, the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan”
does not translate well from Chinese to English. While [“zi”] can be
easily translated to “self,” “zhu” is much more complicated. As a noun,
the word refers to “master,” “owner,” or “host.” As a verb, the word
refers to “direct” or “manage.” As an adjective, the word refers to
“chief” or “main.” Thus, policymakers, commentators, and the media
have translated “zizhu” to “self-relied,” “self-driven,” “self-controlled,”
“self-owned,” “indigenous,” “homegrown,” or “independent.” Out of
all the terms, the word “independent” seems to best capture the term’s
original meaning while preserving its useful Western connotations.175

Thus, when the term is put in the right cultural, linguistic, and
historic contexts, its emphasis is on independence, self-reliance, and
control.176 To some extent, the term zizhu zhishi chanquan and the
174. As I noted in an earlier article,
[T]he term “zizhu” intellectual property certainly covers more than
“indigenous” or “homegrown” intellectual property. Although the term
“independent intellectual property” does not provide a direct translation, it
accurately reflects that “zizhu” intellectual property can be developed or
acquired from abroad or involve China-based entities with minority foreign
ownership. The key to identifying certain intellectual property as “zizhu” is
whether such an asset is independently controlled by Chinese individuals,
firms, or the government.
Yu, supra note 164, at 94–95; see also Shao, supra note 168, at 170 (offering a definition
of zizhu chuangxin, or self-driven innovation). Dan Prud’homme traced the origin of
the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” to the automotive policies in the mid-1990s:
Consultations suggest that the term originated in the mid-1990s [when] it was
used in policy advice to build domestic IPR in the Chinese automobile
industry. At the turn of the new millennium, the term was used in important
policy guidance, which is still in effect, from state leader Jiang Zemin at an
April 2nd 2000 conference on the Exhibition on China’s Fifteen-Year
Achievements in Patent Work.
There is solid evidence . . . that the term typically means IP ownership,
including acquired ownership, by a Chinese entity, which in some cases
expressly is said to exclude entities with a majority foreign ownership.
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 17, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
175. Yu, supra note 164, at 94 (footnote omitted).
176. As Feng Xiaoqing observed,
The goal of China’s zizhu chuangxin (self-driven innovation) is to improve
China’s ability in innovation. The key is to realize the combination of the
breakthrough of core technologies within institutional innovation; its basic
meaning is to emphasize the autonomy of innovation, or to consider that self-
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introduction of the National Intellectual Property Strategy reflected
the Chinese leaders’ frustration with the massive foreign control of
intellectual property rights, the licensing of which had drained a
considerable amount of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.177
Regardless of one’s terminology, however, scholarship in this phase
has focused on two related issues: (1) how China’s new strategy has
affected, or will affect, foreign businesses; and (2) whether that strategy
complies with WTO and other international standards.
One major strand of scholarship that the ongoing discussion of
independent innovation has sparked concerns the innovation models
driven innovation is the advanced stage of technological innovation or
scientific and technical innovation.
Feng, supra note 168, at 80; see also Ken Shao, The Cores and Contexts of China’s 21st-Century
National Innovation System, in INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA, supra
note 168, at 1, 6 (“Self-driven innovation means that Chinese enterprises perform with
their own power source, depend less on external or third-party intellectual fruits, and
thus increase their share in the global value chain. Self-driven innovation can and should
be achieved through different means, such as home-developed patents and original
cultural goods, foreign technology acquisition, share control, takeover, exclusive
licenses, collaborations, and marketing and branding strategies.”).
177. As Chen Jianfu noted,
Chinese firms are now paying hefty prices for foreign technology. According
to the Vice Minister for Science and Technology, Shang Yong, royalties now
paid to foreign firms amount to 20% of the mobile phone sales price and 30%
of the computer sales price, and for each DVD machine sold, the Chinese firm
only makes US$1 in profit, and 10 yuan for each TV sold.
CHEN, supra note 22, at 617–18; see also Chow, supra note 168, at 89 (“[T]he U.S.
licensor will typically charge licensing fees or royalties, which may be onerous. [In
addition], the U.S. licensor may be unwilling to license its most advanced, cutting-edge
technologies, but will only license secondary or outdated technologies to the Chinese
licensee.”); Xue Hong, Between the Hammer and the Block: China’s Intellectual Property
Rights in the Network Age, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 291, 300 (2005) (“The high licence
fees of IPRs are taking a toll on China’s economic development . . . . Foreign IPRs are
believed to suffocate market competition and to reinforce the dominant status of
foreign enterprises in the Chinese market.”); Yu, supra note 101, at 189–90 (noting
that “Chinese leaders consider[ed] intellectual property rights as weapons that were
designed specifically to protect the West’s dominant position and the United States’s
hegemony, to drain the Chinese purse, and to slow down China’s economic progress
and its rise in world affairs” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Edgardo Buscaglia, Can Intellectual
Property in Latin America Be Protected?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING
MARKETS 96, 111 (Clarisa Long ed., 2000) (noting that Latin American countries “have
traditionally used intellectual property rights as an instrument for regulating
technology transfer and avoiding royalty payments on innovations from the developed
world”); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global
Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) (“Paying for imports or
royalties is thus seen as an economic burden fostering a negative balance of trade.”).
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and innovative capabilities of Chinese companies, especially those of
the national champions in the high-technology area.178 Although this
body of scholarship, which Section II.B will discuss in greater detail,179
originates from mostly business and management scholars, it has been
well received by legal scholars and has attracted considerable attention
from those conducting empirical research or policy analyses.180
An additional, but somewhat limited, strand of scholarship in this
phase pertains to China’s changing position in the international
trading and intellectual property systems.181 As China is slowly moving
from its oft-discussed roles of a norm-breaker and a norm-taker to the
new roles of a norm-shaker and a norm-maker, this body of literature
178. As Daniel Chow explained,
One key goal of [China’s indigenous innovation policies] is to develop “national
champions”: Chinese companies that aspire to compete effectively with the
largest and most powerful multinational companies . . . in the world today.
Since innovation and advanced technology are crucial requirements of
competitiveness in the modern global economy, a key component of these
strategies is to spur Chinese entities to develop the capacity to create innovative
and advanced technologies . . . . In China’s view, it can never ascend to the
leading ranks of industrialized nations if it continues to be a recipient or
importer of advanced technologies or IP created by innovator countries, such as
the United States. Innovator countries are often reluctant to provide access to
their “core” technologies but often only provide access to their secondary
technologies in order to preserve a competitive advantage. China wants to
become a leading innovator country in its own right and does not want to
depend on access to technology from the United States, Japan, and western
European nations, which now dominate the area of technology innovation.
Chow, supra note 168, at 82–83; see also ITC Report, supra note 18, at 5–27 (discussing
how China’s indigenous innovation policies have contributed to the success of
“national champions” in the country).
179. See infra text accompanying notes 248–59 (discussing this body of scholarship).
180. See Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 525, 571–73 (2012) (discussing this body of scholarship).
181. See generally Bryan Mercurio, China, Intellectual Property Rights and the WTO:
Challenging but Not a Challenge to the Existing Legal Order, in CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER: NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 293, 316 (Lisa Toohey et
al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER] (discussing
how China has “narrowly interpret[ed] its commitments and engage[d] in excessive
legalism as a shield against unwelcome scrutiny”); Peter K. Yu, The First Decade of TRIPS
in China [hereinafter Yu, First Decade], in CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE: CHINA’S
FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 126 (Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds., 2013)
[hereinafter CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE] (reviewing the intellectual
property developments in China in its first decade of the WTO membership); Peter K.
Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011)
[hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom] (discussing China’s participation in the international
intellectual property regime and its role in both the WTO and WIPO).
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has become quite significant.182 Because the literature involves not
only legal scholars but also those interested in geopolitics and
international relations, Section II.C will provide further discussion.183
F. Closing Observations
The previous Sections have discussed the five phases in which fairly
distinctive bodies of scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system have emerged. To enrich our understanding of the evolution
of this system, and to bring the five disparate phases closer to each
other, this Section offers four closing observations.
First, as the previous Sections have shown, the separation between
the different phases is not always clear-cut. For example, scholarship
in the third phase of customization and standardization and the fourth
phase of integration and assimilation overlapped considerably, with
WTO accession being the main divide. Similarly, scholarship on the
WTO panel report and the Beijing Olympics fit better with the fourth
phase, even though both events occurred after the beginning of the fifth
phase of indigenization and transformation. For researchers studying
the Chinese intellectual property system, understanding the continuity
from phase to phase and the historical contexts behind each phase will
likely be essential. After all, this system has been developing in an
incremental fashion. As many commentators have noted, such
incremental developments can be vividly captured by the phrase
“groping for stones to cross the river” (mozhe shitou guohe),184 a concept
182. In an earlier article, I noted the path of norm engagement China has
undertaken in the international intellectual property arena:
Although piracy and counterfeiting remain major problems within the country,
China is not the traditional norm breaker one typically infers from its
disappointing record of intellectual property protection. Instead, the country
has been a norm taker for most of its participation in the international
intellectual property regime. As its strength, experience, and self-confidence
grow, it slowly assumes the additional roles of a norm shaker and a norm maker.
Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 181, at 258–59; see also Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global
Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker and, Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING
GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011) (noting China’s move
from rule-taker to rule-shaker to rule-maker in the international trade regime).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 283–308 (discussing this body of scholarship).
184. See JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004) (“[T]he Beijing
Consensus still holds tightly to [Deng Xiaoping’s] pragmatic idea that the best path
for modernisation is one of ‘groping for stones to cross the river,’ instead of trying to
make one-big, shock-therapy leap.”); Yu, supra note 93, at 27 (“[A] stronger focus on
intellectual property developments fits within the incremental approach that Chinese
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endorsed by Deng Xiaoping.185
Second, even though the phases discussed in this Part are arranged by
chronological order, they have been episodic and punctuated by isolated
major incidents.
Similar to what Bruce Ackerman has coined
“constitutional moments,”186 these incidents have attracted so much
scholarly attention that they have inevitably colored scholarship in the
relevant phase. Indeed, China scholars are accustomed to discussing
incidents.187 Key incidents explored in the previous Sections included the
signing of the 1979 Agreement; the adoption of the trademark, patent,
and copyright laws in the 1980s and early 1990s; the U.S.-China trade wars
in the early to mid-1990s; China’s WTO accession; the U.S.-China TRIPS
dispute; the Beijing Olympics; the adoption of the National Intellectual
Property Strategy; and China’s active involvement in or exclusion from
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade negotiations.
Third, it remains unclear what phase, or phases, will follow the fifth
phase of indigenization and transformation, which is still ongoing.
Indeed, it will be quite difficult to predict how the Chinese or
international intellectual property system will evolve in the future. Adrian
Johns showed provocatively how “profound shift[s] in the relation
between creativity and commerce”188 had occurred “about once every

leaders have carefully implemented over the years, which some commentators have
referred to as ‘groping for stones to cross the river’ . . . .”); Yu, supra note 164, at 99
(“[I]t is the Chinese leaders’ pragmatic approach in ‘groping for stones to cross the
river’ (mozhe shitou guohe) and their willingness to consider a wide variety of options.”
(footnotes omitted)).
185. See CHEN, supra note 22, at 623 (“Deng Xiaoping was not only pragmatic, he
was also realistic. Thus he neither pushed for ‘Big Bang’ therapy, nor did he try to
change the politico-economic system as defined in the Constitution overnight. He
undertook a gradual process of transformation, politically, economically and
administratively.”).
186. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 266–94 (1991) (discussing
“constitutional moment[s]” and the higher lawmaking process).
187. See generally Keith J. Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang
Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006) (discussing citizen action surrounding the Sun Zhigang
Incident); Jiang Min, Internet Events, in THE INTERNET IN CHINA: CULTURAL, POLITICAL,
AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS (1980–2000S) 211 (Ashley Esarey & Randolph Kluver eds.,
2014) (outlining the major actors, issues, causes, places, and mobilization of Chinese
internet events or incidents in China); Liu Chenglin, Profits Above the Law: China’s
Melamine Tainted Milk Incident, 79 MISS. L.J. 371 (2009) (discussing the food safety
regulatory issues surrounding the tainted milk incident in China).
188. ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO
GATES 498 (2009).
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century, in fact, since the end of the Middle Ages.”189 As he reminded us,
The last major [turning point] occurred at the height of the
industrial age, and catalyzed the invention of intellectual property.
Before that, another took place in the Enlightenment, when it led
to the emergence of the first modern copyright system and the first
modern patents regime. And before that, there was the creation of
piracy in the 1660s–1680s. By extrapolation, we are already overdue
to experience another revolution of the same magnitude. If it does
happen in the near future, it may well bring down the curtain on
what will then, in retrospect, come to be seen as a coherent epoch
of about 150 years: the era of intellectual property.190

Professor Johns’s prognostication, while provocative, seems to be well
supported by all the ongoing and pathbreaking developments
surrounding digital communication, Big Data, Internet of Things, 3D
printing, blockchains, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous
vehicles, nanotechnology, and synthetic biology.191
Finally, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system has
been cyclical. As a result, the scholarship in one phase can easily engage
with the scholarship in another. For instance, the discussion of China’s
responses to U.S. trade policy in the third phase of customization and
standardization easily brings to mind similar responses regarding the
various commercial treaties that China signed in the wake of its defeat
following the Boxer Uprising in 1900.192 A notable example is the 1903
189. Id. at 508.
190. Id.
191. Mark Lemley captured some of these developments:
3D printers can manufacture physical goods based on any digital design.
While home 3D printers are so far quite limited in size and materials, there
are tens of thousands of printing designs available on the Internet already, and
larger commercial-scale printers can print anything from circuit boards to
rocket engines to human organs on site for the cost of the raw materials and
some electricity. Synthetic biology has automated the manufacture of copies
of not just existing genetic sequences, but also any custom-made gene
sequence, allowing anyone who wants to create a gene sequence of their own
to upload the sequence to a company that will “print” it using the basic
building blocks of genetics. And advances in robotics generalize the principle
beyond goods, offering the prospect that many of the services humans now
supply will be provided free of charge by general-purpose machines that can
be programmed to perform a variety of complex functions.
Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 461–62 (2015)
(footnote omitted).
192. During the Boxer Uprising, members of a fin-de-siècle secret society, backed by
Empress Dowager, brutally murdered missionary families, foreign ministers and
diplomats, and Chinese converts. They also besieged embassies and burned churches
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Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the
Commercial Relations Between Them,193 which has been frequently
mentioned in scholarship on the early history of the Chinese
intellectual property system. Referred to by some commentators as the
Shanghai Treaty based on the place of signing, this treaty built upon
the newly adopted Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property,194 to which the United States acceded in 1887.195 It granted
copyright, patent, and trademark protection to Americans in return for
reciprocal protection to the Chinese.196 As William Alford observed,
this treaty had the distinction of being “one of the first efforts by the
United States anywhere to use its strength bilaterally to bring about
greater intellectual property protection.”197
Taken together, these four closing observations have shown that
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system has been
interrelated, episodic, and cyclical. Although these observations are by
no means exhaustive, they provide useful insights into the five distinct
phases of developments that the Chinese intellectual property system
has seen thus far.
II. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY TURN
The previous Part has provided a chronology-based taxonomy of
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system. Although
most scholarship in this area has focused on law and policy, the
scholarship in the past two decades have brought with them scholars
from many other disciplines. To some extent, the increasingly
interdisciplinary nature of scholarship on the Chinese intellectual

and shops that sold foreign merchandise and books. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 387–
418 (discussing the Boxer Uprising).
193. Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the
Commercial Relations Between Them, China-U.S., Oct. 8, 1903, reprinted in 1 TREATIES
AND CONVENTIONS WITH OR CONCERNING CHINA AND KOREA, 1894–1904, TOGETHER WITH
VARIOUS STATE PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS AFFECTING FOREIGN INTERESTS 135 (William
Woodville Rockhill ed., 1904) [hereinafter 1903 Treaty].
194. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13
U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
195. WIPO-Administered
Treaties,
WORLD
INTELLECTUAL
PROP.
ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2 (last visited May 9, 2018).
196. 1903 Treaty, supra note 193, arts. 9–11. Interestingly, out of the three
commercial treaties China signed with Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in
the early 1900s, only this treaty included patent protection. See ALFORD, supra note 94,
at 37–38 (discussing the 1903 Treaty).
197. Alford, supra note 89, at 138.
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property system has paralleled a similarly interdisciplinary turn in
intellectual property scholarship in other areas.198 As the profile of
intellectual property law and policy rises, scholars in other disciplines
have become attracted to this fast-growing field.199 With the arrival of
these scholars, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
has become more inter- and multi-disciplinary as a result.
Thus far, intellectual property scholarship has featured many
198. See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 923, 940 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law]
(noting that “the ‘law and . . .’ movement has finally spread to international
intellectual property law, and the subject has become increasingly multidisciplinary”).
As I suggested in a previous article,
[B]ecause of the ever-expanding scope of intellectual property rights and the
ability for these rights to spill over into other areas of international regulation,
intellectual property training and educational programs should feature interand multi-disciplinary perspectives. Many of the existing programs focus
primarily on the legal aspects of intellectual property. However, it is
increasingly important to consider other aspects of intellectual property, such
as political, economic, social, and cultural.
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Training and Education for Development, 28 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 311, 328 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
199. As Professor Alford recounted,
It is scant exaggeration to suggest that until the 1970s, American legal
academe generally regarded intellectual property law as a subject of modest
intellectual merit, at least compared to such mainstays as constitutional law or
contract. As a consequence, with a few notable exceptions such as Professors
Melville Nimmer of UCLA and Edmund Kitch of the University of Virginia,
courses in this area were typically taught on a part-time basis by adjuncts and
addressed, if at all, in important scholarly journals in a highly doctrinal or
technical manner. Relatively little of the economic, philosophical, or other
extra-legal disciplinary frameworks that had already begun to inform other
areas of the law was brought to bear in this area.
William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter: American Approaches to
Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 9 (1994); see also
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 23 (“[U]ntil recently IPR remained a third-tier, ‘technical’
issue in the lexicon of U.S. trade policy because it is often articulated in a seemingly
arcane discourse that presupposes a considerable degree of specialization and
expertise. As a result, much discussion on intellectual property remains somewhat
esoteric and inaccessible.”); William P. Alford, Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan:
A GATT-Fly’s View, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 98 (“I can remember when intellectual
property was seen as a backwater issue—particularly as concerns East Asia. That, of
course, changed enormously in the 1980s.”); Yu, Teaching International Intellectual
Property Law, supra note 198, at 924 (“Intellectual property law was in the backwater
only a few decades ago. The Section on Intellectual Property Law of the Association
of American Law Schools . . . was not even founded until the early 1980s, and the
creation of intellectual property specialty programs has been a recent phenomenon.”
(footnotes omitted)).

1092

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1045

disciplines. To highlight the growing inter- and multi-disciplinary
interests, the WIPO Journal has devoted the first issue of each volume
to a different area of disciplinary focus. The areas that the journal has
covered in its past eight volumes are law and policy, economics,
political science and international relations, culture, history,
geography, philosophy, and development studies.200 Although the
limited length and scope of this Part do not allow for a comprehensive
analysis of the different disciplinary engagement with the Chinese
intellectual property system, this Part illustrates the interdisciplinary
turn in scholarship by focusing on three broadly defined multidisciplinary clusters within which scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system has emerged outside the area of law and
policy: (1) philosophy and culture; (2) economics, innovation, and
creative industries; and (3) politics and international relations.
A. Philosophy and Culture
Chinese philosophy and culture has been an important entry point
to understanding not only intellectual property law and policy in
China, but also the Chinese legal system in general.201 It is not
uncommon for scholars in both areas to discuss the historic distinction
between li (rituals or rites) and fa (law and punishment) in Chinese
culture.202 Such distinctions trace back to the age-old tension between
200. See Peter K. Yu, Five Decades of Intellectual Property and Global Development, 8 WIPO J.
1, 7 (2016) (“[E]very year since its inception, [the WIPO Journal] has devoted a special issue
to highlighting intellectual property research in a different discipline. Thus far, the journal
has published special issues on law and policy (Vol.1), economics (Vol.2), politics and
international relations (Vol.3), culture (Vol.4), history (Vol.5), geography (Vol.6) and
philosophy (Vol.7).”); id. at 10 (stating that the special issue in Volume 8 “has been
devoted to the development aspects of intellectual property rights”).
201. See Koen Lemmens, Comparative Law as an Act of Modesty: A Pragmatic and Realistic
Approach to Comparative Legal Scholarship, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW
302, 306 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2014) (“Law is first and foremost a
cultural phenomenon, and a deep understanding of a legal order presupposes sound
knowledge of the culture in which it is embedded.”); Gary Watt, Comparison as Deep
Appreciation, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 82, 84–85 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed.,
2012) (“Comparison between the laws of national jurisdictions will remain superficial
unless we week to appreciate those laws in the contexts of their local cultures, and
comparison between laws in their cultures will remain superficial unless we appreciate
that law is not alien to other cultural arts, but is closely akin to them.”).
202. As I elaborated in an earlier article,
Broadly defined, li extended beyond one’s proper conduct or etiquette and
covered the whole range of political, social, and familial relationships that
encompass a harmonious Confucian society. People who were guided by this
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Confucianism and Legalism.203 While the former focuses on normative
roles, responsibilities, obligations, and a wide range of political, social,
and familial relationships, the latter sought to use penal law, physical
concept always understood their normative roles, responsibilities, and
obligations to others. They were also ready to adjust their views and demands in
order to accommodate other people’s needs and desires, to avoid confrontation
and conflict, and to preserve harmony. As a result, litigation and promotion of
individual rights became unnecessary in a Confucian society.
In contrast to li, “fa is a penal concept; it is associated with punishment,
serving to maintain public order through the threat of force and physical
violence.” Unlike the Confucianists, the Legalists believed that it was impossible
to teach people to be good. Thus, fa is needed to tell people what to do and to
induce them to do what they should do. Except in the Qin dynasty in the third
century B.C., fa jia (legalism) has never been the dominant Chinese ideology.
In fact, the Chinese always viewed fa unfavorably and associated it with the harsh
and despotic Qin rule, which unified China and centralized its bureaucracy.
They assumed that “when government leans heavily on fa to reinforce its
authority, it does so because it has no effective ability to rule by li.” To the
Chinese, fa should always be employed as the last resort.
Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure
the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 33–34 (2001) (footnotes
omitted); see also THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 88 (Arthur Waley trans., Vintage 1989)
[hereinafter ANALECTS] (“Govern the people by regulations, keep order among them
by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them
by moral force, keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect
and come to you of their own accord.” (quoting Book II, ¶ 3)).
Notwithstanding the distinction between the two, li and fa have coexisted in
Chinese society. As the introductory comment in book I of the Tang Code declared,
Virtue and morals are the foundation of government and education, while
laws and punishments are the operative agencies of government and
education. The former and the latter are necessary complements to each
other, just as it takes morning and evening to form a whole day, or spring and
autumn to form a whole year.
CHEN, supra note 42, at 17 (quoting the translation in John C.H. Wu, The Status of the
Individual in the Political and Legal Traditions of Old and New China, in THE CHINESE MIND:
ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 340, 361 (Charles A. Moore ed.,
1967)); JOHN W. HEAD, CHINA’S LEGAL SOUL: THE MODERN CHINESE LEGAL IDENTITY IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 48 (2009) (“Legalism and Confucianism were inextricably
bound together, in a new compound material, a legal alloy, that was strong enough to
last for the next two thousand years as a central core of China’s government and
culture.”); see also CHEN, supra note 22, at 18 (“The theory of Yin-Yang . . . justified the
supplementary function of punishment in governing a state, with li, being Yang, as the
first instrument, and punishment, being Yin, as a supplementary tool for governing a
state. In this way [Yin-Yang] laid down the theoretical foundation for the
harmonisation between Confucianism and Legalism.”).
203. For discussions of the debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists, see
generally Pat K. Chew, The Rule of Law: China’s Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43, 48–51 (2005); Yu, supra note 202, at 32–38.
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punishment, threats, and coercion to maintain public order.204
As far as intellectual property scholarship is concerned, one of the
seminal works on the Chinese intellectual property system is William
Alford’s To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense.205 Although this work
covered not only Chinese philosophy but also political culture, it has
been most widely cited for its discussion of the interplay between
Confucian culture and intellectual property reforms in China.206 As I
noted in earlier writings,207 there is both a strong form and a weak form
of Professor Alford’s culture-based argument:
The strong form states that Confucianism militates against
intellectual property reforms in China. It accounts for the failure of
the many reforms pushed by foreign countries and intellectual
property rights holders to induce improvements in intellectual
property protection and enforcement. . . . [By contrast, t]he weak
form . . . states that Confucianism has prevented the Western notion
of intellectual property rights from taking root in China. . . . [It]
does not suggest any incompatibility between Confucianism and the
Western notion of intellectual property rights. Nor does it contend
that Confucianism will militate against intellectual property reforms.
Thus, if such reforms are to be introduced—either internally
through the borrowing of foreign ideas or externally in response to
foreign pressure—these reforms may help China establish an
exogenously developed intellectual property system.208

While the reality on Chinese soil is unlikely to support the strong
form of Professor Alford’s culture-based argument,209 many Chinese
204. See supra notes 202–03 (listing sources that discuss the distinctions between li
and fa and between Confucianism and Legalism).
205. ALFORD, supra note 94.
206. See id. at 19–29 (discussing how the Confucian culture prevented intellectual
property protection from taking root in imperial China). An earlier version of the
chapter cited here was published as William P. Alford, Don’t Stop Thinking
About . . . Yesterday: Why There Was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law
in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3 (1993).
207. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Confucianism, in DIVERSITY IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 247, 253–57 (Irene
Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015) (underscoring the distinction between the
strong form of Professor Alford’s culture-based claim and its weak form).
208. Id. at 253, 256–57.
209. As I noted in an earlier article,
While copying may be an important living process for a Confucian Chinese to
understand life, culture, and society, Chinese poets and literary theorists
widely disagreed on the appropriate extent of copying. It is therefore
problematic to put all of these poets and theorists together. After all,
traditional Chinese culture does not always call for verbatim copying, the
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scholars have equally questioned the weak form of that argument.210
After all, if intellectual property standards are related to legal or normbased incentives that the country has provided to promote creativity
and innovation throughout its millennia-long existence, it likely will be
an overstatement to suggest the lack of indigenous notions of
intellectual property rights in China.
Regardless of one’s reaction to culture-based arguments, however,
there is no denying that Chinese culture has contributed to the success
and failure of the country’s intellectual property reforms. As far as
such culture is concerned, Confucianism provides the immediate
jumping off point for intellectual property scholars. Indeed, a
considerable volume of English-language scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system has been devoted to the Confucian impact
on intellectual property reforms.211 While this type of scholarship has
provided culture-based analyses that are both insightful and appealing
to Western readers, it is ill-advised to equate Confucianism with
Chinese culture. Indeed, an exclusive focus on Confucianism would
create a rather incomplete picture of the impact of Chinese culture on
intellectual property developments.
To begin with, three dominant schools of philosophy existed in
traditional Chinese culture: Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism (which
derived from the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi). Commentators have
described these three schools collectively as sanjiao (three schools of
teachings or three religions).212 Although few commentators have
means by which massive piracy and counterfeiting are often conducted.
Rather, Confucianism has called for the transformative use of preexisting
works that is tailored to the user’s needs and conditions.
Id. at 253–54 (footnote omitted).
210. See supra note 32 (listing sources that criticize culture-based claims relating to
the Chinese intellectual property system); see also Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons
and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1110–23 (1996) (drawing on economic analysis to provide
alternative explanations for China’s intellectual property problems).
211. For discussions of Confucianism and intellectual property reforms, see
generally ALFORD, supra note 94, at 19–29; Shao, Chinese Culture, supra note 32; Shao,
Global Debate, supra note 32; Yu, supra note 207.
212. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 11 (noting that, along with Confucianism, “Taoism
and Buddhism were . . . influential in some periods and in some aspects of life”);
ARTHUR F. WRIGHT, BUDDHISM IN CHINESE HISTORY 70–85 (1979) (discussing the
importance of Buddhism and Daoism in Chinese history); Christoph Antons, Legal
Culture and History of Law in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA 13, 22–23
(Christopher Heath ed., 2003) (noting the importance of Confucianism, Taoism,
Buddhism, and Legalism in China); Rollie Lal, China’s Relations with South Asia, in
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discussed the linkage between Buddhism and intellectual property
developments in China,213 I am not yet aware of any scholar providing a
Daoist analysis of intellectual property law and policy in China.214
Even if one is to focus narrowly on only Confucianism, there remains
the oft-raised question concerning which Confucius best represents
Chinese culture. Are we focusing on the Confucius from the
Analects,215 which provided a record of “selected sayings” collected by
his students?
Or are we discussing the Confucius from
Neo-Confucianism as propounded by Zhu Xi (1130–1200), a highly
prominent Confucian scholar in the Song dynasty?216 As Theodore de
Bary wrote,
“Whose Confucianism are we talking about?” If it is the original
teachings of Confucius in the Analects, then almost nothing said about
Confucianism today speaks to that. Indeed even the anti-Confucian
diatribes earlier in [the twentieth] century spoke rarely to Confucius’
own views but only to later adaptations or distortions of them.217

CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD: BEIJING’S STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
133, 133 (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007) (“China has a long history of relations
with India, beginning with cultural and religious contact between the two by 100 CE.
Buddhism traveled from India through the Silk Route in Central Asia to China, mixing
with the existing Daoist and Confucian philosophies there.”); Charles R. Stone,
Comment, What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary Observations on Classical Chinese
Attitudes Toward What the West Calls Intellectual Property, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 199, 226 (2008)
(noting that “Buddhism and Daoism became quite influential in their own right”).
213. See Stone, supra note 212, at 202 (“The bulk of early book publishing in China
was in fact inspired by Buddhism, not Confucianism, and was directed at the acquisition
of religious merit that appears to have been unrelated, and was perhaps even antithetical,
to what we today would consider a property right.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 227
(“Confucianism in its various incarnations played a central role in the development of
printing and the dissemination of classical texts that . . . contributed to the eventual
development of Chinese intellectual property, [but] it is probably a mistake to focus
all of our attention upon Confucianism in the first place.”).
214. The closest is my analysis of the application of the Yin-Yang school and
correlative thinking to the intellectual property field. See generally Peter K. Yu,
Intellectual Property, Asian Philosophy and the Yin-Yang School, 7 WIPO J. 1 (2015).
215. ANALECTS, supra note 202.
216. See generally CHAN WING-TSIT, CHU HSI: LIFE AND THOUGHT (1987) (discussing
the life and philosophy of Zhu Xi).
217. WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM xi (1991); see also
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 11 (1998) (“Problems of continuity and change in the
evolution of major traditions must be considered. Confucianism should not be
thought either static or monolithic—that is, taking the sayings of Confucius and
Mencius just by themselves, to represent an historically developing, often conflicted,
and yet gradually maturing Confucian tradition.”); Liu Shu-hsien, Confucian Ideals and
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Likewise, in his introduction to the Analects, Arthur Waley clarified that
“[t]he Confucius of whom I shall speak here is the Confucius of the
Analects.”218 He further reminded us of Chinese historian Gu Jiegang’s
helpful admonition that scholars should study “one Confucius at a
time.”219 In short, any discussion of Confucian influence on the
Chinese intellectual property system requires researchers to determine
in advance which Confucius they want to focus on.
As if these issues were not complicated enough, Chinese history has
been filled with many different schools of thought beyond
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In the last chapter of Historical
Records (Shiji), Sima Qian, the grand historian in the Han dynasty
(206 B.C.–220 A.D.), recalled an essay of his late father classifying
Chinese philosophies into six dominant schools:
Yin-Yang,
Confucianism (or, more properly, Rujia), Mohism (Mojia), School of
Names, Dialecticians, or Logicians (Mingjia), Legalism (Fajia), and
Daoism.220 Also present in the Chinese territory are many minority
cultures and beliefs, including those of the Zhuang, Hui, Uygur, Yi,
Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, and Buyei.221
A few years ago, when I put together a special issue on intellectual
property and culture for the WIPO Journal, I went outside
Confucianism to explore whether other Asian philosophy would
provide useful insight into intellectual property developments in

the Real World: A Critical Review of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thought, in CONFUCIAN
TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN MODERNITY: MORAL EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC CULTURE IN
JAPAN AND THE FOUR MINI-DRAGONS 92, 92 (Tu Wei-Ming ed., 1996) (noting that the
term “Confucianism” “may refer to the philosophical tradition represented by
Confucius and Mencius, or it may refer to the institutions and customs that emerged
in the long course of Chinese history through the influence of Confucian thought”);
Benjamin Schwartz, Some Polarities in Confucian Thought, in CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE
CIVILIZATION 3, 3 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1964) (considering “universal and perennial”
questions concerning whether “the original teachings of the founders [of
Confucianism] can be extricated from the interpretations of the followers”).
218. ANALECTS, supra note 202, at 13.
219. Id. at 14.
220. FUNG YU-LAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: A SYSTEMATIC
ACCOUNT OF CHINESE THOUGHT FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT DAY 30–31 (Derk
Bodde ed., 1976).
221. See JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 176
(6th ed. 1999) (“The largest of the fifty-six minority groups are the Zhuangs (15.4
million), Hui or Chinese Muslims (8.6 million), Uygur (7.2 million), Yi (6.5 million),
Tibetans (4.5 million), Miao (7.3 million), Manchus (9.8 million), Mongols (4.8
million), Bouyei (2.1 million), and Koreans (1.9 million).”).
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China.222 Specifically, my article focused on the Yin-Yang School, the
first school of thought mentioned in Historical Records.223 Highlighting
the duality that often appears in both Chinese and international
intellectual property laws and policies, that article argued that the YinYang School’s “focus on contexts, relationships and adaptiveness and
its high tolerance for contradictions have made it particularly wellequipped to address the ongoing intellectual property challenges
concerning both emerging economies and the digital environment.”224
While the analysis of the philosophical basis of Chinese intellectual
property law and policy has thus far remained limited to only scholars
with deep knowledge of Chinese philosophy or culture, a better
linkage between the notions of intellectual property rights and such
philosophy or culture can be quite beneficial. After all, cultural
barriers have provided a prevailing explanation for the failure of
externally induced intellectual property reforms in China.225
Commentators have also noted repeatedly the need to increase public
consciousness of intellectual property rights.226 Thus, if cultural
barriers and the lack of public consciousness indeed accounted for
China’s massive piracy and counterfeiting problems, scholars studying
the Chinese intellectual property system would have to acquire a
deeper understanding of Chinese philosophy or culture before they
could further evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed
intellectual property reforms.
B. Economics, Innovation, and Cultural Industries
The second area worth highlighting concerns economic issues relating
to intellectual property protection and enforcement in China and the
country’s growing intellectual property industries. These issues include
222. See generally Yu, supra note 214 (discussing the application of the Yin-Yang
school and correlative thinking to the intellectual property field).
223. FUNG, supra note 220, at 30; see also CHEN, supra note 22, at 10 (noting the
influence of Yin-Yang Jia on traditional Chinese conceptions of law).
224. Yu, supra note 214, at 2.
225. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131–34 (2003) (discussing the common misconception that
copyright piracy is merely a cultural problem).
226. See NIE JIANQIANG, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
24 (2006) (noting “the conflictory and complementary relationships between the lawon-the-books, law-in-operation and law-in-the-mind within Chinese intellectual property
laws”); Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 428–31 (2003)
(discussing education and public awareness programs); Yu, supra note 101, at 221–25
(noting the need to educate the Chinese populace about intellectual property rights).

2018]

A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP

1099

economic growth, industrial development, technological innovation, and
foreign investment. They are of great interest to economists, researchers
in business or management schools, and those in schools or departments
focusing on innovation and creative industries. Although there was very
limited, if any, early scholarship on the economics of intellectual
property rights in China, scholarship in this area has greatly expanded
as scholars with economic training or interests in industrial
development entered the intellectual property field.
One of the most widely cited early economic analyses of the Chinese
intellectual property system is a book chapter written by Keith Maskus, Sean
Dougherty, and Andrew Mertha.227 This chapter examined the relationship
between intellectual property protection and economic development in
China.228 While the chapter is insightful on its own, it is particularly
illuminating when read together with the other chapters in the edited
volume, all of which featured the latest empirical research on intellectual
property and development conducted by World Bank economists.229
Thus far, economists have shown how stronger intellectual property
protection could lead to an increase in foreign direct investment.
Their research demonstrates that such a positive link requires the
presence of two key preconditions: a strong imitative capacity and a
While China undoubtedly possesses both
large market.230
preconditions, it has presented a “puzzle” to economists. As Professor
Maskus rightly observed in the World Bank volume, if stronger
intellectual property protection always led to more foreign direct
investment, “recent [investment] flows to developing economies
would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe . . .
[rather than] Brazil, China, and other high-growth, large-market
developing economies with weak protection.”231
To be sure, weak intellectual property protection could undermine,
and has undermined, China’s appeal to foreign investors.232
227. See generally Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM
RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 295 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005)
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT].
228. Id.
229. See generally id.
230. See Yu, supra note 94, at 176–80 (discussing the preconditions needed for
stronger intellectual property protection to attract foreign direct investment).
231. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 227, at 41, 54.
232. See Yu, supra note 101, at 192 n.331 (listing sources that discuss the role of
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Nevertheless, other attractive location advantages, such as low labor
costs and a large market, have more than compensated for the
country’s shortcomings in the intellectual property field.233 To a large
extent, the China case has shown the limits of using intellectual
property reforms to attract foreign direct investment.
Another book that has similar contextual significance for
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system is an excellent
collection of articles Hiroyuki Odagiri, Akira Goto, Atsushi Sunami,
and Richard Nelson put together to examine the role of the
intellectual property regime in the development and catch-up
process.234 Titled Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-up:
An International Comparative Study, this edited volume provided
comparative studies on the catch-up processes that developed,
emerging, and large developing countries had experienced.235 While
the book included only one chapter on China236—which featured the
catch-up story of Huawei Technologies237—its concluding chapter and
the other country and industrial studies in the volume provided useful
insights into the challenges and opportunities confronting the
Chinese intellectual property system.238 Together, these chapters
underscored the need to consider the impact of the intellectual
property regime on the catch-up process “in conjunction with
intellectual property rights in attracting foreign investment).
233. See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 259 (2003) (stating that decisions to
relocate research and development facilities are likely to be affected by “the level of
education and training of the local workforce, the condition of its financial sector, the
health of its legal system, and the transparency of governmental procedures”); Keith E.
Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and
Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 123 (1998) (identifying “market size
and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and distance from markets, low wage
costs in relation to labor productivity, abundant natural resources, and trade protection
that could encourage ‘tariff-jumping’ investments” as examples of location advantages).
234. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP:
AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (Hiroyuki Odagiri et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP].
235. Id.
236. See Xue Lan & Liang Zheng, Relationships Between IPR and Technology Catch-up:
Some Evidence from China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCHUP, supra note 234, at 317 (discussing China’s catch-up process following its reopening
to the outside world in the late 1970s and documenting the adaptation of domestic
firms, such as Huawei Technologies, to the intellectual property right system through
gradual innovation).
237. See id. at 350–55 (discussing Huawei Technologies as a success story).
238. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP, supra note 234.
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[industrial] and other government policies.”239
Apart from these two edited volumes, there are other noteworthy
economic analyses of the Chinese intellectual property system. Albert
Hu and Gary Jefferson explored the cause of China’s rising patenting
activities that eventually generated what they referred to as “a great wall
of patents.”240 More recently, Professor Hu, Zhang Peng, and Zhao
Lijing provided a critical follow-up examination of China’s patent
surge of the early 2010s, when China surpassed the United States as
the country filing the largest volume of patent applications.241 In
addition, Deli Yang undertook comparative study of the Chinese and
U.S. patent systems to examine pendency, grant ratios, and issues
relating to national treatment.242 Qian Yi also utilized sales data in the
Chinese footwear industry to explore ways to optimize enforcement
against counterfeit trademarked goods.243
Taken together, all of these economic analyses highlighted the
tremendous benefits provided by research on the economic dimension
of the Chinese intellectual property system. Research in this area is
badly needed, considering how little economic research has been
conducted on the Chinese intellectual property system both inside and
outside the country until the past decade or so. As Maskus, Dougherty,
239. Hiroyuki Odagiri et al., Conclusion, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP, supra note 234, at 412, 421.
240. Albert Guangzhou Hu & Gary H. Jefferson, A Great Wall of Patents: What Is
Behind China’s Recent Patent Explosion?, 90 J. DEV. ECON. 57 (2009). They attributed the
patent explosion to “[t]he continuing surge of [foreign direct investment] in China,
pro-patent amendments to China’s patent law, China’s entry to the WTO, the
deepening of enterprise reform that realigns incentive structures, along with the
intensification of [research and development] in Chinese industry.” Id. at 67.
241. Albert G.Z. Hu et al., China as Number One? Evidence from China’s Most Recent
Patenting Surge, 124 J. DEV. ECON. 107 (2017). In their view,
Chinese firms have been aggressively applying for patents as a result of their
newly acquired capability to invent new technologies and their response to the
government incentives and other strategic considerations. While the former
is most likely to be a result of conscious [research and development] effort,
the latter would have increased the propensity to patent independent of
technology innovation.
Id. at 117.
242. Deli Yang & Mahmut (Maho) Sonmez, Global Norm of National Treatment for
Patent Uncertainties: A Longitudinal Comparison Between the US and China, 53 J. WORLD
BUS. 164 (2018); Deli Yang, Intellectual Property System in China: A Study of the Grant Lags
and Ratios, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 22 (2007); Deli Yang, Pendency and Grant Ratios
of Invention Patents: A Comparative Study of the US and China, 37 RES. POL’Y 1035 (2008).
243. Qian Yi, Counterfeiters: Foes or Friends? How Counterfeits Affect Sales by Product
Quality Tier, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2381 (2014).
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and Mertha lamented in the mid-2000s,
University scholarship in China (and in other countries) in IPRs is
overwhelmingly addressed to legal issues. Many scholars are actively
involved in assessing shortcomings in the law and in drafting
revisions, and they also participate in training new intellectual
property lawyers. Few economists study the processes of technical
change in China and how they are affected by market structure,
competition, and exposure to foreign technologies and investment.
Fewer still examine the relationship between IPRs, technical
development, and growth. Accordingly, economists in China either
remain unaware of IPR issues or are skeptical about the potential for
IPRs to increase technological advance and business development.244

While economic research has been essential to the intellectual
property field,245 comparative research can provide especially valuable
insight into the appropriate international minimum standards for both
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Because
most developing countries have limited resources to enforce these
rights246—and considerable tradeoffs existed between intellectual
244. Maskus et al., supra note 227, at 311.
245. For literature in this area, see generally ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
(2005); THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (2013); CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2010); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 227; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2003); KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2000); KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); SUZANNE
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COUNTRIES WITH ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION (2009).
246. The lack of enforcement resources is indeed why the TRIPS Agreement
includes Article 41.5, which states explicitly that a WTO member state is not required
to devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than to other areas of
law enforcement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 41.5 (“Nothing in [Part III
of the TRIPS Agreement] creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement
of law in general.”); see also WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, annex B-4, ¶ 33
(“Articles 1.1 and 41.5 were key concessions to the developing world, which the United
States and other developed third parties seek now to dismiss and disregard.”); CARLOS
M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 417 (2007) (“[Article 41.5] was introduced
upon a proposal by the Indian delegation, and essentially reflects developing
countries’ concerns about the implications of Part III of the [TRIPS] Agreement.”);
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property protection and other competing public needs—the costs to
sectors unrelated to intellectual property could easily make the
introduction of higher standards of intellectual property protection
and enforcement highly undesirable.247 It is therefore inevitable that
developing countries, China included, will have to conduct holistic
cost-benefit analyses before they explore whether to strengthen
intellectual property protection and enforcement.
Finally, as Section I.E has noted, a fascinating body of scholarship
emerged in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s to examine the fastgrowing innovative capabilities of Chinese firms. In Run of the Red
Queen, Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree located in China “a
remarkably profitable and sustainable model of innovation . . . [that]
makes China into a critical part of the world innovation system, but . . .
does not rely on China excelling in cutting-edge novel-product
[research and development].”248 As they observed, “like the Red
UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT 585 (2005) (noting that Article 41.5 “was in fact one of the few
provisions in Part III where developing countries’ views made a difference”).
247. See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in
INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES xiii,
2 (2009) (“Governments need to make choices about how many resources to spend
on combating piracy, as opposed to enforcing other areas of law, building roads and
bridges, protecting national security, and providing other public goods. Such choices
are usually not stated in explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by
federal and local governments.”); Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development
Approach on IP Enforcement: Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 210 (Li Xuan & Carlos M.
Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT] (noting that
the demands for strengthened intellectual property enforcement “seem to overlook
the cost of the required actions, the different priorities that exist in developing
countries regarding the use of public funds (health and education would normally be
regarded as more urgent than IP enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs are
private rights and, hence, the burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by
the right-holder, not the public at large”); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development: Why
Not an Agenda for the Developing World?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra,
at 133, 143 (“Increment and strength of public enforcement measures will inevitably
impose an economic burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities of
these countries, such as prosecution of violent crimes or relief of poverty.”); Peter K.
Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 2–6 (2010) (discussing the costs
of strong intellectual property enforcement norms and the resulting trade-offs).
248. DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT,
INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 4, 19 (2011).
According to the authors,
As China has become the global center for many different stages of
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Queen [in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass], [China] runs as
fast as possible in order to remain at the cusp of the global technology
frontier without actually advancing the frontier itself.”249 While the
emergence of this alternative form of innovation has raised intriguing
questions concerning economic development, industrial strategy, and
global competitiveness, the book explained why the Chinese model
could complement the breakthrough innovation model embraced by
the United States and other developed countries.250 As Breznitz and
Murphree observed,
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the
iPod and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these
products without China. In the world of flexible mass production,
the Red Queen country [referring to China or other countries with
a similar innovation model] needs the novel-product innovators to
keep churning out new ideas, and the novel-product-innovating
countries need the Red Queen country to keep innovating on almost
every aspect of production and delivery.251

Similarly, other scholars have articulated new theories of innovation
to capture the innovative activities in China. In Dragons at Your Door,252
Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson advanced the concept of “cost

production, it has also developed a formidable competitive capacity to
innovate in different segments of the research, development, and production
chain that are as critical for economic growth as many novel-product
innovations, and perhaps even more so. In addition, taken together, China’s
regional and national systems have developed varied capabilities that amount
to a specific and highly successful, though inadvertently, created national
model. China’s accomplishment has been to master the art of thriving in
second-generation innovation—including the mixing of established
technologies and products in order to come up with new solutions—and the
science of organizational, incremental, and process innovation. Thus, China’s
innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or incremental) innovation
but also in the organization of production, manufacturing techniques and
technologies, delivery, design, and second-generation innovation. Those
capabilities enable China to move quickly into new niches once they have been
proved profitable by the original innovator.
Id. at 4; see also id. at 195 (noting the need to dispel the myth concerning “the Western
techno-fetishism of novelty, which equate innovation only with the creation of new
technologies and products”).
249. Id. at 3.
250. See id. at 206 (“Thanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China need
not be seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.”).
251. Id. at 18.
252. ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: HOW CHINESE
COST INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007).
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innovation” and discussed its global implications.253 As they pointed
out,
[t]he new competition from China is . . . disruptive because it
threatens to obsolete much of the established firms’ assets,
capabilities, and experience base by changing the accepted rules of
the game, undermining traditional profit models, and growing parts
of the market that incumbents are poorly equipped to serve.254

In the authors’ view, “[f]ar from being a zero-sum game . . . , the
emergence of Chinese companies as significant players in the global
market promises new benefits to the world’s consumers and new
opportunities to those established companies that choose the right
responses and execute them well.”255
In Chinnovation,256 Tan Yinglan explored how Chinese innovators are
changing the world by focusing on “process innovation”257 and other
forms of innovation and entrepreneurship.258 As he explained,
Most of China’s companies are in the stage of process innovation.
Start-ups typically learn and adopt business models from other
geographies and adapt them locally. Companies are trying to move
into technological innovation via research and development by
building on their existing knowledge, the way semiconductor firms
are moving into thin film in 2010. Most Chinese firms are still using
existing technology to create products, rather than creating the
technology itself (as is done in the United States). This makes China
tech markets symbiotic and complementary with the U.S. market
and those in some other countries.259

Although all of these discussions suggest that the alternative forms
of innovation found in Chinese firms complement the breakthrough
innovation embraced by the United States and other intellectual
property powers in the developed world, a better understanding of
253. Id. at 1 (describing “cost innovation” as the “tool of choice” for Chinese
competitors and defining such innovation as “the strategy of using Chinese cost advantage
in radically new ways to offer customers around the world dramatically more for less”).
254. Id. at 55–56.
255. Id. at vii.
256. TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING THE
WORLD (2011).
257. Id. at xii.
258. Cf. BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 248, at 4 (“China’s innovation capabilities
are not solely in process (or incremental) innovation but also in the organization of
production, manufacturing techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and secondgeneration innovation. Those capabilities enable China to move quickly into new niches
once they have been proved profitable by the original innovator.”).
259. TAN, supra note 256, at 268.
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these alternatives will enable us to improve the design and calibration
of the international intellectual property regime. To some extent, the
analyses surrounding alternative forms of Chinese innovation make
researchers question whether the existing TRIPS-based intellectual
property standards provide the most suitable arrangements for China.
After all, those problems that are indicative of China’s lack of progress
in developing a robust intellectual property system could easily have
reflected the mismatch between the existing international intellectual
property standards and the many alternative forms of innovation that
can now be found in the country. There is indeed no easy way to tell
whether the former or the latter is the case. Fortunately, this emerging
body of scholarship will help shed light on this difficult question.
Finally, alongside these three notable books, a growing volume of
scholarship has emerged to discuss China’s changing innovative
capabilities, thereby calling into question the hitherto somewhat onesided discourse on China’s status as a pirate nation.260 Shaun Rein
boldly declared “the end of copycat China,”261 building on his earlier
work on “the end of cheap China.”262 As he observed, “Chinese
companies no longer just copycat business models from America and
Europe. They still grab low-hanging fruit but focus more on
innovation.”263 Drawing on statistical materials, Denis Fred Simon and
Cao Cong critically examined the rapid expansion of China’s science
and technology capabilities, focusing in particular on the
contributions provided by an increasingly large and well-educated
talent pool.264 In addition, a number of books examined the rising
middle class and the expanded interest in luxury goods in China.265 A
260. See Yu, supra note 23, at 6–7 (“While piracy and counterfeiting problems
continue to exist, and are unlikely to go away any time soon, many policymakers and
commentators now see China as an innovative power, or at least an emerging one.”
(footnote omitted)).
261. SHAUN REIN, THE END OF COPYCAT CHINA: THE RISE OF CREATIVITY, INNOVATION,
AND INDIVIDUALISM IN ASIA (2014) (discussing changes in the Chinese economy and
emphasizing that local companies are shifting away from copying American and
European business models).
262. Id. at xv; SHAUN REIN, THE END OF CHEAP CHINA: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
TRENDS THAT WILL DISRUPT THE WORLD (2012).
263. REIN, supra note 261, at xv.
264. DENIS FRED SIMON & CAO CONG, CHINA’S EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE:
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF HIGH-END TALENT (2009).
265. See generally SAVIO CHAN & MICHAEL ZAKKOUR, CHINA’S SUPER CONSUMERS: WHAT
1 BILLION CUSTOMERS WANT AND HOW TO SELL IT 1–10 (2014) (discussing the rapid
growth of the group of wealthy and super wealthy customers in China); PIERRE XIAO
LU, ELITE CHINA: LUXURY CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN CHINA (2008) (discussing luxury
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growing volume of scholarship also covered the active development of
Such development provided an
China’s cultural industries.266
intriguing contrast with the “shanzhai” phenomenon that began
appearing in the late 2000s.267
C. Politics and International Relations
In the past decades, scholars have heavily utilized political science
literature to develop a better understanding of the Chinese legal
system. This literature has been particularly insightful because there
is no clear-cut distinction between law and policy from a Marxist
standpoint.268 Not only is law a “concrete formulation of the Party’s

consumer behavior in China); ERWAN RAMBOURG, THE BLING DYNASTY: WHY THE REIGN
OF CHINESE LUXURY SHOPPERS HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN (2014) (discussing the rapid
growth of luxury shoppers in China).
266. For this body of scholarship, see generally HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL AND
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN CHINA (Michael Keane ed., 2016); MICHAEL KEANE, CREATED IN
CHINA: THE GREAT NEW LEAP FORWARD (2007); MICHAEL KEANE, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
IN CHINA: ART, DESIGN AND MEDIA (2013); LI WUWEI, HOW CREATIVITY IS CHANGING
CHINA (Michael Keane ed., 2011); LUCY MONTGOMERY, CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:
COPYRIGHT, SOCIAL NETWORK MARKETS AND THE BUSINESS OF CULTURE IN A DIGITAL AGE
(2011); PANG, supra note 163.
267. “Originally, shan zhai was used to refer to a bandit stronghold outside
government control [in imperial China]; today it is shorthand for a multitude of
knockoffs, fakes, and pirated products. These include everything from mobile phones
to medicine and movies to makeup, and they permeate China’s consumer markets.”
EDWARD TSE, THE CHINA STRATEGY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE WORLD’S FASTESTGROWING ECONOMY 79 (2010); see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values,
16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 390 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property and
Asian Values] (“In recent years, a shanzhai culture emerged in China, raising
challenging questions about the acceptable boundaries of sequential and cumulative
innovation.”). For discussions of the “shanzhai” phenomenon in China, see generally
YU HUA, CHINA IN TEN WORDS 181–202 (Allan H. Barr trans., 2012); Cheung Ming,
Shanzhai Phenomenon in China—The Disparity Between IPR Legislation and Enforcement,
43 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 3 (2012); Hennessey, supra note 30; Sun
Haochen, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with HiPhone? Rethinking the Idea of Social Justice in
Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 387 (2012); Yu, Intellectual Property
and Asian Values, supra, at 390.
268. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 123 (noting that the “Chinese circumstances seem
to blur the distinction between law and policy”); FENG, supra note 31, at 10 (noting
that socialist laws “operate within the boundaries of policy directives, under the
guidance of policy principles and supplemented by various policy tools (such as a Party
or government circular or notice)”); Berkman, supra note 88, at 35 (“Throughout the
Cultural Revolution and until Mao’s death in 1976, law was simply a mechanism for
implementing Party policy, interpreted and reinterpreted to reflect the direction of
the prevailing political winds.”).
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policy,”269 but “law will wither away together with the state” in future
Communist society.270 Throughout Chinese history, law has been
consistently used as a political or administrative tool.271 Although law
was abolished during the Cultural Revolution, its subsequent
restoration272 has precipitated many difficult questions concerning
what law is and whether researchers should understand legal
development through Chinese politics.273
Interestingly, despite the importance of politics to the development
of Chinese laws and legal institutions, few scholars have devoted
attention to studying the political dimension of the Chinese
intellectual property system.274 There are a few notable exceptions,
269. FENG, supra note 31, at 10.
270. CHEN, supra note 42, at 8; see also id. at 2 (“Marx seemed to believe that law in
the bourgeois state was largely a means by which the bourgeoisie maintained their class
rule over the proletariat, and that in the classless communist society which represented
the final stage of social evolution, there would be no need for law to exist.”).
271. See CHEN, supra note 22, at 20–21 (discussing law as both a political tool and an
administrative tool).
272. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 42 (discussing the impact of the Cultural Revolution
on the Chinese legal system). See generally JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS
OF CHINA 273–443 (Touchstone 2003) (providing an insightful personal account of
the Cultural Revolution).
273. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 123 (“A preliminary question which might be
considered in examining the sources of law in mainland China is whether the model
or conception of law used in describing Western legal systems is appropriate in the
Chinese context.”). Determining what law was in the early Chinese legal system after
its restoration has indeed been quite challenging. As the late Victor Li noted in regard
to the challenge of assessing the legal significance of Chinese newspaper articles,
The mass media, such as the People’s Daily, play a major role in [communicating
legal norms]. A Chinese newspaper, unlike an American newspaper, is not a
chronicle of daily events but rather a means by which messages are sent from the
center to the intermediate levels and then to the bottommost levels. These
messages urge particular types of conduct—criticize revisionism, carry out the
principle of self-reliance, etc.—and also lay down some general guidelines on
how this work should be carried out. Good consequences ensue for those who
carry out these urgings, and less pleasant consequences follow for those who do
not. Is this law? No, not in the sense that we are accustomed to; among other
things, it lacks the precision and the use of legal institutions and mechanisms
that we regard as part of law. And yet it does lay down norms of conduct, norms
backed by [an] enforcement mechanism . . . .
LI, supra note 72, at 15; see also KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LI LIANJIANG, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE
IN RURAL CHINA 6 (2006) (“The scope of central policy in China . . . encompasses what
constitutes law in most other nations but also reaches into far murkier realms, such as
pledges made by officials on inspection tours, Party propaganda and the ‘spirit of the
Center’ (zhongyang jingshen).”).
274. See generally DIMITROV, supra note 90 (advancing a theory of state capacity
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however. In The Politics of Piracy, Andrew Mertha offered a pioneering
book showing how the organizational structures and complexities
within Chinese government agencies could affect the implementation
and enforcement of intellectual property laws.275 More attractively, this
book—through its separate chapters on the domestic patent,
copyright, and trademark systems—showed how the differences in
organizational structures and complexities have affected the respective
system to a different degree.276 The book explained not only the
behavior of these agencies, but also the success or failure of select
campaigns or reforms. Particularly noteworthy is the book’s discussion
of the “interbureaucratic competition”277 between two trademark
enforcement agencies—namely the State Administration for Industry
and Commerce and the Quality Technical Supervision Bureau.278
through the study of intellectual property enforcement in China); Mark A.
Groombridge, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in the People’s
Republic of China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra
note 177, at 11 (examining the political economy of intellectual property protection
in China and the contradictions inherent in Chinese society); MERTHA, supra note 44
(discussing the limited impact external pressure has on intellectual property
enforcement in China even though such pressure has helped shape the laws involved);
MICHEL OKSENBERG ET AL., ADVANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE COURSE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 6 (1996)
(providing recommendations on “ways that the public and private sectors in the
United States and elsewhere outside of China might better cooperate with the Chinese
government and private sector to help overcome the obstacles they confront in
improving their IPR regime”); Rebecca G. Hulse & James K. Sebenius, Sequencing,
Acoustic Separation, and 3-D Negotiation of Complex Barriers: Charlene Barshefsky and IP
Rights in China, 8 INT’L NEG. 311 (2003) (discussing the challenges confronting the
U.S.-China intellectual property negotiations from the viewpoint of former Deputy
USTR Charlene Barshefsky); Andrew Mertha & Robert Pahre, Patently Misleading:
Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual
Property Rights, 59 INT’L ORG. 695 (2005) (using the U.S.-China intellectual property
negotiations to develop a model of international negotiation in which states anticipate
the partial implementation of signed agreements).
275. MERTHA, supra note 44.
276. See id. at 77–209 (discussing the intellectual property enforcement problems
in the patent, copyright, and trademark areas).
277. Id. at 32; see also Chow, Counterfeiting, supra note 114, at 22 (“[E]nforcement
actions can be brought with the Administration of Industry and Commerce . . . under
the Trademark Law or the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, or with the Technical
Supervision Bureau . . . under the Consumer Protection Law or the Product Quality
Law.” (footnotes omitted)).
278. See MERTHA, supra note 44, at 164–209 (discussing such competition in the
context of trademark enforcement); see also DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 34 (“[M]ultiple
agencies share an enforcement mandate, sometimes even when they are not interested
in participating in enforcement.”); Groombridge, supra note 274, at 27 (noting that
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A few years later, Martin Dimitrov published an equally informative
book, covering the capacity of government agencies to enforce
intellectual property rights.279 Drawing on personal interviews,
newspaper articles, and comparative statistics, this book showed that
intellectual property enforcement through police raids and campaigns
in China had been high in volume, yet low in quality (as measured by
constituency, transparency, and procedural fairness).280 By contrast,
enforcement through local intellectual property litigation had been
high in quality, but low in volume.281 This book is illuminating because
it covered a wide variety of government agencies within the elaborate
intellectual property enforcement apparatus in China, including the
General Administration of Customs; the General Administration of
Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine; the National
Copyright Administration; the Public Security Bureau; the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce; the State Food and Drug
Administration; the State Intellectual Property Office; and the State
Tobacco Monopoly Administration.282
One topic that has thus far received only limited—but slowly
growing—coverage is China’s role in the international intellectual
property regime. This topic is what brought international relations
scholars to this area. The limited coverage can be largely explained by
China’s hitherto low profile in the international trading and
intellectual property systems.283 Until recently, few scholars—domestic
and foreign alike—have actively studied the interface between the
Chinese and international intellectual property systems. For those
scholars who managed to study this interface, the focus tends to be on
the problem of “too many mothers-in-law (popo tai duo, or yi ge shifu san ge popo)”);
Andrew C. Mertha, Policy Enforcement Markets: How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes
to Effective Intellectual Property Implementation in China, 38 COMP. POL. 295 (2006)
(discussing how bureaucratic redundancy has helped accelerate the evolution of
enforcement markets in China).
279. DIMITROV, supra note 90.
280. See id. at 185–220 (using trademark enforcement as an illustration of highvolume, but capricious and corrupt enforcement).
281. See id. at 249–67 (using patent enforcement as an illustration of low-volume,
but high-quality, rationalized enforcement).
282. Id. at 50.
283. See Henry S. Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO: A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING.
Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 69 (2007) (“Be it in the informal green room meetings, the formal
meetings of the various committees and councils or the grand sessions of the
Ministerial Conferences, China has generally been reticent.”); Yu, Middle Kingdom,
supra note 181, at 229–37 (discussing China’s low profile in the international
intellectual property arena).
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the impact of foreign pressure on domestic intellectual property
reforms—that is, Western impact and Chinese response.284 The focus
rarely goes the other way around.
Nevertheless, there has been a growing volume of scholarship on China’s
increasing role in the international trading system.285 Thanks to the
marriage of intellectual property with trade via the TRIPS Agreement286
and China’s growing emphasis on independent innovation, this role has an
increasingly important intellectual property component. A case in point is
scholarship on China’s role in the WTO, which has included a growing
volume of scholarship covering intellectual property issues.287
284. See supra text accompanying notes 107–19 (discussing scholarship on the
American intellectual property policy toward China).
285. For discussions of China’s role in the WTO-based international economic system,
see generally CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE, supra note 181; CHINA AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 181; CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010); CHINA’S
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 2005).
286. See supra note 123 (listing sources that discuss the TRIPS negotiations).
287. See generally Gao Lulin, China’s Intellectual Property Protection System in Progress, in
CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 129, at 127 (discussing the progress
China has made in the intellectual property area and its effort to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement); Angela Gregory, Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPs Agreement—
Confucius Meets the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 285, at
321 (exploring whether the 2001 Trademark Law satisfied the minimum standards for
protection and enforcement of trademark rights under the TRIPS Agreement); Daniel
Stewart & Brett G. Williams, The Impact of China’s WTO Membership on the Review of the
TRIPs Agreement, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 285, at 363
(discussing the impact of China’s accession on the ongoing negotiations relating to
the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement); Antony S. Taubman, TRIPs Goes East: China’s
Interests and International Trade in Intellectual Property, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM, supra note 285, at 345 (discussing how China’s implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement was consistent with its internal economic and industrial development even
though the policy changes might have been driven from outside); Yu, First Decade, supra
note 181 (reviewing intellectual property developments in China in the first decade of
its WTO membership); Zheng Chengsi, Looking into the Revision of the Trade Mark and
Copyright Laws from the Perspective of China’s Accession to WTO, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
313 (2002) (examining the amendment of the Chinese copyright and trademark laws
in preparation for WTO accession); Zheng Chengsi, The TRIPS Agreement and
Intellectual Property Protection in China, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219 (1998) (discussing
the preparation China was making to join the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement); Zheng
Chengsi, TRIPS and the Amendment of Unfair-Competition Laws in China, in CHINA’S
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 285, at 231 (discussing the inadequacy of the
Chinese unfair competition laws and the need for reforms to enable the laws to comply
with the TRIPS Agreement).
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In the past decade, commentators have also paid greater attention to the
development of bilateral and regional trade agreements China has
established with its trading partners.288 These agreements include China’s
bilateral agreements with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru,
Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, South Korea, Australia, Georgia, and the
Maldives.289 The analyses of these agreements have provided useful contrasts
to the existing discussions of free trade agreements or economic partnership
agreements established by the European Union and the United States.290
Apart from bilateral free trade agreements, China has also actively
negotiated regional trade agreements. In November 2000, China
established the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area with the ten members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).291 China has
also actively participated in the RCEP negotiations, a mega-regional
288. See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements and China’s Global Intellectual Property
Strategy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION 247 (Christoph Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015) (discussing China’s growing
engagement with the developing world, the underlying goals of the bilateral and
regional trade agreements established by China, and the negotiation strategies behind
these agreements); Zhang Guangliang, China’s Stance on Free Trade-Related Intellectual
Property: A View in the Context of the China-Japan-Korea FTA Negotiations, 24 ASIA PAC. L.
REV. 36 (2016) (discussing China’s position on the intellectual property negotiations
relating to the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement).
289. For discussions of China’s free trade agreements, see generally THE CHINAAUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A 21ST-CENTURY MODEL (Colin Picker et al. eds.,
2018); Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China: A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO
MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL
AGREEMENTS 53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008); Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure:
Cross-Regionalism and the China-Iceland Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362
(2010); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 122.
290. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting articles that discuss free
trade agreements in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee
Weatherall, Exporting Controversy? Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia
Free Trade Agreement: Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259
(criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–
400 (2004) (discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to
push for higher intellectual property standards).
291. The ten current ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam. ASEAN Member States, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://asean.org/asean/aseanmember-states (last visited May 9, 2018); see Peter K. Yu, The Incremental Development of
the ASEAN-China Strategic Intellectual Property Partnership, in HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons ed., forthcoming 2019)
(discussing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and other cooperative efforts between
ASEAN and China in the intellectual property area).
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trade agreement that is now being developed between ASEAN,
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea under
the ASEAN+6 framework.292
A related topic that has garnered considerable scholarly interest and
attention concerns China’s exclusion from the negotiations for the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement293 (ACTA) and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP).294 While the scholarship in this area,295 like
scholarship on China and the WTO, is not always limited to intellectual
property, this body of scholarship has provided important insight into
China’s emerging role in international intellectual property normsetting.
From a geopolitical standpoint, having a good grasp of China’s
normsetting activities can be quite beneficial. After all, there has been
growing discussion of the “Beijing Consensus”296—or what noted

292. See supra note 11 (listing sources that discuss the RCEP negotiations).
293. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50
I.L.M. 243 (2011).
294. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text.
295. See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to
Contain China in International Trade, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 370 (2017) (explaining why and
how the United States sought to use the TPP to rein in or constrain China in
international trade); Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1129, 1132–51 (2014) (discussing China’s experience as a “TPP outsider”). As
Shintaro Hamanaka noted,
[T]he formation of regional integration and cooperation frameworks can be
best understood as a dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional
framework where it can exercise some exclusive influence . . . . For an
economy that wants to increase its influence, establishing a regional group
where it can be the most powerful state—dominating other members in terms
of material capacity—is convenient. The most powerful state is likely to be
influential in the group because it can easily assume so-called “structural
leadership,” which is based on material resources. While other factors such as
knowledge can also be a source of power, the exercise of power based on nonmaterial resources is uncertain. Thus, having the largest resources in a
regional grouping is important to increase the likelihood of attaining
leadership. By assuming leadership, an economy can set a favorable agenda
and establish convenient rules. In addition, the most powerful state can
increase influence through prestige and asymmetric economic
interdependence with others.
Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership Versus Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting 1–2 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working
Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 146, 2014), https://aric.adb.org/
pdf/workingpaper/WP146_Hamanaka_Trans-Pacific_Partnership.pdf (footnote and
citations omitted).
296. For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally STEFAN A. HALPER, THE
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Chinese economist Hu Angang modestly called the “Beijing
Proposal.”297 Thus far, those frustrated with the existing international
economic system have touted the Beijing Consensus as a viable
alternative to the Washington Consensus.298 While the Washington
Consensus emphasizes free market reforms as a path to economic
prosperity,299 the Beijing Consensus suggests that economic growth
“comes from the state directing development to some degree, avoiding
the kind of chaos that comes from rapid economic opening, and thus
allowing a nation to build its economic strength.”300 In the intellectual
property area, the tension and rivalry between the Beijing and
Washington Consensuses deserve policy and scholarly attention because
BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2010); THE BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS
OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Chen Weitseng ed., 2017); RAMO, supra note 184.
297. HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER 17 (2011).
298. See Chris Alden, Africa Without Europeans, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: A RISING
POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE 349, 355 (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008) (“The
‘Beijing Consensus’ challenges [the formula dictated by the Washington Consensus]
and may embolden states, even those not recognized as pariahs, to opt out of the
complexities that these norms and values introduce to their economic and political
programmes.”); Dot Keet, South-South Strategic Bases for Africa to Engage China, in THE RISE
OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS
21, 28 (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds. 2010) (“[T]he means and methods employed in
Chinese operations in Africa are more likely to provide appropriate models and more
instructive experiences in the conditions of underdevelopment, lack of basic
infrastructures and other current technical incapacities in Africa.”); Stephen Marks,
Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 1, 11 (Firoze Manji & Stephen
Marks eds., 2007) (citing Nigerians’ appreciation of the Chinese model for providing
stability and visionary leadership); RAMO, supra note 184, at 3 (“China is marking a path
for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to
develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that
allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in
a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity.”). See generally Yu, Sinic Trade
Agreements, supra note 122, at 1018–22 (discussing the battle between the Beijing
Consensus and the Washington Consensus).
299. John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for
International Economics, coined the term “Washington Consensus.” See generally John
Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT:
HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7–20 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (identifying the
economic policies Washington encouraged other states to adopt in Latin America).
The Washington Consensus was derived from policy recommendations in ten different
areas: (1) fiscal deficits; (2) public expenditure priorities; (3) tax reform; (4) interest
rates; (5) the exchange rate; (6) trade policy; (7) foreign direct investment;
(8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights.
300. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER IS
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 56 (2007).
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the TRIPS-based international intellectual property regime was built
upon the latter set of policy recommendations.301
The discussion of China’s growing role in the international trading
and intellectual property systems is also timely and important when it
is tied to the ongoing exploration of developments in the G-2 (Group
of 2)302 or the BRICS countries.303 Since its creation, the term “BRICS”
301. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Introduction: The WIPO Development Agenda and Its
Development Policy Context, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 2–3 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008) (“The
Development Agenda . . . reflects developing countries’ growing resistance to the
upward harmonization of [intellectual property] protection required by the TRIPS
and subsequent ‘TRIPS-plus’ bilateral free trade agreements . . . . [It] should be
understood as part of a broad, multipronged rejection of the ‘Washington Consensus’
that shunted aside the [New International Economic Order] and came to dominate
development policy in the 1980s and early 1990s.”).
302. As Fred Bergsten argued,
The United States should . . . implement a subtle but sharp change in its basic
economic strategy toward China. Instead of focusing on bilateral problems
and complaints, and seeking to coopt China into a global economic system
that it would try to continue leading by itself, the United States should seek to
develop a true partnership with China to provide joint leadership of that
system, even if the system requires substantial modifications to persuade China
to play that role. The two economic superpowers should begin to pursue
together the development of coordinated, or at least cooperative, approaches
to global issues that can be resolved effectively only through their active comanagement. Such a “G-2” approach would accurately recognize, and be
perceived by the Chinese as accurately recognizing, the new role of China as
a legitimate architect and steward of the international economic order.
C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 22–23 (2008); see
also Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global Economy, in CHINA’S
NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 7, 11 (Dorothy-Grace
Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) (describing “a chain-gang relationship” between
China and the United States in light of their growing economic interdependence); Niall
Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, “Chimerica” and the Global Asset Market Boom, 10 INT’L FIN. 215
(2007) (coining the term “Chimerica”). But see HALPER, supra note 296, at 216–18 (arguing
against elevating the U.S.-China relationship to a special G-2 bilateral partnership). See
generally ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY
AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT (2009) (discussing the intertwined
economic relationship between China and the United States).
303. See Jim O’Neill, Building Better Global Economic BRICs (Goldman Sachs, Global
Economics Paper No. 66, 2001) (coining the term “BRIC”); see also JIM O’NEILL, THE
GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND (2011) [hereinafter
O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP] (providing a later and much broader analysis). For
discussions of the BRICS countries, see generally BRICS AND DEVELOPMENT
ALTERNATIVES: INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (José Eduardo Cassiolato & Virgínia
Vitorino eds., 2011); THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE TO GLOBAL COOPERATION (Rostam
Neuwirth et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE]; ANDREW F.
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has been used to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa—and, for some, also other large developed countries.304 In
April 2011, China invited South Africa to join Brazil, India, and Russia for
the first time in Sanya to discuss issues that could benefit from greater
cooperation.305 Since then, an annual BRICS summit has taken place in
New Delhi (India), Durban (South Africa), Fortaleza (Brazil), Ufa
(Russia), Goa (India), and Xiamen (China).306 Although the popularity
and collective influence of the BRICS countries have slightly declined in
the past few years, the BRICS concept has continued to garner
considerable academic and policy attention.307 In the area of international
intellectual property normsetting, some BRICS countries—such as Brazil,
China, and India—have also played rather influential roles, even though
they have not yet utilized their collective clout as a single bloc.308
COOPER, THE BRICS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2016); AMRITA NARLIKAR, NEW
POWERS: HOW TO BECOME ONE AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM (2010); O’NEILL, THE
GROWTH MAP, supra. For discussions specifically relating to intellectual property, see
generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations, the BRICS Factor and the Changing
North-South Debate, in THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE, supra, at 148 [hereinafter Yu, The
BRICS Factor]; Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies,
43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317 (2006); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC
Economies: Lessons from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action,
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines]; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The
Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual
Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking (Int’l Law & Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 2009/5, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785.
304. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A
DEVELOPMENT QUESTION 221–22 (2012) (expanding BRICS to cover other emerging
middle-income economies).
305. See Sébastien Hervieu, South Africa Gains Entry to Bric Club, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19,
2011, 9:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/19/south-africajoins-bric-club (reporting that South Africa joined the four BRIC countries in the third
BRIC summit in Sanya).
306. See Themes and Results of BRICS Summits over the Decade, CHINA DAILY
(Aug. 31, 2017, 2:59 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017brics/201708/31/content_31369213.htm (recapitulating the main themes and results of BRICS
summits over the past decade).
307. See supra note 303 (listing sources that discuss the BRICS countries).
308. See Yu, The BRICS Factor, supra note 303, at 148 (discussing the BRICS countries’
roles in international trade and intellectual property negotiations); Yu, Access to
Medicines, supra note 303, at 370–87 (discussing the important roles that the BRICS
countries can play in the international intellectual property regime); see also Amélie
Robine, Technology Transfer Agreements and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs: The Brazilian Case,
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIV/AIDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: TRIPS, PUBLIC
HEALTH SYSTEMS AND FREE ACCESS 120, 126 (Benjamin Coriat ed., 2008) (discussing the
growing importance of the BRICS countries in the global HIV/AIDS debate).
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D. Summary
This Part has identified three broadly defined multi-disciplinary
clusters within which scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system has been developed outside the area of law and policy. Although
the discussion in this Part is by no means exhaustive, it provides a good
indication of the different types of research that have slowly emerged to
cover the Chinese intellectual property system. Such emergence is
welcome, because inter- and multi-disciplinary research brings with it
different
interests,
assumptions,
preoccupations,
concepts,
methodologies, vocabularies, and research questions.
From a research standpoint, the interdisciplinary turn in scholarship
on the Chinese intellectual property system is noteworthy because it
bears strong resemblance to a similar interdisciplinary turn in
intellectual property scholarship in other areas. With the adoption of
the TRIPS Agreement, the increased salience of internet-based
activities, and the raising profile of intellectual property research,
scholars have paid growing attention to developments in the
intellectual property area. As scholars become more interested in this
area, some of them have also chosen to conduct research on the
Chinese intellectual property system.
III. LESSONS
A. China Scholars
In view of the growing volume of scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system, an instructive question to ponder is what
this body of scholarship can teach China scholars. While it is hard to
explain who constitute China scholars, this Article broadly defines the
term to cover not only Sinologists or China hands,309 but also those
studying China and its developments. This broadly defined group
could draw at least three sets of lessons from scholarship on the
Chinese intellectual property system.
First, this body of scholarship has covered developments in an area
309. See Berthold Laufer, Mission of Chinese Students, 13 CHINESE SOC. & POL. SCI. REV.
285, 286 (1929) (noting that Sinology “is of paramount educational and cultural value
not only to our country, but to mankind at large” and “has a tendency to broaden our
minds, to widen our horizon, to deepen our ideals, to contribute to the progress of a
higher learning and to the discovery of a new and beautiful world that is still unknown
to us”); see also J. Stapleton Roy, A China Hand: Young, Witty and Untiring, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1979, at 7 (noting the emergence of “a new generation of China hands . . . in
the American government”).
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in which China has faced considerable pressure from the outside
world, most notably the United States.310 For instance, those studying
Chinese law will find scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system filled with rich discussions of the transplant of foreign laws and
policies.311 Similarly, those studying U.S.-China trade or diplomatic
relations will find intellectual property an important area through
which one can better understand the dynamics concerning the
engagement between the two countries.312
Second, intellectual property is a highly specialized area of economic
regulation that has progressed very rapidly in China. Indeed, intellectual
property developments have provided an excellent window into the rapid
development of economic laws and policies since China accelerated its
reintegration with the global economy in the early 1990s. Given the
310. See Yu, supra note 101, at 140–51 (describing the United States’ use of section
301 sanctions and various trade threats to induce China to strengthen intellectual
property protection); see also MERTHA, supra note 44, at 41–52 (discussing the U.S.China intellectual property negotiations from 1989 to 1996).
311. See generally ALFORD, supra note 94, at 30–55 (discussing foreign transplants in
the intellectual property area and how the Chinese “learn[ed] the law at gunpoint”);
Niklas Bruun & Zhang Liguo, Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Rights in China:
Norm Taker or Norm Maker?, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 43 (discussing the
interaction between the transplant of intellectual property laws and the building of
intellectual property norms as a dynamic process); Li Mingde, Intellectual Property Law
Revision in China: Transplantation and Transformation, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra
note 93, at 65 (discussing the transplant of international intellectual property norms
to China and the effort the country has made to assimilate those norms into its special
political, economic, and social structures); Yu, supra note 93 (providing a history of
the transplant of intellectual property laws in China and discussing the strengths,
weaknesses, and future of such efforts).
312. See generally Alford, supra note 89 (critically examining the U.S. policy toward
the development of protection for American intellectual property in China and calling
for the policy’s reformulation); Baumgarten, supra note 57 (providing observations on
the changing U.S.-China copyright relations following the signing of the 1979
Agreement); Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295 (1996) (providing a critical assessment
of the various U.S.-China intellectual property conflicts in the late 1980s and early to
mid-1990s); Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that Started from a
Parody: American Intellectual Property Policy and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in Modern
China, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 237 (2009) (discussing the conflict the existing U.S.
foreign intellectual property policy has posed to American democratic ideals and
democratic foreign policy objectives); Yu, supra note 101 (criticizing the
ineffectiveness and shortsightedness of the American intellectual property policy
toward China in the early to mid-1990s and offering the constructive strategic
partnership as a new conceptual framework to reformulate the policy); Yu, supra
note 111 (arguing that the United States’ WTO complaint could create a new “cycle
of futility” and suggesting ways to avoid such a cycle).
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tremendous difficulty in studying the varying aspects of economic laws
and policies, a focus on intellectual property developments will make
research projects more manageable. Indeed, intellectual property
developments provide “an excellent window into the policymaking and
policy enforcement processes of contemporary China.”313
Third, the intellectual property area provides international
benchmarks against which Chinese developments can be easily measured
against those in the rest of the world—for both good and bad.314 To be
sure, scholars studying China can debate whether the existing TRIPSbased international intellectual property standards suit the country’s
specific local conditions or cultural background. Nevertheless, the
existence of two sets of initially drastically different standards inside
and outside China enables researchers to make the much-needed
comparison.315 Indeed, a vast divide existed between early socialist
regulations relating to intellectual property in the 1960s and 1970s316
and the TRIPS-based intellectual property system that China has
today.317 Even after China reopened its economy to the outside world,
the development of the early modern intellectual property laws in the
1980s, most notably 1982 Trademark Law and the 1984 Patent Law,
was filled with back-and-forth debates about the different ways to
introduce intellectual property rights.318 Those debates not only
313. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 26.
314. See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 13–17 (2010)
(discussing the challenge of figuring out how to compare a multitude of countries with
different sizes, economies, market conditions, technological proficiencies,
institutional infrastructures, and cultural backgrounds).
315. Commentators may question the difference between the current intellectual
property laws in China and those in other parts of the world, given the harmonization
brought about by the TRIPS Agreement and other international and regional
intellectual property agreements. Nevertheless, as Chen Jianfu rightly reminded us,
law always operates in local conditions:
Chinese law has become less Chinese than ever before, both in its form and
substance. Law, however, always operates in “local conditions”; that is, in the
unique political, social, economic and cultural context of the country
concerned. However much Chinese law has become “western,” the adoption
of western law is not necessarily the same as the introduction of the western
values that underpin the western law.
CHEN, supra note 22, at 699–700 (footnote omitted).
316. See supra Section I.A (providing examples of scholarship in the first phase of
prehistoric development).
317. See text accompanying supra note 120 (discussing China’s effort to comply with
the TRIPS Agreement).
318. For discussions of the debates surrounding the drafting of the 1984 Patent
Law, see generally ALFORD, supra note 94, at 66, 70; MERTHA, supra note 44, at 84–86;
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explained the design of those laws, but also reflected the strengths and
weaknesses of the current international intellectual property regime.
B. Intellectual Property Scholars
The previous Section has explored what China scholars can learn
from developments in the intellectual property area. This Section asks
the reverse question about what developments in China can teach
intellectual property scholars. There are at least five specific lessons.
First, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
provides updates on the latest developments in a country that has a
growing influence on the international intellectual property
community. Whether the focus is on the massive piracy and
counterfeiting problem, the millions of patents that Chinese applicants
file annually,319 or the new international intellectual property norms that
China has helped establish through the RCEP negotiations,320
intellectual property developments involving China are likely to have
considerable impacts at the domestic, regional, and international
levels. For those studying the competition between China and the
United States—or, for that matter, between China and other
countries—scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
will provide useful information about the state of bilateral
competition, opportunities for increased cooperation, and possibilities
for greater rivalry or confrontation. Although scholarship on the
Chinese intellectual property system has thus far focused on the impact
of the international intellectual property regime on China—the
primary focus of the first four phases321—it is high time that researchers
undertook more in-depth study of China’s impact on the international
intellectual property regime.322
Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 22, at 6.
319. See Table 1 Statistics on Applications for Inventions from Home and Abroad, STATE
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/
1111449.htm (last visited May 9, 2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of
1,381,594 applications for invention patents); Table 2 Statistics on Applications for Utility
Model and Design from Home and Abroad, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE,
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111448.htm (last visited May 9,
2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 1,687,593 applications for utility
model patents and 628,658 applications for design patents).
320. See supra note 11 (listing sources that discuss international intellectual property
normsetting through the RCEP negotiations).
321. See supra Sections I.B–D (discussing scholarship in the three phases of imitation
and transplantation, standardization and customization, and integration and assimilation).
322. In various forums, I have made a similar claim with respect to internet
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Second, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
encourages researchers to think more deeply about the different
justifications for and treatment of intellectual property rights in nonmarket economies. Although intellectual property laws in China have
been repeatedly revamped to ensure compliance with the TRIPS-based
international minimum standards,323 a historical analysis of the early
developments of the Chinese intellectual property system provides
especially helpful insights into the different ways to promote creativity
and innovation.324 The limited scholarship in the first two phases also
raises important questions about the compatibility and mismatch
between intellectual property rights and what commentators have
referred to as “socialist legality with Chinese characteristics.”325 While
China—or, for that matter, other socialist economies—may not
protect intellectual property rights to the same extent as Western
developed countries, it will be hard to justify the claim that socialist
countries do not offer any protection to these rights. As scholarship in
the first phase has shown, even during the Mao Zedong era, China

developments in China. See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 181, at 253–54 (“[T]he
important question about the Internet in China is not only how the Internet will
change China but also how China will change the Internet.”); see also JACK GOLDSMITH
& TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 104, 104
n.60 (2006) (citing Peter K. Yu, The Path of Sinicyberlaw, Presentation at Michigan
State University College of Law Symposium: Digital Silk Road: A Look at the First
Decade of China’s Internet Development and Beyond (May 23, 2005)).
323. As I noted in an earlier article,
The primary driver of convergence of intellectual property laws in Asia is the
World Trade Organization (WTO), which was established in April 1994. Except
for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Iran and Timor-Leste, all countries in Eastern,
Southern and South-eastern Asia (under UN classification) are members of this
organization. As a result, they abide by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Indeed, countries such as
China and Vietnam had to strengthen their intellectual property regimes and
go through a strenuous accession process before they could finally join the
WTO—in December 2001 and January 2007, respectively.
Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law and Policy, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 150 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017).
324. See PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES
AND THEIR CLIENTS 223 (2010) (“Despite the fact that there was virtually no patenting
activity [in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries], there was innovative
activity. Quite remarkably, China was able to build between 1860 and 1949 a modern
chemical industry.”).
325. E.g., ALFORD, supra note 94, at 70; Jonathan K. Ocko, Using the Past to Make a
Case for the Rule of Law, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 65, 66 (Karen G.
Turner et al. eds., 2000).
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offered protection through inventors’ certificates (faming zhengshu),326
payments to authors or inventors,327 and non-property-based protection
of these creators (similar to moral rights in Western jurisdictions).328
Third, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
provides an attractive forum for scholars to undertake comparative
intellectual property research.329 In this increasingly globalized world,
such scholarship is urgently needed.330 In a recent article, Irene
326. See Gale, supra note 49, at 349 (noting the monetary awards to inventors
provided through the 1963 Regulations Concerning Awards for Inventions and the
1963 Regulations Concerning Awards for Technical Improvement Proposals); Hsia &
Haun, supra note 47, at 282, 289 (discussing the financial awards or compensation
provided to authors and inventors through the regulations in the 1950s and 1960s).
327. See 1984 H. COMM. PRINT, supra note 59, at 19 (“[The Regulations Concerning
Awards for Inventions and the Regulations Concerning Awards for Technical
Improvement Proposals] changed the system of awards to inventors that had been tied
to the certificates of authorship. In place of the annual payments, lump-sum bonuses
in much smaller amounts were prescribed.”); ALFORD, supra note 94, at 57 (“[The
certificates of inventions under the 1950 Provisional Regulations on the Protection of
Invention Rights and Patent Rights] entitled persons or entities responsible for worthy
advances to recognition and monetary rewards tied to the savings realized from their
inventions.”); id. at 59–60 (discussing the Soviet-style of contracts with authors in the
1950s, which provide for gaofei, or basic payments for the writings).
328. See Gale, supra note 49, at 349 (stating that “all monetary awards in China
[under the regulations for invention awards in the 1950s and 1960s] were to be
accompanied by honorary awards as well, in the form of medals, certificates and
titles”); Loeber, supra note 55, at 913 (“The author possesses the right to the
inviolability of his work. This means that changes of the text may only be inserted with
the permission of the author. The Chinese author also possesses the right to be
acknowledged as the author of his works.”).
329. See Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic
Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 6–13 (2005) (explaining “why foreign
law is becoming more relevant in deciding IP claims arising under domestic statutes”).
330. As Hiram Chodosh declared,
[Comparison of laws in different jurisdictions] serve many overlapping
purposes. First, they potentially facilitate a greater appreciation of similarities
and differences among competing laws. Second, they are integral to law
reform initiatives intended to reduce the differences. Finally, comparisons
inform the creation of private and public international law designed to
eliminate conflicts of domestic law.
Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV.
1025, 1027–28 (1999). Similarly, Albert Chen wrote,
By studying the history, structure, content and operation of legal systems and legal
cultures in different parts of the world, comparative law scholarship illuminates
the similarities and differences in the ways in which different peoples, nations and
civilisations solve the fundamental “law-related” problems of human society . . . . It
generates the data on the basis of which legal philosophers may rest or develop
their theories about what a legal system is or ought to be, about the relative merits
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Calboli called on U.S. intellectual property scholars to engage more
actively in comparative legal analysis.331 As she explained,
[such] analysis can offer additional information about diverse
perspectives on the justification of intellectual property norms and
the application of these norms in different national contexts. This
information is relevant to all scholars, including all of us in the U.S.,
for a more comprehensive evaluation of a variety of intellectual
property issues, as intellectual property laws remain territorial laws
despite decades of intensive international harmonization.332

Fourth, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system
enables researchers to appreciate the significant challenges
confronting the developing world as well as evaluate the potential
benefits provided by intellectual property reforms. While scholarship
in the first three phases has shown China’s reluctance to introduce
stronger intellectual property protection, scholarship in later phases
reflect China’s changing position. Today, there is no denying that the
country “has benefited from the TRIPS-based intellectual property
of different forms of socio-legal arrangements and institutions, and about the
relationship and interaction between the legal, political, economic, social and
cultural domains of human existence in society.
CHEN, supra note 42, at 1; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property
Litigation: A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 453
(2001) (“A comparativist perspective will always aid appreciation of laws. But the
increasingly multidimensional nature of international intellectual property litigation
may mean that only a comparativist can fully appreciate these dimensions and accord
them the proper weight.”); John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 690 (2002) (“[A] diverse legal system has positive
externalities for other legal jurisdictions precisely because it provides information to
the other jurisdictions about the value of different legal rules.”); Lee, supra note 329,
at 21 (“Diversity in IP approaches . . . provides insurance against poorly calibrated IP
laws. Just as diversification can diminish the risk of loss in an investment portfolio, so
too with IP laws can a diversity of approaches diminish the risk of over- or underprotecting it.” (footnote omitted)).
331. See Irene Calboli, A Call for Strengthening the Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in the
United States, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 609, 611–12 (2016) (“[C]omparative legal analysis
could play a larger role compared to the one that it currently seems to play amongst U.S.
intellectual property academics, and that a larger number of U.S. scholars could turn to
comparative legal analysis in some instances in conjunction with other research
methodologies while conducting research in intellectual property law.”).
332. Id. at 637–38; see also Martha L. Minow, The Controversial Status of International
and Comparative Law in the United States, in COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 513, 528
(Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2015) (“Neglecting developments in
international and comparative law could vitiate the vitality, nimbleness, and
effectiveness of American law or simply leave us without the best tools and insights as
we design and run institutions, pass legislation, and work to govern ourselves.”).
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system [even though] the country would not have reached its current
position had it implemented the TRIPS Agreement to the fullest
extent.”333 Thus far, the TRIPS Agreement has been a “mixed bag”
because it can help and simultaneously hurt developing countries.334
Moreover, as I noted in previous works, China is in the process of
crossing over from the pirating side of the intellectual property divide
to the other more promising side.335 If so, the Chinese experience may
inform the experience of other similarly situated, or even smaller,
developing countries.336 As Professor Mertha observed, “The Chinese
case is instructive because China is similar to many developing and
postsocialist countries and, therefore, it is possible to make inferences
from the Chinese experience to explain intellectual property
development (or the lack thereof) in these other countries.”337
Finally, by analyzing developments in another country, scholarship
on the Chinese intellectual property system invites scholars to question
intellectual property developments within their own countries or other
third countries. After all, comparative legal analysis has always been a
two-way street. In the context of legal transplants, commentators have
noted how the transplant of a law often provides an opportunity for
policymakers to undertake reform and to determine how a law should

333. Yu, supra note 23, at 12.
334. See Peter K. Yu, The Comparative Economics of International Intellectual Property
Agreements, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 282 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni
B. Ramello eds., 2016) (critically assessing the TRIPS Agreement from a comparative
economic perspective).
335. See Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1
WIPO J. 1, 10–15 (2009) (discussing the existence of a “crossover point” where countries
consider it to be in their self-interest to move from a pirate nation to one that strongly
respects intellectual property rights); Yu, supra note 180, at 529–32 (noting that China is
at the cusp of crossing over from a pirate nation to a country respectful of intellectual
property rights); see also Suttmeier & Yao, supra note 169, at 6–7 (“China is . . . poised for
an IP transition. Yet whether this transition will lead to greater harmonization with
international IP norms and practices, toward ‘destroying the IP regime’ . . . , or to some
other departure from the given order remains unclear.”).
336. As John Orcutt and Hong Shen noted,
If China is successful in developing an innovative nation that includes a robust
university technology commercialization system, it will have made one of the
most dramatic economic transformations in history . . . . China’s success will
not only be important for the 1.3 billion people living in China, it could also
prove to be the key for many in the developing world.
JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 254 (2011).
337. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 23–24.
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be adapted and assimilated.338 The transplant process may also allow
the recipient country to become a donor in turn by sharing valuable
comparative lessons and experiences.339
IV. CHALLENGES
The previous Part has underscored the importance and benefits of
conducting research on the Chinese intellectual property system to
both China and intellectual property scholars. This Part turns to the
different challenges confronting research in this area. While some
challenges were particularly daunting at the formative stages of the
modern Chinese intellectual property system, they have since subsided
considerably. Others, however, have remained.
The challenges that scholars most widely discussed in the early days
of the Chinese intellectual property system was the lack of availability
of research materials concerning that system. Those challenges were
particularly acute before China reopened its economy to the outside
world. As George Ginsburgs observed,
The study of Communist Chinese law is fraught with many
difficulties. Not the least of these is the problem of getting enough
reliable data on what the law is and how the legal system operates on
the mainland. Under the circumstances, watchers of the China
scene have tried by various means to supplement the meagre fund
of available information. Those able to visit China on more or less
protracted jaunts have brought back personal impressions from
conversations with ordinary Chinese citizens as well as officials and
party cadres. Some have even managed to obtain permission to
observe sessions of the local people’s courts at work and have shared
their experiences with their less fortunate colleagues. Systematic
interviewing of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong and Macao has also
338. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 35
(2d ed. 1993) (“[A] time of transplant is often a moment when reforms can be
introduced.”); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong,
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 756 (2010) (“Although legal transplantation is a process
wherein laws migrate from one country to another, it is important not to ignore the
fact that the transplantation process also provides important opportunities for
improvements, experiments, and new developments.”).
339. See Jeremy Bentham, Of the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 169, 185 (Adamant Media 2005) (1843) (“That a
system might be devised, which, while it would be better for Bengal, would also be
better even for England.”); WATSON, supra note 338, at 99 (“[T]he time of reception is
often a time when the provision is looked at closely, hence a time when law can be
reformed or made more sophisticated. It thus gives the recipient society a fine
opportunity to become a donor in its turn.”).
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contributed to the sum total of our knowledge of legal life behind
the so-called Bamboo Curtain. Finally, perusal of what has been
published on legal developments in Communist China in foreign
languages has helped further flesh out the picture.340

Even in the 1980s and 1990s, many legal or normative documents
remained classified as neibu—that is, as internal documents that
foreign researchers could neither use nor access.341
The lack of such materials not only explains the limited scholarship
on the Chinese intellectual property system in the first two phases,342 but
also calls for considerable appreciation of the pioneering efforts that
early scholars of the Chinese intellectual property system undertook.
Although scholarship in this area has changed considerably—often for
the better—there is no denying that later researchers, myself included,
have greatly benefited from the precious scholarship of previous
researchers. In the area of Chinese intellectual property research—or,
more broadly, Chinese legal research—the aphorism that “we are
standing on the shoulders of giants” cannot be more accurate.343
Although materials have been difficult to find in the first two phases,
the accessibility of these materials has greatly increased in later phases,

340. George Ginsburgs, Soviet Sources on the Law of the Chinese People’s Republic,
18 U. TORONTO L.J. 179, 179 (1968). See generally CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW:
RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES (Jerome Alan Cohen ed., 1970) [hereinafter
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW] (providing an excellent collection of articles discussing
methodologies in and challenges to studying Chinese law before the country’s
reopening in the late 1970s).
341. See Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China’s Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts,
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 803 (1997) (noting the need “to increase ‘transparency’ and
prohibit reliance upon ‘internal’ (neibu) documents”); James V. Feinerman, China’s
Quest to Enter the GATT/WTO, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 401, 404 (1996) (noting that
“[f]ormerly neibu (internal) documents describing China’s foreign trade regime were
made public to the GATT/WTO Secretariat in the early 1990s” as part of China’s effort
to accede to the WTO); Liu Nanping, Judicial Review in China: A Comparative Perspective,
14 REV. SOCIALIST L. 241, 247 n.13 (1988) (“Many ‘internal’ (neibu) Party documents
may be enforced as law where the statutes are silent on the issues they address. These
documents are unavailable to the general public.”).
342. See supra Sections I.A and I.B (discussing the scholarship in these phases).
343. The phrase “standing on the shoulders of giants” is often attributed to Isaac
Newton, thanks to his 1675 letter to Robert Hooke. See Letter from Sir Isaac Newton
to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (“If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the
shoulders of giants.”). Nevertheless, the phrase “can be traced back to philosopher
Bernard de Chartres in the twelfth century.” Michal Shur-Ofry, Non-Linear Innovation,
61 MCGILL L.J. 563, 566 n.7 (2016); see also ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF
GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965) (tracing Newton’s aphorism and discussing
the metaphor of dwarfs perching on the shoulders of giants).
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especially after China’s accession to the WTO. Article 63 of the TRIPS
Agreement specifically includes transparency obligations, which
require the publication or making available of laws, regulations, “final
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application.”344 As
a result of such obligations and the related preparation for WTO
accession, many of the laws, regulations, and judicial decisions
concerning the Chinese intellectual property system have become
accessible online. While some of these research materials appear in only
Chinese, a growing volume of materials has now become available in
both Chinese and English. As the quality of automated translation
technology continues to improve, the linguistic barrier to research on
the Chinese intellectual property system will reduce accordingly.345
Better still, the WIPO Intellectual Property Laws and Treaties Database
(WIPO Lex) has made available the English-language versions of many

344. Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides,
Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application, made effective by a Member pertaining to the subject
matter of this Agreement (the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement
and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights) shall be published,
or where such publication is not practicable made publicly available, in a
national language, in such a manner as to enable governments and right
holders to become acquainted with them. Agreements concerning the subject
matter of this Agreement which are in force between the government or a
governmental agency of a Member and the government or a governmental
agency of another Member shall also be published.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 63.1. In October 2005, Japan, Switzerland, and
the United States invoked this obligation to formally request “clarifications regarding
specific cases of IPR enforcement that China has identified for the years 2001 through
2004, and other relevant cases.” Letter from Peter F. Allgeier, United States Trade
Representative, to H.E. Mr. Sun Zhenyu, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the
People’s Republic of China to the World Trade Organization (Oct. 25, 2005). This
formal request was made before the USTR filed a WTO complaint in April 2007. Japan
and Switzerland also made similar requests. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF GREATER
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT 14 (2006) (stating that the request was “made in
conjunction with similar requests by Japan and Switzerland”).
345. See NICHOLAS OSTLER, THE LAST LINGUA FRANCA: ENGLISH UNTIL THE RETURN OF
BABEL xix (2010) (“When electronics removes the requirement for a human
intermediary to interpret or translate, the frustrations of the language barrier may be
overcome without any universal shared medium beyond compatible software.”); James
Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 675–76 (2016)
(“Google Translate reads superficially and in fragments; its translations aren’t great,
but they’re good enough to make professional translators worried about the future of
their profession.”).
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Chinese intellectual property laws and regulations.346 A number of data
sources and case databases, such as Beida Fabao and CIELA, have also
emerged to facilitate research on intellectual property cases in China.347
The second challenge concerns the lack of understanding of the
Chinese intellectual property system, attributable to factors that range
from language to culture to simply distance. A vivid example is a
keynote presentation that I once heard from a Nobel laureate who will
remain nameless. During the question-and-answer session, I asked the
expert whether his view about China would differ based on the vastly
different regional developments within the country. Shockingly, the
expert told me in a room full of conference attendees that he had been
to only Beijing and Shanghai and his analysis about China would
unfortunately have to be based on those two cities. While I respect the
scholar’s candor and understand his reluctance to make claims beyond
what he had experienced firsthand, there are inherent problems in
using Beijing or Shanghai as proxies to study China.
More
importantly, if this noted scholar has faced such a daunting challenge
despite his firsthand experience in China, one has to imagine the even
greater challenges confronting those scholars who have not yet visited
China and have only obtained information from scholarly literature—
or, worse, short media reports.
Indeed, as shown by the research on the historical development of the
Chinese intellectual property system, it remains difficult for scholars
studying this system to fully understand the politically driven or related
developments unless they have a good grasp of the Chinese political
landscape.348 For instance, without understanding the structure of the
346. WIPO Intellectual Property Laws and Treaties Database (WIPO Lex), WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en (last visited May 9, 2018).
347. See, e.g., GORDON C.K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA:
POLITICS OF PIRACY, TRADE AND PROTECTION 39–62 (2011) (utilizing the data from
official government statistical yearbooks); Brian J. Love et al., Patent Litigation in China:
Protecting Rights or the Local Economy?, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 723–25 (2016)
(utilizing the Chinese court records collected in the “China IP Litigation Analysis”
(CIELA) database created by the law firm Rouse); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We
Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
773, 790–809 (2011) (utilizing the data provided by the White Paper on the Intellectual
Property Rights Protection in China and the cases provided by the database Beida Fabao
launched by Peking University); Xie Huijia, Empirical Research on Criminal Copyright
Infringement in China, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 36, 36 n.2 (2018) (utilizing over
1500 cases provided by the database Beida Fabao).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 275–82 (discussing scholarship covering the
political developments concerning the Chinese intellectual property system). For
example, Martin Dimitrov highlighted the complexity concerning those Chinese
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Chinese government,349 the problem relating to partial decentralization,350
government agencies that have intellectual property enforcement portfolios:
[At the time of the book’s publication], only two bureaucracies with IPR
enforcement portfolios have a vertical (i.e., centralized) bureaucratic
structure, the GAC [General Administration of Customs] and the STMA [State
Tobacco Monopoly Administration]; both agencies serve as primary revenue
generators for the consolidated national budget: centralization allows the
central government to establish better control over the tax revenue it collects
from these agencies. The SAIC [State Administration for Industry and
Commerce], the AQSIQ [General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection, and Quarantine], and the SFDA [State Food and Drug
Administration] are partially centralized. Other bureaucracies with an IPR
enforcement portfolio are fully decentralized: the Ministry of Culture (MOC),
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), the
General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), the National
Copyright Administration of China (NCAC), and the MPS (known as the
Public Security Bureau or PSB at the local level). [SIPO], though formally
decentralized, functions in practice as a quasi-centralized bureaucracy, since
it only penetrates down to the provincial level, a structure that makes
monitoring easier than for bureaucracies with deeper reach.
DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 50.
349. See generally Li Mingde, The Process of Intellectual Property Law Reform in China, 8
QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 26 (2018) (providing an authoritative analysis of the various
processes that have been used to enact or amend Chinese intellectual property laws).
350. As Peter Corne explained,
Ideally, authorities are supposed to share power according to a system of dual rule
(shuangchang lingdao). Problems that arise are supposed to be resolved by the
unifying authority of the CCP at the same level, which normally has an office and
a deputy secretary in charge of the area in question, and which has jurisdiction
over it. In reality, however, there is no dual rule. There is rule by either tiao tiao
or kuai kuai authorities depending on their relative power and the issue at hand.
PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL
SYSTEM 87 (1997) (footnote omitted); see also DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 42 (noting
the complications created by “the principle of ‘one system of government offices, two
nameplates’ (yige jigou, liangkuai paizi)”); Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft”
Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA Q. 791 (2005)
(discussing the institutional cleavages and fragmentation in China that have made it
difficult for the government to centralize its regulatory bureaucracies). Likewise, Fred
Bergsten and his coauthors declared,
Many in the United States believe that China’s one-party system gives Beijing
total power and control over all levels of government. The image, perhaps left
over from the Maoist cult of personality era, of a single leader or core group of
leaders responsible for and in command of all aspects of Chinese society still
pervades the American imagination. This perception of absolute authority has led
US policymakers and industry groups to focus on securing top-down commitments
from Chinese leaders to resolve bilateral economic and other issues. That the
leaders sometimes do not fulfill these commitments endlessly frustrates the
Americans who have sought them, who view this as negligence on the part of
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the handling of budgets and personnel,351 and the complex conditions in
local economies,352 the analysis of the Chinese enforcement infrastructures
is at best superficial, if not completely off base.
The third challenge pertains to the “moving target” nature of
developments concerning the Chinese intellectual property system,
Chinese leaders, lack of political will, or even outright malfeasance.
Beijing’s ability to unilaterally impose its will throughout China is,
however, highly limited. For a variety of reasons . . . , China’s authoritarian
regime lacks the capacity to implement many of its decisions throughout the
polity, a limitation that has important implications for policymaking in
Beijing. The leadership has to gauge carefully what it can and cannot get away
with vis-à-vis local authorities; how much political capital will be required to
enact controversial policies at local levels; and how much discretion to allow
local authorities in policies set at the national level—recognizing that the
center has no capacity to enforce absolute obedience to its edicts. The policy
process can frequently result in vague national policy pronouncements that
look less like hard and fast rules than abstract guiding principles—
exhortations to local authorities to “do the right thing” that leave considerable
latitude for local recalcitrance. Even when Beijing issues more categorical
commands, local compliance is far from certain.
BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 302, at 75.
351. As Professor Mertha noted,
One part of the enforcement story is the degree to which a given enforcement
bureaucracy is independent of its “host,” or superior, bureaucracy . . . . [B]oth
the copyright and the patent administrative enforcement agencies become
increasingly absorbed in their superior bureaucracies the farther on goes down
China’s administrative rungs . . . . Bread-and-butter issues such as personnel and
budgetary matters are managed by these superior bureaucracies, making the
copyright and patent bureaucracies dependent on their “host” units.
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 15. Likewise, Daniel Chow observed,
Rivalries have developed among the various parallel government entities charged
with public enforcement against counterfeiting. The authority to combat
counterfeiting results in larger budgets and more staffing, power, and prestige.
Raids are also potential revenue generating activities because the authorities
confiscate cash, goods, machinery, and equipment, including cars, and then sell
the confiscated goods at public auctions. Fines imposed upon counterfeiters are
paid into government coffers and some administrative agencies give cash bonuses
to personnel who participate in successful raids. Government authorities also
routinely ask companies to reimburse the cost of lodging where travel is required,
the cost of hiring trucks to load and move confiscated goods, and the cost of
storing the goods if a private warehouse needs to be rented. Some government
authorities will also ask companies to pay case handling fees.
Chow, Counterfeiting, supra note 114, at 31 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 30–31
(discussing the importance of case fees and other payments to officials); DIMITROV, supra
note 90, at 211–12 (discussing case-handling fees (ban’an fei) and bribes (hongbao)).
352. See Chow, Commercial Piracy, supra note 114, at 218–20 (using the town of Yiwu
to illustrate the importance of counterfeiting activities to local economies).
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similar to the challenge of studying international intellectual property
normsetting through the ever-changing plurilateral intellectual property
negotiations, which have moved from ACTA to the TPP to the RCEP to
now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP).353 Since the adoption of modern Chinese
intellectual property laws in the 1980s and 1990s, the patent and trademark
laws have been revised three times, the copyright law twice, and the antiunfair competition law once. At the moment, China is already exploring
the Fourth Amendment to the Patent Law, while it is working hard to finish
revising copyright law for the third time. In August 2008, China also
introduced an anti-monopoly law,354 which has serious ramifications for the
protection and licensing of intellectual property rights.
The final challenge relates to the implicit bias that has creeped into
any discussion of the Chinese intellectual property system. As this Part
has noted earlier, many foreign researchers of intellectual property
laws and policies in China still have a rather limited understanding of
the country.355 As a result, their views have inevitably been colored by
353. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressiveagreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text [hereinafter CPTPP]. Although the United
States withdrew from the TPP Agreement in January 2017, the remaining eleven TPP
partners developed the CPTPP, a modified version of the original agreement. See CPTPP
vs.
TPP—The
Differences,
N.Z. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-undernegotiation/cptpp-2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained (last visited May 9, 2018)
(explaining the differences between the TPP and the CPTPP); see also CPTPP, supra,
annex (listing the provisions that have been suspended from the TPP Agreement).
354. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2008, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (China);
see also H. STEPHEN HARRIS JR. ET AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA (2011)
(providing a treatise-length analysis of the law); Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition
Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231 (2008)
(discussing this law and the related competition policy reforms); Thomas Pattloch,
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, in PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA, supra note 54, at 313
(discussing the various intellectual property issues raised by the Chinese Anti-Monopoly
Law); Xu Shiying, Intellectual Property Protection and Competition Law, in CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 54, at 323 (discussing issues
lying at the intersection of intellectual property and competition law in China).
355. As the late William Jones reminded us:
Chinese law is very easy to misunderstand. It is not at all certain that anyone—
Chinese or foreign—understands it. The reason for this is that when we think
about law, we think about a formal legal system of the western type. We look
at China and expect to find such things as a law of contracts, a bench and bar,
and all the other paraphernalia that we associate with law. At present, one can
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what they have read through scholarly literature, the mass media, or
other sources. While these sources are not always biased,356 the scholars’
lack of understanding has made it particularly difficult for them to
determine whether the views expressed by others are in line with the
reality.357 These challenges are the most daunting when exploring

find such institutions in China, but they are modern imports. Until recently,
they did not exist. What one found instead—and still finds—quite easily, are
a vast number of statements by China’s most prominent thinkers, notably
including Confucius, that show great hostility to what we think of as law.
William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in UNDERSTANDING
CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 7 (C. Stephen Hsu ed.,
2003); see also PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA: AMERICAN HISTORICAL
WRITING ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 198 (1984) (“All of us are to an extent prisoners
of our environments, trapped in one or another set of parochial concerns. And the
truth we retrieve is inevitably qualified by the intellectual and emotional
preoccupations each of us, through our vocabulary and concepts, brings to bear on
the study of the past.”); Nari Lee, Intellectual Property Law in China—from Legal
Transplant to Governance, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 5, 10 (“Researchers
working on the topic of Chinese law are . . . warned of the possibility that the concept
of law may be so different in China that an eager application of so-called functional
comparison would lead to an incorrect observation or conclusion.”); Stanley Lubman,
Methodological Problems in Studying Chinese Communist “Civil Law,” in CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE LAW, supra note 340, at 230, 230 (“[I]f we are to appreciate nuanced
differences between institutions in China and elsewhere, we must move from
presuppositions rooted in our own systems to others, more neutral.”); William P.
Alford, “Seek Truth from Facts”—Especially when They Are Unpleasant: America’s
Understanding of China’s Efforts at Law Reform, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 177, 184 (1990)
(discussing the impediments that have impaired American scholars from
understanding Chinese legal development).
356. See Yu, supra note 6, at 1127–29 (discussing the concern about the potential
exploitation of differences between China and the United States).
357. See COHEN, supra note 355, at 4 (arguing that most American historians ask the
wrong questions about China’s past); James Lilley, Trade and the Waking Giant—China,
Asia, and American Engagement, in BEYOND MFN: TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN
INTERESTS 36, 36 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994) (“Americans have
always had a propensity for misunderstanding China.”); MANN, supra note 89, at 373
(asserting that one of the greatest misperceptions of Washington in the 1990s is that
China does not understand American politics); WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF
CHINA: HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPER POWER 400–01 (1993)
(stating that misconceptions of China and Japan have always troubled American
relations with Asia because Americans do not know as much about Asia as they do
about Canada and Europe).
This lack of understanding can also go in the other direction. As the late Victor
Li recounted his experience accompanying the Chinese table tennis team during its
1972 U.S. tour,
The Chinese visit coincided with our Presidential election year in which
Senator Eugene McCarthy was entered in some of the primaries. Upon seeing
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highly polarized topics, such as those concerning whether the United
States should impose sanctions on China, file a WTO complaint, or
even initiate a trade war.358 Given the contentiousness of many debates
concerning the Chinese intellectual property system, implicit bias will
remain a continuing challenge for researchers in this area.
V.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Part I has identified five phases in which fairly distinct bodies of
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system have been
developed. Although new phases will appear as the system continues to
evolve, the conclusion of that Part has not discussed what phase, or phases,
will emerge after the fifth phase of indigenization and transformation.359
some of his campaign literature, one of my Chinese companions asked
whether Gene was related to Joe. I told him no.
He continued, “Wasn’t Eugene McCarthy purged in 1968?” No.
“What has he been doing the past several years?” At that point I began to
realize that we were heading toward a misunderstanding since I had to reply that
among other things, McCarthy had been teaching poetry at McAllister College.
“He was not purged, huh?” No.
“Then this was not a case of removing McCarthy on the left to balance
the removal of Lyndon Johnson on the right?”
LI, supra note 72, at 5.
358. See Martin Farrer, China Promises “Necessary Response” to US Tariffs as Trade War Fears
Grow, GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/08/
china-promises-necessary-response-to-us-tariffs-as-trade-war-fears-grow (“The prospect of a
trade war between China and the United States has increased after Beijing’s foreign
minister said it would make a ‘necessary response’ in the event of Donald Trump
introducing punitive tariffs on steel and aluminium imports.”); Trade Wars: A Lose-Lose
Deal, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2018 (noting the growing worries of a looming lose-lose
“trade war of attrition”); see also PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS: WHERE
THEY WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW THEY CAN BE WON (2007) (discussing the various
potential conflicts between China and the United States). See generally Daniel Chow,
China’s Coming Trade War with the United States, 81 UMKC L. REV. 257 (2012) (examining
the U.S.-China trade deficit and the major bilateral trade disputes that may arise in the
next four years).
359. As Phoebe Li surmised,
I name the [next] stage the “mass innovation” stage, whereby the development
agenda for a “xiaokang” society is a critical theme in striking a balance in
intellectual property monopolies. The primary goal for this nascent phase is
therefore not to blindly transplant foreign intellectual property infrastructure
but to conscientiously build a development-oriented intellectual property
institution that reflects local characteristics. A “mass innovation” patent
regime should be able to redress the disparities and to balance the interests of
big corporations with those of mass entrepreneurs. It should differentiate
certain fields of technologies for the purpose of safeguarding the public
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Indeed, it will be difficult to predict what the future will hold for not only
the Chinese intellectual property system, but also the international
intellectual property system. Despite the inherent difficulty in making
predictions, it will be useful to offer some brief observations on the
future directions of scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system. Although these observations are inevitably personal, they draw on
developments that have already begun in the area of Chinese legal
scholarship or intellectual property scholarship in general.
First, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system are
likely to pay greater attention to international intellectual property
developments involving China. Thus far, a growing number of
scholars have already explored the development of China’s free trade
agreements, the exclusion of China in both the ACTA and TPP
negotiations, and China’s active role in the RCEP negotiations.360 In
the future, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system
will pay even greater attention to the regional or international
intellectual property norms that China sought to create or shape. They
will also be highly interested in any new initiatives that China has
undertaken—an obvious example being the “one belt one road” or
belt-and-road initiative.361
Second, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system
will undertake more research on intra-country developments. While

interest and not be compromised by private patent monopolies. Joseph
Stiglitz elaborates on the idea that a development-oriented intellectual
property regime requires special consideration to ensure effective
competition, access to lifesaving medicines, the transfer of technology, and
protection of traditional knowledge and genetic resources.
Phoebe Li, Patents, Mass Innovation and the Xiaokang Society, 8 WIPO J. 97, 104 (2017)
(footnote omitted).
360. See supra text accompanying notes 288–95 (discussing the scholarship covering
these topics).
361. See generally Lee Jyh-an, The New Silk Road to Global IP Landscape, in LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 417 (Lutz-Christian Wolff & Chao Xi
eds., 2016) (analyzing China’s “one belt one road” initiative from the intellectual
property perspective and identifying its potential opportunities and challenges); Peter
K. Yu, Building a New International Intellectual Property Infrastructure Through China’s Beltand-Road Initiative, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the
development of a new international intellectual property infrastructure through China’s
“one belt one road” initiative); see also High Level “Belt and Road” Conference Urges Closer IP
Collaboration for Economic Growth, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (July 27, 2016),
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2016/news_0008.html
(reporting WIPO’s participation in the two-day High Level Conference on Intellectual
Property for Countries Along the “Belt and Road” in Beijing on July 21, 2016).
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intellectual property scholars will continue to explore issues that are
important to the country as a whole, they will conduct more research
on the country’s internal developments, thanks to the active
participation and growing support of provincial intellectual property
offices in China, the arrival of new regionally based developments, and
the increased volume of data concerning provinces, prefectures,
counties, townships, and villages. Such a shift from nation-based
analyses to finer-grained analyses will greatly enhance our
understanding of the Chinese intellectual property system.362 After all,
the wide divergences within China suggest the pointlessness of
analyzing China as if the country were homogenous.363 What is true
for one province often does not hold for many others.364
362. See Yu, supra note 6, at 1118–22 (noting the importance of developing a more
sophisticated understanding of provincial and local differences); see also Special
Provincial Review of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Request for
Public Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,969, 34,970 (June 16, 2006) (requesting public
comments “to spotlight strengths, weaknesses, and inconsistencies in and among
specific jurisdictions”); Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods:
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (written
testimony of Myron Brilliant, Vice President, East Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Washington, D.C.) (“[T]he root of China’s IP problem resides in the provinces. It
is . . . absolutely critical that we cultivate the support of the provincial/local officials,
as well as local industry, if IP enforcement is to be addressed in a truly meaningful
way.”); CHEUNG, supra note 347, at 39–62 (discussing Guangdong, Beijing, Zhejiang,
and Fujiang as “new ‘hot spots’ of counterfeiting”).
363. As I noted in a recent article,
Based on the 2016 figures on invention patents provided by the State
Intellectual Property Office of China, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Anhui
provinces—the provinces with the three largest volumes of applications—had
a total of 184,632, 155,581, and 95,963, respectively. Meanwhile, Yunnan, Jilin,
and Gansu provinces had a total of only 7,907, 7,537, and 6,114, respectively.
The latter figures were less than one-tenth of the figures in the more
developed provinces. If one includes provinces and autonomous regions with
fewer than 4,000 patent applications, such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia,
Ningxia, Qinghai, Hainan, and Tibet, the statistical contrasts between the two
groups will become even starker . . . .
Peter K. Yu, A Spatial Critique of Intellectual Property Law and Policy, 74 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 2045, 2093–94 (2017).
364. As I noted in an earlier article,
China is “a country of countries.” The country is large, complex, diverse, and
“sometimes internally contradictory.” The Chinese speak different languages,
enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and subscribe to
different historical and philosophical traditions. Conditions in Beijing are often
very different from those in Guangzhou, intellectual property strategies that are
effective in Shanghai are likely to fail in a village in Guizhou, and the trade
patterns found near the coasts are very different from those found inland.
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Third, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system will
inevitably focus more on developments in specialized areas. Indeed,
Chinese legal scholarship has already become more specialized today
than it was two decades ago. Gone are those books and articles
studying the overall Chinese legal system, which are common in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Appearing in their stead are books and articles
covering a specific body of law, or even some specific domestic legal
problems.365 While this type of scholarship enables foreign researchers
to actively engage their Chinese counterparts on specific laws, policies,
cases, and topics, the more specialized focus takes away opportunities
for scholars to identify larger trends and developments concerning the
Chinese intellectual property system.
Fourth, in the past decade, scholars in this area have begun to study
those spillover issues that do not fit squarely within the intellectual
property field. Section I.E already discusses the interrelationship
between intellectual property and indigenous innovation.366 In the early
to mid-1990s, especially during the U.S.-China negotiations, intellectual
property protection is often discussed alongside market access.367
Today, policymakers and scholars have devoted considerable attention
to intellectual property-conditioned government incentives—that is,
measures that the government has provided to promote creativity and
innovation.368 As the Chinese intellectual property system becomes

Yu, supra note 6, at 1118; see also Yu, supra note 94, at 173, 203–13 (discussing the wide
regional and sectoral disparities in China); Yu, supra note 93, at 36 (“The type of
intellectual property standards that work well for major cities (such as Beijing,
Shanghai and Guangzhou) may not work well for the countryside. Likewise, standards
that suit the prosperous coastal areas may be inappropriate for the poor rural west.”).
365. See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous
Marks Doctrine in China, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 57 (2015) (discussing the
trademark squatting problem in China); Benjamin Pi-Wei Liu, The Glocalization of
Patent Linkage in China, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 163 (providing an
interesting and in-depth discussion of patent linkage in China); Wu Weiguang, China’s
CMC system and Its Problems from the Copyright Law of 1990 to Its Third Amendment, in CHINA
AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 213 (outlining the defects of the system for the collective
management of copyright and related rights in China and its possible changes in the
forthcoming Third Amendment to the Copyright Law); Xie, supra note 347 (using
empirical research to identify the defects of criminal copyright infringement laws in
China and advancing solutions to address these defects).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 168–77 (discussing this interrelationship).
367. See ZHENG, supra note 54, at xxvi (“In the 1996 Sino-U.S. negotiations, what the
USTR really wanted was not the impossible short term elimination of pirate copies,
but access to the Chinese markets for its cultural products.”).
368. See generally ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-CONDITIONED GOVERNMENT
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more complex, researchers will devote more time and effort to
studying measures complementary to the intellectual property system.
Fifth, scholars in this area, especially those in China, will inevitably
devote attention, energy, and resources to the growing waves of
intellectual property problems that now arise in the developed world
and at the global level. We have already seen Chinese scholars
undertaking research on problems posed by the internet and the
digital revolution369—problems that are explored by non-Chinese
scholars and that will affect virtually any part of the world. Likewise,
research concerning Big Data, Internet of Things, blockchains, 3D
printing, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles,
nanotechnology, and synthetic biology can be classified as generic.
While it will still be instructive to explore whether these problems will
affect China to the same extent as they will affect other parts of the
world, there is no denying that much of the research in these emerging
areas is global in scope. In short, scholars in China may just be
conducting research on the same or highly similar topics as scholars in
other countries. As a result, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual
property system that we find in this area may just be a subset of the
overall body of scholarship—featuring Chinese perspectives or Chinabased examples, perhaps.
Finally, there has been an active and growing discussion of new
modes of innovation in the past decade. For instance, intellectual
property scholars have explored how we can develop incentives for
innovation outside the intellectual property system. Indeed, the socalled “IP without IP” literature has become increasingly important
and popular in Europe and the United States.370 Only time will tell

INCENTIVES (Dan Prud’homme & Song Hefa eds., 2016) (discussing these incentives).
369. For this body of literature, see generally Du Ying, Secondary Liability for
Trademark Infringement Online: Legislation and Judicial Decisions in China, 37 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 541 (2014); Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers’ Vicarious Liability Versus
Regulation of Copyright Infringement in China, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375; Wan
Yong, Safe Harbors from Copyright Infringement Liability in China, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 635 (2013); Wang Jie, Not All ISP Conduct Is Equally Active or Passive in Differing
Jurisdictions: Content Liability and Safe Harbour Immunity for Hosting ISPs in Chinese, EU,
and US Case Law, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 732 (2015); Xie Huijia, The Regulation of
Digital Rights Management in China, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 662
(2008); Xue, supra note 177; Xue Hong, Les Fleurs du Mal: A Critique of the Legal
Transplant in Chinese Internet Copyright Protection, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 168
(2007); Zhu Dong, Beyond Safe Harbour: Secondary Trademark Liability of Online Auction
Sites in China, 7 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 265 (2017).
370. As Amy Kapczynski recently observed,
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whether scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system will
also proceed in the same direction. While Chinese scholars have often
embraced research topics that are considered cutting-edge abroad—
especially in Europe or the United States—the ongoing academic and
policy discussions in China seem to have focused on the potential
benefits and the much-needed calibration of the intellectual property
system. Due to the structure of Chinese academic institutions, the
funding support for research projects, and the country’s continued
large-scale piracy and counterfeiting problems, Chinese academe
seems to have not yet experienced the same divide between intellectual
property attorneys and policymakers on the one hand and intellectual
property scholars on the other.371 While the former advocate a
maximalist view of intellectual property protection, the latter prefer
the opposite. In China, if the scholarship focuses on the limitations
and exceptions in the intellectual property system, those limitations
IP scholarship has for decades been centered on a simple account: IP is
necessary to achieve the information production that we as a society desire.
But over the last few years, the field has come to recognize that IP as an
approach has both significant costs and substantial limits. In response, an
important new scholarly literature on “intellectual production without
intellectual property,” or “IP without IP” has emerged.
Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in Influenza, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1542–43 (2017) (footnotes omitted). For scholarship in this
area, see generally KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY:
HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting
Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123
(Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of
Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
1121 (2007); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787
(2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006).
371. See James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents
Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 107–
09 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (describing the “bipolar disorders of intellectual property
policy”); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2004) (expressing concern “that the increasingly binary tenor
of current intellectual property debates . . . obscures other important interests, options,
critiques, and claims for justice that are embedded in many new claims for property
rights”); Maggie Wittlin et al., What Causes Polarization on IP Policy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (investigating the source of polarization on intellectual property
debates); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1, 8–12 (discussing the bipolar intellectual property debate).
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and exceptions tend to be justified based on the needs for either
development or social equality, as opposed to new “IP without IP”
innovation models.372
CONCLUSION
In examining the past half-century of scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system, this study has shown how historical
developments have heavily influenced scholarship in this area—both
in phases and through isolated major incidents. This study has also
shown that scholarship in this area has undergone an interdisciplinary
turn. As a result, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property
system has become richer, more diverse, and more sophisticated.
While it is impossible to cover all scholarship on the Chinese
intellectual property system in the past fifty years, this Article seeks to
capture the changing developments in the field. It has also devoted
greater coverage to those works that were published before the mid1990s and in non-legal disciplines.373 After all, those works tend to be

372. Interestingly, some of the rare scholarship discussing China from the “IP
without IP” angle actually came from Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, the two
leading scholars in “IP without IP” literature. See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, Let Them Eat Fake Cake: The Rational Weakness of China’s Anti-Counterfeiting
Policy, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
263 (Sun Haochen et al. eds., 2015) (examining China’s knockoff economy and
explaining why legitimate branded luxury goods and counterfeits can coexist in the
country); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It till You Make It: The Good News
About China’s Knockoff Economy, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2013, at 25, 30 (noting the
need to “keep Chinese copying in perspective and recognize its upsides along with its
costs”). But see Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles: Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just
Survive in China’s High-Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467 (2014) (offering
a critical response to this line of scholarship).
373. Many articles and book chapters cited in this Article were published in the
United States, due to their wide availability on HeinOnline, LexisNexis, and Westlaw
and through free online repositories. Their emphases could be quite different from
those found in publications from other parts of the world. See Shi & Weatherley, supra
note 118, at 448–63 (noting the differences between the China-EU intellectual
property debate and the China-U.S. debate). Nevertheless, as the sources cited in this
Article have shown, a growing number of non-U.S. scholars have published their works
on the Chinese intellectual property system in U.S. journals. Many non-U.S.
publications have also been included in HeinOnline, LexisNexis, or Westlaw. Notable
European intellectual property journals that immediately come to mind are the
European Intellectual Property Review, the International Review of Intellectual Property and
Competition Law (formerly the International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright
Law), and the Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property. In addition, while I struggled
to locate journal articles published outside the United States, due to constraints
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less familiar to scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property
system, especially those in the legal discipline.
Today, China is at a crossroads concerning what type of intellectual
property law and policy it should adopt. Owing to the changing
political environment in the United States and the now significantly
different expectations of China at the international level,374 the U.S.China intellectual property relations are also at a crossroads. The wide
range of scholarship discussed in this Article will no doubt provide
useful insights into the different ways to address challenges and
opportunities that are slowly emerging at these crossroads. It is my
hope that the systematic analysis provided in this Article will make it
easier for us to locate the relevant scholarship.

imposed by U.S. library collections and a lack of ready online access, I managed to
locate many books and book chapters published in English outside the United States.
374. These exceptions are due in large part to the growing strength of China’s
aggregate economy. Although most commentators have placed China as the world’s
second largest economy, some suggested that China might already have been the
largest based on select metrics. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Chinese Century, VANITY FAIR
(Jan.
2015),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largesteconomy (“2014 was the last year in which the United States could claim to be the
world’s largest economic power. China enters 2015 in the top position, where it will
likely remain for a very long time, if not forever.”).

